This argument of the defendants did indeed arise from the testimonies of Mr. Rachmin and Mr. David (see pages 60-61 of the transcript of the hearing of September 10, 2025, and in particular page 61, lines 1-13; and also pages 75-77, and especially page 77, lines 30-32). However, the plaintiffs rightly claimed that it was brought up surprisingly, and during the testimony of the two in the main interrogation on behalf of the defendants, so that the plaintiffs could not prepare for it and try to challenge it by taking preliminary proceedings and submitting evidence. In paragraphs 35-36 of the statement of claim, the plaintiffs explicitly referred to the date of termination of the skeleton as the relevant date for the first phase of the third part of the loan (albeit in a different context). Despite this, the defendants did not claim that this was not the relevant date: neither in the statement of defense, nor in the affidavit of Boaz Barzili on behalf of the lenders.[14] This is when we are dealing with a factual claim, which relates to a late agreement that changes the written agreement in the second agreement, which was expected to be raised in advance.
In the framework of the summaries, the defendants' counsel did not have a proper explanation for this procedural conduct, and for the argument that this was a clear "widening of the front" (see the defendants' summaries on page 28 of the transcript of the hearing of September 18, 2025, lines 22-35). Therefore, even though there may be substance to the defendants' argument on its merits, it cannot be heard. Allowing the defendants to raise the claim at this stage harms the plaintiffs, who, as stated, were not allowed to prepare in advance to deal with it, and may incentivize conduct that will ultimately harm procedural efficiency, procedural fairness, and the ability to clarify the facts (see, for example: Civil Appeal Authority 8600/12 Clalit Health Services v. Mishta, paragraph 7 (February 3, 2013)). In any case, there is no need to discuss On the question of whether the board was authorized to agree on behalf of the class members to a change The date of charging interest by virtue of The second agreement (in this regard, compare the question of the authority to sign a waiver of claims, which will be discussed in the paragraph 104 onwards Below).
- An alternative argument raised by the defendants is that taking into account that the delay in completing the skeleton stemmed from the existence of a stop-work order, for the purpose of adding the additional interest, "the date on which the skeleton is mostly finished...", so that "the completion of the skeleton is also 39.2", and not only 40% of the work as is customary (the defendants' summaries on page 29 of the transcript of the hearing of September 18, 2025, lines 25-27).
I do not believe that the argument should be accepted. Even if it is possible to understand the difficulty created by the cessation of work order from the perspective of the parties, in my opinion the agreement should not be called what was not stated in it, i.e., that the "termination of the skeleton" applies even when the skeleton has not ended. This matter also requires addressing the question of who is at risk for the issuance of the cease and desist order, for which no evidence was submitted (and it should be remembered that the defendants chose not to submit an affidavit on behalf of the contractor in advance). Moreover, accepting the defendants' argument will raise the question of when the situation was close enough to the end The skeleton So it could be seen as a real end Asher He refrained only because of the order. This question requires the submission of evidence and the hearing of arguments, and in any case it will create uncertainty regarding the clear agreement in the agreement.
- The second argument raised by the defendants is directed at the rate of arrears interest that applies to the credit facility and the costs of the insurance policy after the expiration of the date for their repayment. The expert was of the opinion that this rate is 7% per annum, whereas according to the defendants, the rate should be 18% as aforesaid. In order to address the claim, it is necessary to review which of the provisions of the Second Agreement regarding arrears interest rates.
Clause 3.3.1 includes, as stated, the specific agreements regarding the credit facility and the costs of the credit facility, and it also refers to the date of repayment and the interest due to non-payment on time. Thus, clause 3.3.1.5 states that the amounts will be paid 30 days from the date of termination of the skeleton (the alternative that concerns receipt of other financing is not our business), and clause 3.3.1.6 - which I also referred to above with regard to the question of the repayment date - states that "to the extent that the credit facility and the costs of the skeleton are not cleared on the date of termination of the skeleton... These amounts will bear a fixed annual interest rate of 7% Until the actual payment date" (emphasis added).