In addition to the praise that should be given to the accuser's attorney for being able to withdraw the argument presented on behalf of the accuser in a statement dated March 21, 2018, regarding a factual difference between Fisher and Malka according to the evidentiary basis that the accuser had at the time the indictment was filed and which justified the distinction between them (and how could it have been argued differently? See above the series of statements attributed in the indictment to Malka in his conversations with the state witness and David during the meeting, While no concrete statement is attributed to Fischer in the indictment, the evidentiary balance as presented by the accuser still does not advance the clarification of Fischer's claim of selective enforcement. In contrast to the argument raised by Fischer in 2016 (which was rejected) that the facts of the fourteenth indictment do not reveal an offense against him, the claim of selective enforcement assumes the existence of evidence for the prosecution of both Fischer and Malka at least with equal intensity, even though in Fischer's opinion the facts of the indictment already indicate that Malka's part in this indictment exceeds his own (see, for example, paragraphs 29-31 of Fischer's request of March 15, 2018).
Indeed, in the same hearing on December 17, 2024, counsel for the accuser did not claim that the evidence at the time of the filing of the indictment showed a difference between the degree of Fisher's guilt and Malka's guilt in connection with the night meeting. She did note that Malka described the meeting in his statement to the Department for the Investigation of Police in the way he experienced it from afar, and that Fischer "at least partially" managed the event that took place at his home, when he was "perhaps indifferent, but he is definitely in the discourse. He's part of it. He is completely in the frame" (p. 25036). However, the same part of Fischer in the discourse as described by the accuser's counsel (speaking with Attorney Zemer about the consequences of the incident; telling the state's witness: "Why do I have to pay for the mistakes of others?" and "Why don't you go?"; receives the phone from the state committee and talks to Malka afterwards; Receiving advice from his lawyer, David, on how to behave in the interrogation and hearing from her that penetration of mobile phones means a "disaster" and a severity in the sentence expected of him) is not located closer to the core of the actual interrogation and the conduct during it, compared to the conversations that according to the indictment Malka took place during the meeting with other suspects: with the state's witness who "shared with him her fear of the investigation and the arrest that awaits her", and with David (counsel for another suspect) LaMalka told her "that in the expected interrogation he intends to maintain the right to remain silent" and she informed him "that even Defendant 2 intends to do so" while adding that "he should not worry about A. since she is 'taking care of it,' and that A. will be 'ready' for interrogation" (paragraphs 12-13). As noted, not only did the accusing ISA not claim an evidentiary difference between Fischer and Malka, but it also emphasized that its position is that "it would not be correct to begin examining the amount of evidence that the accuser had in the case of each of the defendants, and to assess the weight of that evidence. We think that the gap between the evidence is also irrelevant." Despite this, the accuser remained adamant in her position that there was no basis for the claim of selective enforcement, with her reason for this focusing on the claim that the removal of the charge against Malka in the nightly meeting affair was made as part of a plea bargain. Let us therefore turn to this issue.
- As stated above, the reliance on the plea bargain as a reason for removing Malka from the charge of the night meeting was made by the accuser back in 2018. In the accuser's statement of March 21, 2018 (following the words of the accuser's counsel at the hearing of March 19, 2018), mention was made of the fact that the filing of the amended indictment at the beginning of the hearing on June 10, 2015, was accompanied by a statement by the accuser's counsel that Malka's confession in the amended indictment was part of a plea bargain between him and the accuser. In the hearing on March 22, 2018, counsel for the accuser clarified, in response to a question from Fischer's counsel, that the decision of the Director of the Department for the Investigation of Police to remove Malka from the charge of the nightly meeting was part of the plea bargain, even though it was reached after the agreement of June 4, 2015 between the accuser and Malka (which, according to its title, constitutes a state witness agreement and a plea bargain) and before the arrangement was presented to the court on June 10, 2015 (pp. 3312-3313). Fischer's counsel refused to accept the clarification, and argued that the plea bargain to which the accuser's counsel referred in the hearing on June 10, 2015, dealt with Malka's willingness to confess to the indictment filed against him and not to amend the indictment, and moreover, in the written agreement dated June 4, 2015, Malka undertook to confess to the original indictment filed against him on May 14, 2015, in which he was also charged with the night meeting affair (p. 3313, 3325).
- The truth must be said that the accuser's version regarding the existence of a plea bargain – Monday or Revised - Her relationship with the queen caused considerable difficulty when it was first brought up in March 2018.
Counsel for the accuser noted at the beginning of the hearing on June 10, 2015 (p. 1):