In the explanatory notes to the proposed amendment 39, Feller and Kremnitzer discussed the rationale for imposing criminal liability on the basis of territorial affiliation, namely: "These characteristics of territorial application stem from the main purpose of criminal legislation, which is the protection of the proper order of life within the territory of the state's sovereignty" (S.Z. Feller, M. Kremnitzer, "Proposal of a Preliminary Part and a General Part of a New Penal Law and Concise Explanatory Notes" [132], at p. 201).
Indeed, the roots of the approach that recognizes the territorial connection are rooted in basic concepts in penal law and legal theory regarding the role of social association, and in the modern incarnation of the state, as a means of protecting the well-being and well-being of the public under its wings. The modern garb of this principle is the concept of "state sovereignty" in the name of which authority is given to the sovereign
about what is happening in its geographical area. This is the "power inherent in sovereignty" referred to by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blackmer v. United States (1932) [85], at
p. 437. In implementing this designation, the State is authorized to establish a set of norms regarding what is permitted and prohibited in the territory under its control, and to enforce them. This normative system extends both to acts that took place within the boundaries of the state and to acts intended to disturb public order in its territory.
From all of the above, you learn that Israeli law after Amendment 39 recognized a broad territorial connection. This is not only in consequential offenses, but also in conduct offenses, and not only in substantive offenses, but also in the conspiracy offense and other preparatory acts. These respond to the broad affinity insofar as they have produced, or are intended to produce, a result within the territory.
- American law has been adopted since the beginning of the century-20 Similar approach. The guiding determination is reserved for the judge Holmes In Parashat Strassheim v. Daily (1911) [86], at p. 285:
“Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power”.