And an impressive expression of this approach was given by my colleague, Justice D. Levin, in one of the cases, when he noted:
"There is no dispute that the aforesaid method of interpretation of the writing, according to the literal, simple and reasonable meaning of the words, is a convenient and good starting point for understanding its meaning, for it is natural and only understandable that the parties to the engagement that is the subject of the writing sought to give expression to their true intentions and to the extent of the agreements between them in the words they chose in the process of drafting...
However... The set of rules is much broader, and the overall wording and the words chosen to express the intention of the communicators must be addressed from a comprehensive and in-depth perspective, which penetrates the purpose of the legislation or the letter of agreement and the purpose that they sought to achieve. Therefore, we find quite a few exceptions to the initial and simplistic rule... It will become clear that in the appropriate case, it is permissible and appropriate to give the letter a liberal interpretation, even if it ostensibly stands in contradiction to the explicit words, as written in the letter of policy. This is in order to reach the same logical and true meaning to which the contractors intended in the letter of policy, and thus, of course, when a comprehensive reading of the text leads us to the conclusion that the words in their literal sense do not represent the intention of the text" (Civil Appeal 631/83 [15], at p. 572).
Sometimes this idea is expressed in halakha, that it is permissible to deviate from the language of the contract if its interpretation of its language leads to an absurd result (see High Court of Justice 932/91 Central Pension Fund of Histadrut Employees in Tax Appeal v. National Labor Court et al. [59], at p. 436); see also: Civil Appeal 46/74[10], at p. 482; Civil Appeal 72/78 Israel Lands Administration v. Raab [60], at p. 789). The word "absurd" is vague. It is not defined. What seems absurd to one seems to the other to be a proper arrangement. Indeed, it is customary in case law to accompany speech "absurd" with other expressions such as inconsistency, inconsistency (ecneinevnocni), and the like expressions that accompany "absurdity" (see the classic expression in 1234, at[74] (1857) Grey v. Pearson; See also High Court of Justice 305/82, 353 Mor et al. v. District Planning and Building Committee, Central District et al.; A. Aharonov et al. v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Ra'anana, et al. [61], at p. 148). In my opinion, everything that is hidden behind these and other expressions is a (literal) understanding that is inconsistent with the purpose of