Alongside these claims regarding selective enforcement against Fisher in comparison to the other participants in the meeting, Adv. Perry reiterated in the hearing on December 8, 2024, the main arguments regarding selective enforcement against Fisher in comparison to Malka. Adv. Perry argued that it was not possible to accept the explanation presented by the accuser in March 2018 regarding the decision made by the director of the Department for the Investigation of Police to drop the charge against Malka regarding the night meeting, inter alia, due to "evidentiary considerations that stemmed from the evidentiary basis that the accuser had at that point in time", and since "a review of the facts of the indictment shows that the facts attributed to Eran Malka are different from those attributed to defendants 2-3". According to him, this explanation is already not possible from the accuser's own plea, who clarified in the hearings of July 14, 2016 and March 22, 2018, that in her opinion, the offense of disruption was committed by Fischer by allowing David, who served as his attorney in the investigation, to hold the disruptive conversations with the state's witness and Malka in his home and in his presence, as described in sections 8-13 of the indictment. Since these exchanges between David and Malka were included in the indictment from Malka's statements in the interrogation, it is inconceivable that the accuser would view them as part of the offense of disruption attributed to David in the indictment, and from her – vicarious liability – to Fischer, and at the same time deny that Malka, the other party to David's very conversations, committed the disruption at the same time. In addition, Adv. Perry argued that the grounds for removing Malka from the indictment presented by the accuser in a statement dated March 21, 2018 are: "The circumstances of the case as a whole, and the evidence collected... With regard to defendant 1, they led to the conclusion that it is possible not to proceed with the conduct of criminal proceedings against him in this matter" – there is no known or possible ground under the law for closing a criminal file; that in light of the accuser's failure to completely document the events that led to Malka's removal from the indictment, her argument (based, as aforesaid, on an attempt to trace it retroactively) that this was a decision made by the director of the Department for the Investigation of Police following a request from Malka's counsel should not be accepted; that Malka's version in his testimony in court was that the initiative to drop the charge against him came from the prosecution; and that the accuser's explanation, which makes Malka's expulsion from the charge dependent on the plea bargain with him, should also be rejected since in the framework of the state's witness agreement / plea bargain between the accuser and Malka dated June 4, 2015, it was determined that Malka would plead guilty to the indictment filed against him (section 2) and the only benefits he would receive were not taking enforcement measures and economic forfeiture, not harming his pension, and being released to full house arrest for two weeks after the sentence was given. and refraining from demanding that a monetary penalty be imposed on him (section 9). All of this, as of the date of the filing of the amended indictment on June 10, 2015, and even without the fact that in the end, Malka's version (which he first raised in a witness interview conducted for him at the Department for the Investigation of Police and later in testimony in court) was that during the night meeting, he said many times more serious things in terms of the scope and intensity of the disruption of the investigation compared to the statements attributed to him in the indictment.
- The accuser's response to these allegations was heard at the hearing on December 17, 2024. This time, the response was quite different from the accuser's responses in 2016 and 2018.
First, the accuser did not repeat her claim from those years that Fischer committed the offense of disruption together with David by virtue of her being his agent, who during the meeting held the disruptive conversations described in the indictment in his presence. On the contrary: counsel for the accuser clarified that although she still insists on the claim of joint execution, she does not claim the existence of vicarious liability (pp. 24970, 25016-25015). The accuser's attempt to minimize the gap between her own positions by stating that already in the hearing on July 14, 2016, her counsel mentioned the claim of joint execution cannot be accepted. It is clear from the accuser's arguments in the hearing of July 14, 2016 (see quotation above) that the center of gravity was then placed on the existence of the mission relationship, from which the accuser sought to derive Fisher's responsibility as a joint perpetrator of the statements of his counsel. And if there was any doubt about the matter, the matter was clarified by the accuser's counsel in the hearing of March 22, 2018, because in her opinion, the difference between Fischer and Malka is that while Malka was not present at the meeting, Fischer was present at the meeting that took place at his home, and did not prevent David from "doing what she does in his presence, she is his branch, he is the sender" (pp. 3309-3310).