The significance of the acceptance of the Petitioner's position by the Honorable Court is that any provision of the law that exempts any role from holding a tender must be read as a mandatory obligation for the appointment of a search committee, even if this position is not one of the positions in respect of which it was expressly determined that a search committee would be established, and even if it is a position that has been determined by law an explicit exemption from the tender obligation. In the state's opinion, this interpretation contradicts the explicit language and the clear intention of the relevant government decisions. Moreover, and this is the main point, this approach nullifies the authority of the executive branch in general, and the government as its most senior organ, to determine its work in a field that is clearly devoted to its governmental powers. From the very fact that there may be those who may think that it is preferable to take such an election procedure over another, there is still a long way to go to determine that there is a legal obligation to choose the desired selection process for the Petitioner and not for the desired for the Prime Minister and the Government.
[...]
In this context, it should be noted that there are a number of additional senior positions appointed by the government that are not by way of a tender or a search committee: the Chief of Staff [...]; The head of the Israel Security Agency [...]; the Inspector General of the Israel Police [...]; And more. Similar to the position of Civil Service Commissioner, these positions also do not have a public advertisement inviting candidacy; There is no committee for locating candidates for the position, although of course this is not a position that is considered a 'position of trust' and the person who recommends the candidate for the position is the minister in charge of it. [...] Hence, the selection process adopted in the case of the Civil Service Commissioner is not an exception, a similar procedure is taken in the matter of senior and equally important positions that are examined by the Appointments Committee (for example, the head of the National Security Council, the Accountant General, the Director of Budgets, the Directors General of Government Ministries, etc.), which can shed more appropriate light on the Petitioner's arguments regarding the unreasonableness of the proceeding in our case" (ibid., paragraphs 29-32).
- These correct words, which are difficult to understand how the Attorney General does not stand behind them today, and which instead expresses the opposing position that was then asked to be rejected with both hands, were adopted as they were written and worded in the judgment given in the case of the High Court of Justice 2699/11 [Nevo]. Already at the beginning of that judgment, the Court noted that "Section 6 of the Appointments Law, which regulates individually the manner of appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner, exempts the appointment from the duty of the tender" and that "the Appointments Law does not prescribe additional conditions that bind the government in the appointment process, in other words: the government is not subject, as far as the Appointments Law is concerned, to any procedural restrictions when appointing a Civil Service Commissioner". Subsequently, the court addressed the arguments raised in the petition that is the subject of the same proceeding, which were detailed above, and rejected them in full. With regard to the claim that it concerns the way in which other senior professional positions in the civil service are filled, it was held that:
"Admittedly, a significant portion of the positions in the public service are indeed filled by way of a tender or by way of a search committee. However, there are also quite a few senior positions appointed by the government that are not through a tender or a search committee. This is the case with the appointment of the Chief of Staff [...], the head of the Shin Bet [...], the police commissioner [...], the Commissioner of Prisons [...] and more. Candidates for these positions are transferred [...] to the examination of the 'Advisory Committee for Appointments to Senior Positions' (hereinafter: the Advisory Committee), whose activities are similar to that of the Appointments Committee, which is established for the purpose of examining the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner. In fact, in a certain respect, the areas of examination of the Appointments Committee in our case are broader than those of the Advisory Committee, since the Appointments Committee examines the candidate's qualifications and his general suitability for the position, while the Advisory Committee examines only the integrity of the candidate.