"Here, the prosecution sought both to add to the indictment and to subtract from it. The 'subtraction' was nothing more than the removal of two charges from the 'indictment map'. An indictment that has been completely dismissed in any case does not require the defendant to defend himself, and the duty to give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to defend himself – an obligation that constitutes an integral part and an indispensable condition for the authority to amend after the beginning of the trial – is automatically null and void...The total deletion and dismissal of an indictment do not therefore fall within the scope of s. 92(a), but rather the expungement – or the removal – constitutes in theory and in fact an act of retracting a prosecutor from an indictment under s. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Law, whether the prosecutor used the language 'erasure' or 'retraction of the charge' or declared that he would not bring evidence for that charge. The return of a prosecutor from an indictment after the defendant's response to the indictment obligates the court – without any discretion – to acquit the defendant of that charge, in accordance with the provision of the aforementioned s. 94" (emphasis added).
See more: Criminal Appeal 3971/90 Assis v. Judge Victoria OstrovskyIsrSC 45(1) 661, 666 (1990); Municipal Bylaws - Choice of Law (Shalom Be'er Sheva) 1253/08 State of Israel v. Sadot Investments in Agriculture and Real Estate in a Tax Appeal (10.11.2010); Heftza Claim (Shalom Eshed) 109-08-21 State of Israel v. Afikim - Advanced Transportation Services (September 5, 2023). Accordingly, it was clarified in Y.'s book Kedmi, on criminal procedure (Part Two - Post-Indictment Proceedings - 2009), p. 953, that even in the framework of a plea bargain, the consent of the defense is required to withdraw from an indictment that does not involve acquittal. As stated, in the case before us, no such consent was given. In any event, Fischer's acquittal of the original charges that did not appear in the amended indictment strengthens the justification for attributing most of the result relating to those charges, specifically to evidentiary considerations and not only to considerations of protection from justice, in such a way that the power of the defense of justice is at the waist of continuing to have a substantial effect on the appropriate punishment for Fisher for the offenses of which he was convicted.