Moreover, acceptance of the interpretation proposed by the State, as to the case in which the deduction to which section 6(h)(3) would apply, would have rendered the license of the section meaningless. As is evident from what is stated in the license, the matter of the clause is "In the case of the realization of a purchase undertaking ... after the end of the execution period." If it were true that the clause regulates cases in which the contractor was late in completing the execution, there would be no logic in limiting the reduction from the calculated price to be paid to him only in the event that he presented the state with the demand to fulfill the undertaking after the end of the execution period. In other words, if the deduction from the calculated price, which is discussed in this section, is directed at a case of delay in completing the execution, what is the significance of the question of when the demand for realization was submitted by the contractor? The purpose of the contract in the light of its language.12 Confirmation of the District Court's view regarding the simplicity of its language and the clarity of the intention of section 6(h)(3), exempts me from the need to deal with the circumstances of the conclusion of the program contract, as a separate source of interpretation. In this regard, the rule dictated in section 25(a) of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, applies, which states that
"a contract shall be interpreted according to the intentions of the parties, as it is implied in the contract, and to the extent that it is not implied by it, from the circumstances."
"The 'intentions' of the parties is the purpose or purpose that the parties had in mind when concluding the contract" (Justice Barak, Other Municipal Applications 554/83 "Ata" Textile Company in a Tax Appeal v. Estate of the late Zolotulov Yitzhak et al. (hereinafter: the Ata case [1]), at p. 305). A well-established rule is that a contract whose language is clear to the extent that it leaves no room for doubt as to its intention, the opinion of the parties must be assessed from within it, and for this purpose the circumstances of its conclusion should not be relied upon (see: the words of Justice Barak in the Ata case [1], at p. 304, between the letters of the margins 3-4; the words of Deputy President Ben-Porat, Other Municipality Applications 450/82, 454/84 State of Israel v. Hiram Landau Earthworks, Roads and Development in a Tax Appeal [2], at pp. 667-668, and other municipal motions 191/85 State of Israel et al. v. Neve Shuster Company in Tax Appeal et al. [3], at p. 579; and more recently: Civil Appeal 5795/90 Skelly v. Doran in Tax Appeal et al. (hereinafter – the Skelly case [4]), the words of Justice S. Levin at p. 830 opposite footnote E). To be precise: the meaning of this rule is not that clear language prevails over a clear purpose that contradicts the language, but rather that it means that clear language testifies to the intentions of the communicators and the purpose of their engagement. And if the language is clear, then the purpose is also known, and the court no longer turns to examining the intentions of the communicators, perhaps in secret they were aiming for another purpose, which they did not express. As Justice Cheshin said in the Skelly case [4], at p. 817: