that arises from its unusual language or external circumstances. "The presumption is that the purpose of the contract will be realized if the language of the contract is given the usual meaning known to it in the language used by the parties. The burden is on the party claiming special significance" (Judgment inAdditional Hearing 32/84[40], supra, at p. 274); "It is presumed that the ordinary meaning of the language chosen by the parties in the contract is intended to reflect what was agreed between them, and the fulfillment of the agreement between the parties is also the purpose of the contract" (Justice Or Other Municipality Applications 779/89 [46], supra, at p. Thus, it is not a two-stage test in which the clear or unclear language of the contract serves as an evidentiary melting point, but rather a one-stage test, in which there is a constant movement from the language of the contract to its external circumstances, while creating a rebuttable presumption that the purpose of the contract is that which arises from the ordinary language of the contract. This presumption can be contradicted by the totality of the circumstances.
- Second, an examination of judgments that I myself have written in the past shows that I, too, have sometimes needed formulations that are reminiscent of the two-stage theory. Thus, for example, I wrote in one of the parashots:
"Indeed, just as a law is interpreted according to the 'intentions' of the legislator – the creator of the law, so too a contract is interpreted according to the 'intentions' of the parties – the creators of the contract. The intentions of the parties can be learned from any reliable source. The most reliable source, and therefore first and foremost, is the contract itself. But he is not the only source. The court may refer to the 'circumstances', i.e., where the contract itself does not indicate the intention of the parties, to refer to the 'circumstances', i.e., to the factual framework in which the contract was concluded. To be precise: in all these situations, the judge is confronted with a contract, that is, before a "text" (explicit or implicit, written or oral), and the question before him is, what is the significance that should be given to the contract, and what is the scope of its deployment. The court discusses this meaning according to 'the intentions of the parties,' which it learns from the contract itself and from the circumstances" (Ata [1], supra, at p. 304).