Judge M. Cheshin in criminal appeal 7230/96 Anonymous [22] - it is the legal system, as a condition without it - that it does not have the power to impose liability under its penal laws.
A basic rule is that each legal system is entitled to exclude for itself through its governmental institutions the connections by virtue of which it will apply, and thus determine the scope of applicability. In most, if not all, of the systems, the territorial connection is preceded by the system, which in the common sense applies the system's penal laws to any offense committed in the geographical area in which it operates. "The territorial connection is accepted today in most of the world's legal systems, as a connection that constitutes the basis for the application of the laws of the state and criminal norms in terms of the place where the offense was committed..." - Statements of President Barak in Criminal Appeal Authority 1178/97 Kahane v. State of Israel [23], at p. 269. See also the words of my colleague Justice M. Cheshin in criminal appeal 7230/96 Anonymous, supra [22], at p. 521.
- An equally fundamental principle states that the legal system has the power to extend its application to acts committed as well Outside to territory. It has its roots in the common law conception that the legislature (and in the original - The English Parliament) may enact any law it desires, without being limited in any way, but because of the possible implications of the law for what is done outside the territory. Insist on this Judge Agranat In a High Court of Justice case 279/51 Amsterdam v. Cher-The Ministry of Finance (hereinafter - High Court of Justice Amsterdam [24]), p. 964, referring to the words of the British scholars Coke ("'The power of Parliament is all-so capable and absolute that it cannot be reduced within any limits'") and-Blackstone ("'There is nothing on earth that can undo what Parliament has done.'") This approach was also anchored in the well-known judgment of the International Court of Justice-Leumi on the matterThe case of the S.S. “Lotus” (1927) [120], where the connection between the principle of state sovereignty and its authority to expand the application of its laws was recognized, insofar as it is not limited by the force of norms prohibiting the matter.
On this basis, Israeli law formulates the approach that the legislature may outline the boundaries of the law as it wishes, including its extension beyond the boundaries of the state, without being limited by foreign law or even by international law (see section 9(a) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977 and Feller, "Criminal Jurisdiction" [130], at p. 582). In the case of the Amsterdam High Court of Justice [24], Justice Agranat ruled that "... In the absence of a supreme constitution containing a contradictory provision, the principle takes hold... regarding the unlimited legal authority of the legislative branch - also in the State of Israel" (ibid., at p. 966). This determination also appeared in other cases (see: the words of Justice Landau in the case of the High Court of Justice 100/57 Weiss v. Inspector General of Police [25], at p. 184, and the words of Justice Sussman in the Aziza case [21], at p. 419). It was held that the court may also interpret