program contract is that set forth in clause 6(h)(3), i.e., a deduction from the demand price at the rate of 5% for each month of delay in execution. Thus, a contractual symmetry is created between a delay in the fulfillment of the demand and a delay in the execution of the construction. In both cases, a certain percentage of the price of the apartment is reduced; In both cases, the percentage reduction in the desired areas is 2%; In both cases, the percentage of reduction in the development areas is 5%. Add the missing wheel to the contractual cart. She can go on her way.
- Regarding the completion of a deficiency in the program contract, I would like to make two comments: first, this construction is only an alternative as far as I am concerned. The main solution, which seems to me to be appropriate, is the one that interprets clause 6(h)(3) of the program contract as a legal source for a (civil) sanction for delay in the execution of construction in the development areas. This interpretation is made by changing the language of the contract (see paragraph 26 above), in such a way that the provision of clause 6(h)(3) in which it will apply (directly) to delay in performance. I brought the construction of filling in the gap, but in order to point out that even according to the approach of my colleague, Justice Matza, the state's position must be accepted. I am aware that the two solutions (interpretation and filling in the gaps) – although they lead to the same conclusion in the case before us – may lead to different results in other situations. Thus, for example, if the contractor is late in realizing the undertaking in development zones, the question is whether the reduction will be of 5% for each month following the execution period (as my colleague, Justice Matza) or of 2% for each month following the passage of 18 months from the end of the execution period (as my colleague, Justice D. Levin, viewed, and as my own). Second, the construction of filling in the blanks was not raised in the District Court. It was also not argued before us. As for myself, it seems to me that it should be seen only as an aspect of an interpretive examination (in the broad sense) that was discussed in both instances. However, due to the lack of argument in this matter and in light of the difference between a "regular" interpretation and a "supplementary interpretation", I do not wish to base the judgment on this construction. As stated, it comes only to point out that even according to the basic interpretive assumptions (in the narrow sense) of my colleague, Justice Matza, the appeal should be accepted.
For these reasons, I joined the reasoning of my colleague, Justice D. Levin, and the conclusion he reached, that the appeal should be accepted.