Finally, it was argued that the appellant has a defense from justice, which necessitates the suspension of the extradition proceeding. According to him, the long-standing policy of the Public Prosecution for Drug Offenses is
prosecution in Israel, even if the act was committed outside of Israel. In particular, the appellant notes the fact that the Dadosh brothers were prosecuted in Israel, at least initially. The argument is, in summary, that the decision in the appellant's case is tainted with improper discrimination, and even for this reason it should be annulled.
The Attorney General's Response
- The Attorney General relies on the District Court's decision. He asks us to look at the appellant as someone who served, in theory and in practice, the head of a criminal organization. As such, the appellant was not required to take part in the activity in the destination country and could have instructed his people from a distant place. There is therefore no real significance to the geographical location from which the appellant operated.
The Respondent further argues that an interpretation that aspires to realize the purpose of the Extradition Law must give considerable weight to the interest in promoting interstate cooperation in the fight against organized crime in general, and in the distribution of dangerous drugs in particular, and such cooperation requires the extradition of the appellant. This is also reflected in the international obligations that Israel has assumed in the agreements it has entered into.
If we follow the appellant's approach, argues the respondent, we find that everyone who operates within the boundaries of one state against the safety and security of another state is allowed to escape the fear of the law or at least to choose the law that is convenient for him. The appellant, it was argued, has no "right" to commit an offense against one state and at the same time to be tried according to the laws of another state. For this reason, his claim for protection from justice should also be rejected. The respondent is misleading, in the process, that the term "escape" should not be interpreted narrowly, and it must be recognized that it is not merely "physical flight in the sense of uprooting a place of residence from one country to another", but rather "any action that is intended or enables to distance a person from the arms of law enforcement and from the fear of the law in the applicant's country and from the injured country". Another interpretation will lead to a normative situation in which the extradition law will apply only to those conspiracy partners or members of criminal organizations who are at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy - couriers, distributors, manufacturers and sellers - and not to those at the top. This conclusion, it is argued, is inconsistent with the purpose of the Extradition Law and with the vital interest in eradicating cross-border crime.