In that case, Fonta received a sum of NIS 100,000 in cash from the contractor's driver, and transferred it to the mayor, who used the money to finance the payments of the compensation agreements. It was also held that the mayor's knowledge of the contractor's knowledge that the contractor was the one who gave the money for the compensation agreements was proven (see also the Supreme Court's supplementary judgment of July 12, 2022). On the other hand, Fischer did not transfer the bribe money after receiving it from a warehouse, and in fact did not even receive the full amount of the money in question (₪150,000), but rather a file that was predicted to contain this sum and in fact contained NIS 100,000 bills. In addition, in the amended indictment in which Fisher was convicted, there is no claim that Fisher informed the policeman, to whom the money was supposed to be transferred, that Hassan was supposed to transfer the money.
The distinction between the appropriate punishment for the offense of bribery brokerage and the punishment for attempted bribery involves insisting on the uniqueness of the offense of bribery, which in itself – and even before an attempted offense is attached to it – "is a kind of 'derivative offense' of the main offense – bribery. It deals with the early stages of the bribery deal, and imprints on them the imprint of a perfect offense that stands on its own." This uniqueness requires caution "against expanding the criminal definitions excessively, in the sense of 'decree for decree.' A possible implication is that the rulings that were stated in relation to the offense of bribery, which is the 'main offense,' are not necessarily relevant to the offense of bribery brokerage, which is a kind of 'derivative offense'" (Criminal Appeal 4456/14 Kellner v. State of Israel, paragraph 10 of the judgment of Justice Hendel in the chapter dealing with the Dankner and Rabin case (December 29, 2015)). Above this stands the fundamental issue of the appropriate punishment for a probationary offense. As Prof. Y. Rabin and Prof. Y. Vaki noted in their book Penal Law (Volume 1, Third Edition - 2014), even after Amendment No. 39 to the Penal Law, which equated the punishment of the attempter with that of the perpetrator of the perfect offense, the court is left with broad discretion in adjusting the sentence of the attempter "in accordance with the degree of his proximity to the perfect offense and in accordance with the degree of his guilt. Thus, it will be possible, for example, to distinguish between a perfect attempt and an imperfect attempt, between a successful attempt and an unsuccessful attempt, all according to the degree of guilt of the attempter, which is learned, as stated, from the degree of proximity of the attempt to the perfect offense and the degree of danger that was exposed to the protected value... Completely eliminating the luck of the laws of temptation is not desirable and inappropriate in any case... From the point of view of the extent of the harm to the public's confidence in the actual validity of the value protected by the prohibition, there is also a difference between the perfect attempt and the perfect offense" (pp. 571-573 and the references therein; See also Criminal Appeal 5001/15 Anonymous v. State of Israel, para. 3 (July 24, 2016); Criminal Case (Central District) 55372-07-17 State of Israel v. Malkin, para. 20 (June 16, 2019)).