The respondent also rejects the appellant's argument regarding the lack of connection between the acts attributed to him and American law. The interest of the United States in prosecuting the appellant, it was argued, is clear
And it is evident that the appellant intended to harm the rule of law of the United States, the social values that its laws seek to promote, and the safety and security of its citizens. Therefore, there is no basis for the argument that the appellant's connection to the requesting state is a "technical-formal" connection, but rather it should be regarded as a material connection, which makes its application to the case of American law appropriate.
The Respondent emphasizes that the realization of the proper constitutional balance between the appellant's rights and the public interest is that if he is convicted, the appellant will be returned to Israel to bear his sentence, and the United States has expressly undertaken to do so.
Finally, the Attorney General argued that the "procedural arrangements" proposed by the appellant that concern the reduction of the dispute arena should be rejected, as they are inadmissible and erroneous even on their merits. He also seeks to reject the appellant's argument regarding the expected infringement of his substantive and procedural rights in the United States, inter alia, in view of the existence of guarantees that have the power to ensure the conduct of a fair trial there.
Discussion
Protection from Justice
- I will begin the discussion with those arguments that are not at the core of the issue and can be decided even before we get to the bottom of the matter. The first is the claim of protection from justice. In the common sense, the doctrine of the defense of justice allows the court to dismiss an indictment because the defendant cannot be guaranteed a fair trial, or the prosecution violates the principles of justice (Criminal Appeal 2910/94 Yefet v. State of Israel (hereinafter - the ruling Yefet [3]), p370; High Court of Justice 1563/96 Katz, Adv. v. Attorney General [4], p. 543; High Court of Justice 5319/97 Kogan v. Military Advocate General [5], p. 94; Israel Bar Association Appeal 2531/01 Hermon v. District Committee of the Bar Association-The Law on the Tel-Spring-Jaffa [6], p. 77; Criminal Appeal 4855/02 State of Israel v. Borowitz (hereinafter - Parashat Borowitz [7])).
The main justification for the use of this power is the desire to ensure that the legal authorities act appropriately, as required by their status as a governing body. It is intended to serve as a brake on unbridled enforcement activity, blind to the interests of others, and denying the rights of the accused and the values of the rule of law. This is an extraordinary authority, as are the circumstances that justify its exercise. It incorporates a complex tapestry of competing values: promoting the public interest in prosecuting offenders alongside the necessity of adhering to the rights of the accused; The desire to reach the truth, but not in all