Moreover, it seems that the prevailing approach today in the case law of this Court is that where there is no violation of the "hard core" of autonomy, and no real consequential damage has been caused, i.e., when the "infringement of autonomy" is attributed to the denial of the power of choice only, and the negative feelings that accompany it are: marginal, weak in their intensity, and insignificant (and such are the feelings felt by a customer who did not actually consume the product, In a case such as the one before us) – there is no place to recognize the "infringement of autonomy" that originates in the denial of the consumer's power of choice as compensable damage (see: the Salomon case, in the opinion of my colleague, Justices Y. Amit and A. Shoham, against the dissenting opinion of my colleague, Justice A. Arbel) (ibid., para . 44).
- Justice (as he was then called) Justice Yitzhak Amit in his article "The Wild Horse of the Infringement of Autonomy" (Strasberg-Cohen book) writes, among other things:
...At the end of the day, the violation of autonomy is expressed in negative feelings, and therefore it is a form of non-pecuniary damage, sometimes pure non-pecuniary damage. Therefore, there is no reason to give excessive weight to the value of autonomy in situations that are not at the core of the injury or the damage involved is relatively small compared to other damages, such as actual bodily injury. It is appropriate to dedicate the institution of infringement of autonomy to cases in which the damage is residual and compensation cannot be awarded in any other way, or to significant cases in which the core of autonomy has been violated and this infringement is the main or only damage caused (ibid., p. 494).
- Flint and Vinitsky write on this subject in their book, among other things:
...The halakha today – and in our eyes rightly – is that compensation for an infringement of autonomy can only be given to someone who has actually suffered negative emotions, such as "anger, frustration, insult, disgust, shock, anguish, and the like." Two conclusions are drawn from this rule: first, that it is impossible to award compensation for infringement of autonomy alongside compensation for mental anguish and the like, because compensation for the infringement of autonomy is in fact compensation for the mental anguish caused to the consumer as a result of the injury; The second is that according to the Stendel rule, a mechanism should be introduced that will enable the detection of group members who have been harmed and have actually felt negative emotions.