In accordance with this rule, and given the long period, of more than two years, during which Fischer was held in electronic handcuffs without 'ventilation windows', when in the first months the electronic handcuffs were carried out at his mother-in-law's home and not in his own home, there is room for a deviation from the appropriate punishment range for this reason as well (and also due to the nine months of house arrest). Beyond that: where taking into account all the considerations of the Coke leads to an actual prison term approaching a period of nine months during which it is possible to order to serve with community service, it is possible to consider the combination of the days of detention behind bars with the other considerations of the Coke, and it is not necessary to 'single' the days of detention specifically to the deduction from the actual period of imprisonment (Criminal Appeal 7879-08-24 Anonymous v. State of Israel (20.10.2025); Criminal Appeal 1777/20 Kabaha v. State of Israel (24.5.2021); Criminal Appeal 1981/20 Abdullah v. State of Israel (23.7.2020); Criminal Case (Tel Aviv District) 42162-12-21 State of Israel v. Ben Galim (18.1.2024); Criminal Case (Hai District) 21862-05-22 State of Israel v. Trevia, paragraph 42 (September 7, 2023)). It should be noted that the full account in this regard is not only the 72 days of detention from 2015, since we must add to them the 13 days of detention that Fischer spent in 2014, as part of the same investigation file in which he was arrested again in April 2015, i.e., in total 85 days of detention Behind bars (whose conditions are harsh than prison conditions).
Gap between the original indictment and the indictment in the plea bargain
- Another consideration in the field of requisite justice, which leads to a reduction in Fischer's sentence below the lower threshold of the appropriate punishment range, is the extreme gap between the original indictment (in which Fischer was indicted for 51 offenses on 14 charges) and the indictment in which he was convicted as part of the plea bargain (five offenses on three charges). As detailed above, this is not only a significant quantitative gap, since in terms of the severity of the offenses the gap is even larger.
The justification for a significant reduction in the sentence due to the aforementioned gap traces the nature of the matter and the damage that Fischer suffered due to the need that was forced upon him to deal with an indictment of many dimensions and heavy offenses. The very fact that he was dealing with the many serious charges took a heavy toll on Fischer in various areas: he was placed in detention (behind bars and later in electronic handcuffs) for more than two years, and then for nearly another nine months under house arrest; He has been required to conduct a trial for more than a decade, during which time his law license has been suspended and he is unable to work for a living; Most of his property was seized in temporary seizure orders due to his accusation of economic offenses, all of which were eventually revoked; And he was subjected to the fear and fear that every defendant who defends himself faces many serious charges. All of these harms would have been spared Fischer if the indictment had been limited to the magnitude (even if not the exact dimensions) of the indictment in which Fischer finally confessed as part of the plea bargain. In any case, the gap in itself, and especially the consequences that were created in its wake, constitute a strong consideration of justice to view Fischer as having already served a real part of the sentence that suited him, throughout the prolonged period in which he conducted a trial against an indictment that turned out to be largely erroneous (compare Criminal Appeal 677/14 Dankner v. State of Israel, paragraphs 36, 49 (July 17, 2014); Serious Crimes Case (Tel Aviv District) 39303-07-14 State of Israel v. Nachman (27.12.2015); Serious Crimes Case (Tel Aviv District) 55674-03-23 State of Israel v. Abu Latif, paragraphs 58, 64 (June 10, 2024) and paragraph 31 (May 30, 2024); Criminal Case (Tel Aviv District) 31235-05-16 State of Israel v. Haddad, paragraph 34 (November 30, 2020); See also the judgment of April 8, 2019 of Defendant 6 in the present proceeding, paragraph 8; In the case of acquittal from a secondary offense as a remedy of protection from justice following an acquittal of the main offenses, see Criminal Case (Shalom Tel Aviv) 46667-02-13 State of Israel v. Shabana, paragraphs 47-50 (July 17, 2016); Criminal Case (Shalom Tel Aviv) 36170-06-21 State of Israel v. Ali, paragraphs 39-42 (November 17, 2022)).
- In this context, the accuser's argument, which in the framework of the arguments for punishment based the center of gravity of the gap between the original indictment and the amended indictment, should be rejected on the same considerations of justice for which Fischer argues that the sentence to be imposed on him for the offenses of which he was convicted should be significantly reduced. As may be recalled, the accuser argued that the considerations of defense from justice were given the main expression at the stage of reaching a plea bargain with Fischer, in which most of the offenses and charges that were included in the original indictment were deleted from the amended indictment, and therefore the considerations of justice should not be given double expression (which is in the sense of exacting a double price from the accuser and the public) by way of a further significant reduction from the sentence that is now appropriate for Fischer. Three answers to this claim:
First, in the hearing on August 28, 2025, in which the accuser's counsel laid out the reasons behind the decision to reach a plea bargain with Fischer, the first consideration in the count and importance that she presented was The Significant and Substantial Evidentiary Difficulties which were clarified regarding the charges that were omitted in the amended indictment (with detailed reference to major difficulties – in the testimonies of the state's main witnesses, the State Committee, the testimony of state witness Sasson Chai, the evidence relating to the Lubinsky affair, and more). On the other hand, the considerations of protection from justice derived from the defects and omissions that occurred in the conduct of the investigation and the proceeding, were placed by the accuser's counsel only of secondary importance (pp. 25588-25587).