Additional Hearing High Court of Justice 70105-05-25 Government of Israel v. Louis Brandeis Institute for Society, Economics and Democracy, The College of Management Academic Track, founded by the Tel Aviv Bureaucracy - part 20

In other words.  There is nothing wrong with issuing decrees and setting restrictions in order to avoid and distance oneself from prohibitions.  It is not forbidden to abstain from performing actions to improve behaviors.  But all this is only that we will know how to always distinguish between the original prohibition - the "law" - and the addition required according to our personal tastes, and we must not upgrade the qualifications we desire by means of "interpretation" to the level of the original.  In that case, not only will there be no benefit and we will not distance ourselves from the offense, but "everything that adds detracts" (see at length my position on the issue of unlawful assumption of powers and the dangers that result from it in the changes that are required for our matter: Likelihood, paragraphs 1-6; 30; 41-37; 44).  And so it is in our case.  Anyone who adds detracts and the desire to do good is liable, God forbid, to lead not only to a normative failure but also to a serious behavioral malfunction, while thinking that "a transgression for its own sake is greater than a mitzva not for its own sake."Babylonian Talmud, Nazir23b).

On the margins of things, but not on the margins of their importance

146. Before concluding the discussion on the appointment mechanism, I would like to make a number of additional general comments.
147. The assumption implied in the respondents' arguments, which was even adopted by the majority opinion in the judgment, is that the appointment mechanism set forth in Resolution 2344 is not "strong" enough to prevent the government from abusing its power and status and abusing the authority given to it. It seems that it is difficult to imagine an argument that has a deeper frontal contradiction than that of the presumption of administrative correctness.  This must be clearly stated: Like any administrative authority, the government also has the presumption of administrative correctness.  Any government.  Whatever its composition may be, whatever its opinions.  It is inconceivable that in one fell swoop the basic principles on which this Court has stood time and time again, they will be trampled upon.
148. Anyone who claims that my words are a turning a blind eye to the reality that is taking place. To this I will reply that the court sits among its people, and sometimes even against its will, it is required to enter the arena and decide on the issues that come before its gates.  But even in this framework, the court must act according to the existing rules outlined in our case law and be careful not to turn them into such that they can be changed and shaped in accordance with the circumstances brought before it.  Legal certainty and trust in the court are based on the fact that the rules will be applied in a similar manner in any case that does not come before it, and extreme caution must be taken against deviating from this in order to reach the desired result in the individual case.
149. Needless to say, the toolbox contains a wide range of tools that enable the court to ensure compliance with the rules of administrative law in general, and to deal with invalid appointments in particular. In any event, even an argument for the lack of means in the existing toolbox cannot justify a deviation from the accepted ways of examining an administrative decision.  Nor can it justify the use of bar-legal reasoning that belongs to the districts of the neighbors to our dwelling.  Failure to take precautions in these aspects leads to a slippery slope of damage to the institution's trust, and this must be avoided with all care.
150. These words lead me to another point, which is brought here at the end of the discussion, but in fact has its place at the beginning. This Court reiterated that a petition filed before the competent authority has made a final decision on the merits of the matter is a preliminary petition that the court will not require (and see many more: High Court of Justice 6238/21 The Women's Caucus in Israel v.  Judicial Selection Committee, para.  16 [Nevo] (October 7, 2021); High Court of Justice 1634-11-24 Civil Democratic Movement v.  Minister of Defense, para.  2 [Nevo] (December 4, 2024); High Court of Justice 4758/21 External Studies SAB Tax Appeal v.  Minister of Labor, Social Affairs and Social Services, para.  5 [Nevo] (August 11, 2021)).  Adherence to this rule in the case before us would have prevented the need to examine the content of the appointment mechanism and its possible outcomes, and would have made it possible to focus on the appointment itself - which is at the heart of the real dispute - in accordance with the grounds existing in the law, which are adapted to the situation in which the final administrative decision has already been made.  Focusing on the mechanism before it is implemented, certainly in a situation in which it has been determined to be one-time, raises difficulties on many levels, and it is not for nothing that clinging to the existing grounds seems forced to a large extent.

Permanent Appointment Mechanism

151. Another component of our discussion relates to the obligation of the applicants to anchor the mechanism for the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner in a fixed procedure.
152. In the framework of the request for an additional hearing, the applicants requested that the question of whether there is room to oblige them to determine the procedure for the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner in a permanent procedure. In this context, they argued that the government cannot limit future governments in its decisions, and therefore it is clear that there is no justification for forcing them to establish a fixed procedure, let alone at this time.
153. As to the very fact of establishing a fixed procedure at this time, I have addressed the above and will not repeat what I said. With regard to the argument regarding the very obligation to establish a permanent procedure, without being required to relate it to Resolution 3793, in which, as stated, the Government stated that it would be required in the future to propose a procedure for the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner, it appears that with the progress of the proceeding before us, the Applicants abandoned this argument and agreed that with a forward-looking view, there is room to anchor the process of appointing the Civil Service Commissioner in a permanent procedure.  to be done in cooperation with the legal counsel (see: p.  30 of the minutes of the hearing of September 21, 2025, lines 10-38 and p.  31 of the transcript, lines 1-22).  In these circumstances, there is no reason for us to reconsider this issue.

Conclusion

154. I would therefore suggest to my colleagues that we order the annulment of the judgment that is the subject of the further hearing and leave Resolution 2344 in place. At the same time, with a forward-looking view, the applicants must act to establish a permanent mechanism for the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner.  I will also suggest to my colleagues that we order the cancellation of the expenses charged by the Applicants in the judgment and charge Respondents 1-2, Respondent 3 and Respondent 4 with the Applicants' expenses in the total sum of ILS 30,000 to be divided between them in equal parts.