"A contract is an integrative framework. Its various parts are intertwined and intertwined. Its different organs influence each other" (Judgment in the Ata Case [1], at p. 305).
Therefore, the interpreter may read into a provision in the contract additional words that are not found in it, or detract from it words found in it, in order to give the provision of the contract an understanding that realizes the purpose of the contract as a single unit, which seeks to realize a known purpose. Indeed, it seems that I will not be wrong if I say that if the placement of clause 6(h)(3) of the programme contract was the same as clause 6(h)(2) of the programme contract, after the existing clause 6(g), my colleague would have had no difficulty in determining that there is room for a change in the language of the clause, in such a way that it would be interpreted as applying to a delay in execution. In my opinion, the same result should be reached within the framework of the existing location of the section.
- Indeed, an interpretation (in the broad sense) must be adopted with regard to the interpretation of section 6(h)(3).
The interpretation given to this provision according to its language misses the purpose underlying the contract. He denies the state a central sanction that the contract sought to grant it and which is intended to ensure its main goal
– the rapid construction of apartments for immigrants in development areas and their offering for sale on the free market. The literal interpretation of the provision of section 6(h)(3) entails two anomalies: first, it creates duplication as to the realization of the undertaking after the end of the performance period. As we have seen, this matter is covered (with respect to all types of apartments) in subsection (2). The literal meaning of subsection (3) leads to the fact that a conflicting arrangement in the same matter, with respect to apartments in development areas, is found in subsection (3). There is also no logical explanation for the gradual difference between the two types of apartments. In terms of the structure of the contract, it would have been appropriate – according to the interpretation given to subsection (3) by Justice Matza – to precede the provision of subsection (3) to the provision of subsection (2), since according to its content it applies for realization after the end of the performance period, whereas the provision of subsection (2) applies in respect of realization after eighteen months. However, it is natural to attach an exercise after the execution period to a provision of subsection (1) that deals with similar matter. Second, and this is the main thing, a literal interpretation of the provision of clause 6(h)(3) leads to the fact that the basic purpose of the contract is impaired. While the "benefit side" of the contract applies to the full extent of the two types of apartments, the "sanction side" is interrupted, and it applies only to one type of apartment. The internal nourishment of the contract is collapsing. Its internal structure failed. The contract cart loses one of its four wheels. In these circumstances, it is legitimate for the judge – as my colleague, Justice D. Levin did – not to read subsection (3) literally. For this purpose, the judge is permitted to change the language of the clause, in order to realize the (business) purpose underlying the contract.