Although this ruling at the time referred to the application of the laws of one state in the United States to acts that occurred within the territory of another state in the United States, in later cases the Strassheim rule [86] was also applied to acts committed outside the United States (see Ford v. United States (1927) [87], at p. 620; Rocha v. United States, supra [82], at p. 548; Marin v. United States (1965) [88], at p. 178). This ruling was based on the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State (later Justice) J.B. Moore, in his essay on the Cutting Affair (in which he was indicted in Mexico in 1887, is an American for an article he published in a Texan newspaper against a Mexican citizen - Report on Extraterritorial Crime and Cutting Case). Commenting on the necessity of applying this approach in an era where evolving modus operandi facilitates the commission of cross-border offenses, Moore said:
“The principle that a man who outside of a country wilfully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done, is recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries. And the methods which modern invention has furnished for
the performance of criminal acts in that manner has made this principle one of constantly growing importance and of increasing frequency of application” (J.B. Moore A Digest of International Law (vol. II) [140], at p. 244; Emphasis added - E.E.L.).
In later rulings, the courts in the United States began to use explicit language in referring to the broad aspect of the principle of "objective territoriality" (see United States v. Cotten (1973) [89], at p. 749; United States v. King, supra [74], at p. 850; Chua Han Mow v. United States, supra [84], at p. 1311; United States v. MacAllister, supra [76], at p. 1308 ). In the case of Rivard [83], Justice Dyer held:
“There are, however, two views as to the scope of the territorial principle. Under the subjective view, jurisdiction extends over all persons in the state and there violating its laws. Under the objective view, jurisdiction extends over all acts which take effect within the sovereign even though the author is elsewhere” (ibid, at p. 886).
- Since the 1980s, it has been registered in the United States - First in the legal literature (see: Restatement 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1981) [149], § 402
And C.L.. Blakesley “United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime” [144], at p. 1112) and then in case law - Another flexibility of the territorial element. In the background were, inter alia, the offenses related to the import and distribution of drugs (which, as will be recalled, are also the subject of the appeal before us). These conspiracy offenses, which are governed by individual legal provisions
sit down-Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. §846, 21 U.S.C. §963) - This is in contrast to the offense of conspiracy Clalit in the U.S. law (18 U.S.C. §371) - do not demand, as a condition for imposing criminal liability, that the conspiracy be accompanied by an additional act that is necessary for its realization. It is sufficient to prove that the conspiracy offense was designed to have an impact within the United States (see: United States v. Bermudez (1975) [90], at p. 94; United States v. Thomas (1978) [91],
at p. 641; United States v. Littrell (1978) [92], at p. 832; United States v. Marable (1978) [93], at p. 153; United States v. Rodriguez (1980) [94],
at p. 919; United States v. Bey (1984) [95], at p. 894).
However, the aforementioned raised a problem with regard to the relationship that was made abroad. According to the Strassheim [86] ruling, the imposition of liability in such a case is conditional, as stated, on its existence within its boundaries