(See Civil Appeals Authority 7002/17 Anonymous v. Anonymous (published in Nevo, May 21, 2018); Civil Appeal 6332/15 Salah v. Adawi (published in Nevo, November 23, 2017))) (and Civil Appeal 3518/16 Fogel v. Municipality of Tiberias (published in Nevo, October 25, 2018)).
- Emphasized in Parashat Anonymous above, inter alia, that "...The presumption relates to the manner in which the factual occurrence is proved, and not to the normative judgment of a certain behavior as negligence.". And later on:
We emphasized the rule that the relevant date for examining the lack of knowledge is the date of the legal hearing and not the date of the accident. This rule teaches that from a material standpoint, the rule set forth in section 41 is intended to be applied in cases of objective evidentiary ambiguity that does not necessarily depend on the knowledge of the injured party at the time of the accident. [....] A review of the proposed Property Law Law strengthens the conclusion that the first condition for the application of the rule focuses on objective ambiguity and not on the question of whether the injured party knew "in real time" what harmed him. However, we emphasized that when the plaintiff can bring evidence and he does not do so, the first condition will not apply, and in any case the rule "it testifies to itself" will not apply (ibid., paragraph 28).
- The first condition for the application of the rule in question requires the plaintiff's lack of knowledge and inability to know the circumstances of causing the damage. The applicants did not claim anything and did not provide real evidence in this context, and it is doubtful in my opinion whether this condition is fulfilled in any way.
- In the Kishon case above (Civil Appeal 6102/13), it was held with respect to the transfer of the burden due to "something dangerous" or "the thing speaks for it", inter alia, in light of the provision of section 38 of the Ordinance quoted, that:
It was argued that the factories had discharged hazardous materials into the Kishon River, and therefore the burden is on the respondents to prove that there is no causal connection between their fault and the damage.