of the United States, of actual action (see also United States v. Winter (1975) [96], at p. 982). This disharmony was restored by the courts in the United States through a revision of the rule formulated by Justice Holmes. It was held that in all those offenses that do not, by definition, require the existence of an act to realize the desired result, the law will apply whether the act actually produced, or was only intended to yield an outcome in the United States. It was held as follows:
“It seems somewhat anomalous, however, that Congress intended these statutes to apply extraterritorially, but that jurisdiction attaches only after an act occurred within the sovereign boundaries. Thus, even though the statutes were designed to prevent one type of wrong ab initio, under the traditional approach, the courts were without power to act. This dichotomy directly contravenes the purpose of the enabling legislation.
As a result, it is now settled in this Circuit that when the statute itself does not require proof of an overt act, jurisdiction attaches upon a mere showing of intended territorial effects... The fact that appellants intended the conspiracy to be consummated within the territorial boundaries satisfies jurisdictional requisites” (United States v. Ricardo (1980) [97], at pp. 1128-1129; Emphasis added - E.E.L.).
See also: United States v. Mann (1980) [98], at p. 671; United States v. Noriega (1990) [99], at p. 1513; United States v. Wright-Barker, supra [79],
at p. 168; United States v. Yousef, supra [73], at p. 91; and compare United States v. Postal (1979) [100], at p. 866. For an exhaustive expression of the matter, see also the judgment of the U.S. District Court in United States v. Best (2001) [101], at p. 660 .
Finally, it should be noted that the courts in the United States did not see room to distinguish between a criminal who acts on his own from abroad and commits criminal acts on the soil of the United States, and a person who employs for this purpose from his place of residence outside the country emissaries who are his "long arm" in its territory (see the words of Justice Hand in the United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra [69], at p. 444).
- Summary: The Israeli legal system, as well as the American system, see it as applying its penal laws to anyone who has acted abroad, if only by conspiracy
Connection, to the commission of an offense within the borders of the state, whether or not his plan was realized, whether he acted on his own or through another - all this on the basis of a territorial connection, and without the need to require other extensions of application for this purpose. The legal systems do so by making the strict rules of application somewhat more flexible, in order to ensure that public order is maintained in the geographical area over which they dominate. In the background is the understanding that this is necessitated by the need to fight crime, especially that which extends across a number of countries.