According to the procedure, this determination will be made on the basis of one of five indications, which include, in addition to certain results of professional tests performed to identify the odor, the accumulation of "civil" reports of odor identification. The procedure requires, in this context, that "there be at least three odor complaints from different parties (different housing units, different streets, etc.) in the same area, received within 24 hours, or at least ten such complaints, received over a period of 30 days, which reported an odor hazard of a sense intensity of degree 4 or higher, which is a strong odor..." (Section 4.1 of the procedure, where the required reporting method is also detailed). It follows that at least according to the procedure, the identification of an odor hazard can be based on a backlog of complaints, but only under the specific conditions mentioned above, and within the framework of an orderly examination conducted by a professional, which relates to the environmental conditions and the various characteristics of the odor.
This is the place to note that, in contrast to the provisions of the procedure for defining odor hazards, past case law has recognized that proving the existence of an odor hazard does not necessarily require a professional opinion on the matter (see Oppenheimer, at p. 322; Moses, at para. 15; Class Action (Hai District) 11781-05-09 Lahat v. Carmel Chemicals Ltd., paragraphs 28-30 (December 2, 2010) (the Honorable Judge Yigal Grill)). Whether or not we follow this approach (to another position, according to which such proof requires an expert opinion, see: Flint and Vinitsky, at pp. 498-503), when it is clear that the procedure for defining odor hazards does not limit the court's discretion on the issue (and with regard to this broad discretion, see Criminal Appeal 151/84 Israel Electric Corporation in Tax Appeal v. Prshet, IsrSC 39(3) 1, 5-6 (1985) (hereinafter: the Prasht case)), there is no room to "neglect" the evidentiary basis necessary to prove such a hazard. A central reason for this, which is sufficient for the purpose of the present discussion, is the objective nature of the odor hazard, which is expressed in the requirement that it be "strong or unreasonable" (section 3 of the Prevention of Hazards Law; and this despite the somewhat subjective conclusion of this section; and see in this context my judgment in the Mozes case, at paragraph 15). When complaints by bystanders are at the center of the discussion, for example, avoiding that "neglect" can be expressed, inter alia, in a clarification that will determine the number of complaints, the place of the passersby in relation to the location of the alleged hazard, the strength of the odor reported in the complaints, the evidentiary anchoring of the complaints themselves and the court's impression of the characteristics of the alleged hazard in relation to the complaints presented to it (and compare, in this regard, the provisions of the procedure presented above) [ibid., at length, paragraphs 49-52].