Legislation in a manner that extends its application beyond the territory (Criminal Appeal 123/83 K.P.A. Kiryat Arba Steels in Tax Appeal v. State of Israel [26], at p. 820; Civil Appeal 800/89 Biton v. Karsel [27], at p. 655; Civil Appeal 1432/03 Yinon Manufacture and Marketing of Food Products in Tax Appeal v. Kara'an (hereinafter - the Yinon Case [28]), at p. 356). The condition is that the law will hear, out of its purpose, the possibility of such an extension.
- This is how it is in our law, this is how it is in the laws of the United States. Rule is in American law, in both civil and criminal matters (see United States v.. Nippon Paper Indus. Co. (1997) [66]), that the law may extend beyond the territory as well, provided that the intention to do so is implied by the purpose of the legislation enacted by Congress (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. (1991) [67], at p. 248). Although it would have been better if such an expansion should be in line with the rules of international law-Nationally, Congress is not limited in its determination by any external law (Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (1804) [68], at p. 118; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (1945) [69], at p. 443 (“Alcoa”); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond. (1963) [70], at p. 21; FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson (1980) [71], at p. 1323; United States v. YuILS (1991) [72],
at p. 1091; United States v. Yousef (2003) [73], at p. 92). The expansion of applicability, in essence, is consistent with the U.S. Constitution (United States v. King (1976) [74], at
p. 850; United States v. Felix-Gutierrez (1991) [75], at p. 1204).
An intention to have extraterritorial application can be learned from the explicit language of the law, but it can also be deduced from the "nature" of the law (United States v. MacAllister (1998) [76],
at p. 1307). There are offenses for which by their very nature the imposition of criminal liability does not derive from the place where they were committed, but rather derives from the need to protect important interests of the state. This was discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States, according to Justice Taft, in the case of
United States v. Bowman (1922) [77], at p. 98: