"...The provision of section 39 of the Contracts Law (General Part) is a multifaceted 'royal' provision. Sometimes it imposes duties that are not explicitly mentioned in the contract between the parties..." (Judgment 2High Court of Justice 1683/93 Yavin Plast in Tax Appeal et al. v. The National Labor Court in Jerusalem et al. [32], at p. 708).
In this framework, and as one of its aspects, the principle of good faith is perceived as a missing complement to the contract. In addition to these three (interpretive) aspects, the principle of good faith has additional effects on the life of the contract (see jurisdictional discretion under the new civil code, a. S. Hartkamp 554, 551(1992) . Am. J. Comp. L 40"of the netherlands). Thus, for example, it has the power to bring about a change in the
explicit language of the contract, "while changing the contractual obligation itself" (the Ata case [1], at p. 300) or to limit the use of a contractual right. It is appropriate to distinguish carefully between these various consequences – some of which are of a dispositive nature and some of which are of a cogent nature of the principle of good faith. A good example of a proper distinction between the various aspects of the principle of good faith is the evaluation on which my colleague, Justice Matza (Civil Appeal 479/89 [8], supra). My colleague noted in the same case that a contract can be evaluated, by virtue of the principle of good faith, by way of interpretation (in the narrow sense). This is how this was done in Parashat Ata [1]. The rules of evaluation can be shaped according to the principle of good faith as a principle of complementary interpretation (filling in the gaps – interpretation in the broad sense). This is how it was done in other municipal applications 479/89 [8] supra. An appraisal may occur by virtue of the principle of good faith as an "external" principle to the contract, lacking an interpretive nature, but expressing its cogent power to change the content of the contract.
- Second, the principle of good faith, according to which the court fills in a deficiency in the contract, fulfills the role that in the past implicit stipulations played in the life of the contract. This matter arose in one of the cases, where Justice H. Cohen noted:
"...Since the entry into force of the Sale Law, 5728-1968, and of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, I am afraid that we no longer call implied terms into contracts – or at least we no longer call them implied terms" (Civil Appeal 627/78 Weizmann v. Abramson et al. [67], at p. 298).