And later on -
The conclusion is that Israeli law has not yet recognized the head of damage of putting the person at risk only, in the absence of proven damage on its side
[....]
Indeed, there are those who maintain that it is precisely in cases of mass exposure torts, in which the injured parties do not suspect that their damage, or part of their damage, stems from the tort, that recognition of the head of damage of creating a risk is an appropriate solution (Porat and Stein, at pp. 113-114; Porat, Creating Risk, at p. 619; Boaz Schnur, Environmental Torts Claims 377-387 (2011) (hereinafter: Schnur, Environmental Claims)). However, given that the Class Actions Law as currently drafted requires proof of damage, it is not possible to allow the filing of a class action on top of this damage (ibid., paragraph 22)
(See also: Chevron Case, paragraph 69; Yakubowitz Case, paragraph 96, paragraph) [and also: Respondents' summaries at paragraphs 378-385].
- From what is presented in detail above, it appears that the applicants have not been able to prove, each with respect to his place of residence in the Bay area, and in general, that the quality of the ambient air is poor and dangerous. The Applicants did not present evidence that contradicted the expert evidence on behalf of the Respondents and stated in the testimony of Prof. Rennert and stated in his opinion.
- The obvious conclusion is that the court did not lay an appropriate evidentiary basis (and even for this stage of the hearing) that the applicants and the group were exposed to environmental air pollution of hazardous values, and that the only source of emissions from the respondents' factories was the applicants. Hence, the applicants have not been able to prove that they or any of the members of the class have suffered any "damage" – "real consequential damage" (as stated by the court in Other Municipality Applications 1326/07 Hammer v. Amit (Nevo, May 28, 2012), para. 72) – which establishes grounds for compensation for infringement of autonomy.
637. Nor did the applicants provide any proof of anxieties or negative feelings among the residents of Haifa Bay due to the violation of freedom of choice or the denial of information and non-disclosure.
- I also accept the words of the court in the Chevron case, as a matter of prudent policy, and balance that:
Accepting the Applicant's position and imposing liability on the Respondent for damage that originated solely with knowledge of a possible concern is not a desirable legal rule from a normative point of view, inter alia, because such a rule will cause excessive deterrence of players in the energy market and will lead to a chilling effect, as is desirable in our case. In fact, such a legal rule will lead to the expansion of the cause of action until it applies to the mere knowledge that pollution has occurred and without denying the individual's right to choose. According to the Applicant's approach, the knowledge in itself may entitle the residents of the beach who live near the site of the incident as well as the environmental activists who live in another site, since the knowledge is sufficient to establish the foundations of the cause or the head of the damage due to the infringement of autonomy. This position contradicts both the purpose of effective deterrence set forth in section 1 of the Law and the objectives of tort law. These seek to bring about optimal deterrence and not maximum deterrence of harm (Ariel Porat, "The Law of Torts," The Economic Approach to Law 273 (Uriel Procation, ed., 2012) (ibid., para. 64 in the middle) [see also: the words of Judge Y. Amit (as he was then called) in the Ivy case , supra, para. 11].
- On the verge of concluding on this issue, I will add a "cool" note to the words of the court in the Shemen case above, which relate to the case here and its circumstances, according to which "...Recently, we have witnessed in almost every class action proceeding, not only in environmental matters, the claim of infringement of autonomy. It seems that in this area as well, Justice Amit's words at the end of his aforementioned article, in which he said that "it seems that the infringement of autonomy is the new wild horse of the law, and perhaps, as the poet says, the time has come to 'stretch the pull and take back a little'" (ibid., section 69).
Deception, non-disclosure
- The applicants argued in section 50f of the application for approval, inter alia, "misleading, concealing information and breaching the duty of disclosure as required in accordance with sections 15(a), 27 of the Clean Air Law and in accordance with sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the Environmental Protection Law (Emissions and Transfers to the Environment – Reporting and Registration Obligations) 5772-2012" (ibid., at page 12).
- Section 15(a) of the Clean Air Law states that: "An emission permit holder, an emission source listed in the Fourth Addendum or an emission source that is subject to a license under the Business Licensing Law shall, in accordance with the conditions set out in the emission permit, carry out emission monitoring and sampling in accordance with the provisions under section 41 or the terms of the business license or temporary permit under the Business Licensing Law, as the case may be, emission monitoring and sampling for the purpose of measuring pollutant emissions from the emission source. as well as air monitoring as stated in section 7(d); The monitoring or sampling data shall be provided to the Commissioner as well as to the Association of Cities or to an environmental unit as stated in Section 18(d), all in a manner and at such times as the Commissioner may order."
- We would like to clarify that in accordance with Section 2 of the aforementioned Law: "'The Commissioner' – the Head of the Air Quality Division in the Ministry or an employee of the Ministry to whom he is subordinate, professionally or administratively, whom the Minister, on the recommendation of the Head of the Division, has authorized in all or part of the provisions under this Law."
- The duty imposed on the factories defined in this section is towards the 'Commissioner' and towards the Association of Cities. It is not clear to what non-disclosure or deception the Applicants are referring to, which, to the extent that it ostensibly exists, has not been proven by them in any case.
- Section 27 of the Clean Air Law states in subsection (a) that:
The holder of an emission permit shall not, by himself or through another, make a change in the source of the emission permit or the manner in which it is operated, including raw materials used in the emission source, which is capable of significantly changing the emission emission of pollutants from the emission source compared to the emission values or which constitutes a significant deviation from other restrictions set out in the emission permit, and shall not add or expand a facility at the source of emissions. which is not an addition as stated in subsection (c) (in this law – a significant change in operation), except after receiving the written approval of the Director-General; the Director-General may approve the application, refuse a visa or approve it under conditions, as he may direct.
- Here, too, the respondents' action is vis-à-vis the Commissioner and their duty to do what is required in the event of a 'significant change of operation' is vis-à-vis him. It is not clear what non-disclosure or deception the applicants are referring to, what change of operation took place and when. Insofar as there is prima facie, deception or non-disclosure, in any case they have not been proven by the applicants, and the same applies even in relation to subsections (b) and (c), which have nothing in them, which have been proven that the respondents have defected or violated them.
- The aforementioned Environmental Protection (Emissions) Law stipulates, inter alia, that a factory owner shall submit to the Registrar, once a year, no later than March 31 of that year, a report on the plant as detailed below, for the fiscal year preceding the reporting date. A list of 8 topic details, such as: the amount of each pollutant emitted to each of the environmental components in the plant; a list of whether the emission of a pollutant or the transfer of a pollutant in the wastewater, in whole or in part, is the result of a malfunction, and the water consumption and energy consumption of the plant.
Section 3(c) states that "an annual report shall be prepared and submitted in the format instructed by the Registrar, and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit from the factory owner, in which he declares that the information included in the annual report is true and complete, and in the case of a factory owner who is a corporation, the annual report shall be accompanied by an affidavit from the General Manager."