Third, it is the party injured by the breach of the agreement, aka Hajj, who seeks to enforce approximately by receiving rights in the musha, which are relatively lower rights than those agreed upon in the agreement. Therefore, in such a case, the willingness to agree to the implementation is approximately higher.
Fourth, defendant 1 did not object to the approximate execution in the statement of defense, but rather claimed that she did not know about the transaction and that she respected the court's rulings in the previous proceeding. All she said was that she recognized that there were rights registered by the name of Jaris and that she did not know the "meaning and essence" of those parts. To complete the picture, defendant 1 filed an application in 2014 with the Family Court, in a proceeding it filed against Jerrys, in which it requested an order prohibiting the disposition of these rights. To this request was attached a detailed affidavit on behalf of defendant 1 regarding these rights. Moreover, in the previous proceeding, Jereys did not object to the execution of the sale transaction, and it can be assumed that he would not have objected to its fulfillment by granting rights in the subject. In any event, the other defendants have no status or right to object to the approximate execution of the transaction (in contrast to their right to claim that Jaris did not have sufficient rights left since these belong to Munir)
For all the reasons I have mentioned above, the agreement can be enforced approximately by registering rights in Hajj's name in Musha'a, at the expense of Jerris's registered rights.
Conclusion and Conclusion
- In conclusion, I have reached the conclusion that the rulings in the previous proceeding do not establish a cause of action, which prevents Haj from filing a lawsuit to enforce the agreement in the near future. In addition, Munir's claims of internal reckoning between him and Jarays do not override Hajj's rights in accordance with the agreement. I also found that the agreement between the brothers and the council could not prevent Haj from enforcing the agreement and preventing the registration of rights in his favor. These rights will be recorded when the ascribed roads are relinquished, and in a claim for dissolution of co-operation, the question of who is supposed to bear the balance payments, if any, due to the provision for the roads will be decided. I also found that enforcement of the sale agreement is approximate possible, since it is not an enforcement that differs substantially from the original agreement, and that this is a preliminary stage for a claim for dissolution of partnership. The results of a future lawsuit for the dissolution of the partnership and the allocation of specific plots to the various owners will bring the parties - Haj and Jarayes - very close to the original agreement between them. I further determine that it is the liquidation court that will decide whether Plan M/8 is a binding distribution plan or whether Plan M/10 and whether balance payments should be awarded following the provision for roads, and such a decision is not necessary at this stage in order to rule on the claim.
- In light of this, I accept the claim and order that rights in the land amounting to 609 square meters of Jerais's rights be registered in Hajj's name. I am still a gift, in accordance with the permanent authority In section 4 According to the Pharmaceutical Contracts Law, Shahaj cannot make any use in any unique and exclusive manner of the land that will be transferred to him in the framework of this judgment, including the promotion of any planning, without a claim for dissolution of partnership filed by him and a court ruling on it. Hajj may file a ruling later for registration purposes.
As for the expenses, defendants 1-10 should be charged for Hajj expenses, but the Council should be exempted from these expenses. As I stated above, I accept that there was an agreement between the Council and the brothers, even though it was not signed by the competent bodies in the Council. On the other hand, the Council refrained from registering this agreement, although the lack of registration does not constitute an obstacle to Hajj's lawsuit. Therefore, for these reasons, we do not find it necessary to charge the council for the expenses.