Finally, respondent No. 3 referred to the need to formulate a permanent procedure regarding the process of selecting the Commissioner, a need deriving from Resolution 3793. In addition, the appointment of a special appointments committee close to the discussion of the candidate raises a real difficulty in the committee's independence from the level appointing its members, in view of the real concern that the composition will be suited to the requested candidate. A permanent procedure will help prevent dependence between the committee and the selected candidate, and will ensure that the selection is made solely on the basis of relevant and competitive considerations. According to the approach of respondent 3, there is no impediment to anchoring in a permanent procedure for the appointment of the Commissioner, a criterion that will ensure an ideological connection between the two without the latter undermining his professionalism and independence.
- Respondent 4 also adhered to the reasoning of the majority opinion. According to her, the majority justices' interpretation of section 6 of the Appointments Law is correct and necessary, while the interpretation presented in the Vice-President's opinion is erroneous. Section 6 of the Law does not prescribe a positive provision as to the manner of appointment of the position of Commissioner, and the mere fact that the section provides for an exemption from a tender does not indicate an intention to sweepingly exempt the appointment from any competitive process; The fact that other positions for which a statutory exemption from a tender has been determined are actually appointed through search committees, also teaches that Section 6 does not exempt the position from any competitive process. When the search committees in those cases were not established by the good will of the government, but in accordance with the directive of the legal advisor to the government; Section 6 of the Law is silent regarding the identity of the entity that will offer the Government a candidate for the position of Civil Service Commissioner, in contrast to other provisions of the law that establish a statutory exemption from the duty of a tender, whereas if the legislature had viewed the position of the Commissioner as a personal appointment of the Prime Minister, it would have explicitly instructed this; and an interpretation according to which the Civil Service Commissioner should be appointed as a personal appointment, which does not provide a guarantee to prevent the politicization of the position, is inconsistent with the purpose of the Law.
In the same context, respondent No. 4 referred to the determination of the Vice-President that the purpose of the exemption is in section 6 The law is a tool designed to assist the government in realizing its goals, even at the cost of giving up some of the defense mechanisms that are intended to preserve the professional and apolitical character of the civil service. This determination is not anchored in the law or in its explanatory notes; Other explanations may be exempt, such as the rigidity of the tender process; Caution must be exercised in the interpretation that assumes a waiver of the professional and apolitical nature of the civil service. In any event, even if this is indeed the purpose of the exemption, this does not require the appointment of the commissioner on a personal appointment. The realization of that goal can and should be done in a competitive process. The assumption that ideological proximity to the prime minister is necessary for the purpose of advancing government policy also contradicts the basic concept of the civil service as a stately, professional, and neutral service, which is independent of the identity or worldview of the person holding the position. In addition, an appointment process that does not provide a significant guarantee to prevent the politicization of the civil service commissioner does not constitute a specific concession to the defense mechanisms, but rather creates a significant loophole in them. Respondent 4 also emphasized that even in the framework of a competitive appointment process, the government will retain a significant degree of influence on the appointment, whether through the design of the competitive process, or through the representatives who will sit on its behalf on the search committee, or in the government's ability to choose a candidate from among a number of candidates that will be proposed.