"MK Yohanan Cohen raised an idea in the committee. We didn't get it. He said: The director general will remain for five years, and if a position becomes vacant, the government decides, and so on. Why didn't we accept it? It has nothing to do with the matter of politicization or depoliticization. [...] We said: The entire government must be responsible, after an anonymous minister proposes a general manager. I do not believe that anyone can force a minister to work with a general manager who cannot work with him. There have been cases where ministers and general managers, as well as senior officials, were from different parties. The minister knew that they were from another party, and they remained in their positions, since there was a compatibility of work between them and mutual trust, and they continued to work together" (remarks by MK Akiva Govrin, Chairman of the Labor Committee, in the same discussion (D.C., April 6, 1959, 1929); emphases added - 10).
- From the above, it appears that those present at the Knesset deliberations Recognize in real time the special characteristics of positions intended to fulfill the appointing authority's policy, and identify the possibility of using the appointment method to promote compatibility and mutual trust between the appointer and the appointee. Therefore, the fact that these rationales were not mentioned at all during the discussion on the role of civil service commissioner at the Labor Committee meeting of January 14, 1959 - and in particular not by the Minister of Justice Rosen and the Chairman of the Labor Committee, MK Govrin, who took an active part in the discourse on the two items - speaks, in my view, for itself.
- I will add that in the hearing that took place before us, counsel for the government emphasized "the desire of the Government of Israel to work with someone who has an affinity or affinity in terms of worldview, in terms of values for the implementation of his policy" (transcript of the hearing of September 21, 2025, at p. 12, paras. 8-9). Even at the stage of hearing the petitions, counsel The government stressed that there is no flaw in the appointment that stems from considerations Political-Ideological, and in the hearings that took place before us, he argued that the appointment of the commissioner "must be political, because since the commissioner heads the public service [...]" and that "It is the right of the government, so the legislature saw it, to determine who in his worldview, in his managerial approach, is suitable to be in this position(See paragraph 37 of the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing). As stated, such a consideration was not mentioned in real time by those present at the meeting of the Labor Committee in which the method of appointing the Commissioner was discussed - and this, in my opinion, is not for good reason. In fact, the statement of the government representative is closer to the way the Knesset members treated the position Office Director Generaland not to the position of civil service commissioner - with all that this entails.
Let us reiterate that the term of office of the Civil Service Commissioner does not coincide with the term of office of the government, and even that is not for nothing (and I will refer again to the words of MK Govrin in the plenum debate from the 6.4.1959 (paragraph 37 above)). In fact, the next commissioner who will be appointed is expected to work under three governments, so the intention to burden the appointment with an "ideological-professional" or "political-ideological" closeness to the specific government currently serving is contrary to the state-professional-independent nature of the position.
- To summarize this part: The minutes of the Labor Committee meeting of January 14, 1959 strengthen my conclusion that the purpose of the position of Civil Service Commissioner, which is anchored in In section 6 The Appointments Law is consistent with the general purposes of the Appointments Law: to ensure the professionalism and apolitical nature of the public service as a whole, and to preserve the independence and independence of the Civil Service Commissioner in particular. At the same time, the minutes of the meeting do not reveal any support for the opposite thesis, according to which the legislature viewed the commissioner as a kind of executive arm of the government, and therefore sought to allow the government to appoint the commissioner as it saw fit.
- Taking into account the importance that my colleagues, Vice President Solberg And the Judge Mintz, to the question of the legislature's intention as to To the section 6 to the Appointments Law, it is clear that these words are meant to affect the question of the purpose of the commissioner's position - which is a purely interpretive question that is at the center of the further discussion.
- Now that we have reached an interpretive conclusion about the existing law, we will now turn to the question of the ground for intervention - and on this level, the interpretation Section 6 The Appointments Law is intended to influence the identification of the range of relevant considerations that the government faces when determining the exact mechanism for appointing the Commissioner, and on the examination of whether the decision that is the subject of the proceeding in question was made on the basis of these considerations alone.
The Range of Relevant Considerations in the Case at Present
- As stated above, the purpose of the Section 6 The law affects the set of relevant considerations on which an administrative decision given by virtue of the section must be based. In this context, I have not found support for the position that the purpose of Section 6 It also includes the consideration raised by my colleague the Vice President Solberg in his judgment in the petitions, and dealt with "the existence of an ideological-professional closeness, which has the power to assist the government in realizing its goals" (in paragraph 12 of his judgment). In any event, as to the question of whether this is a matter of interest in relation to senior positions in the public service as a whole, I will refer to the rulings of this Court in the matter Einstein (at pp. 130-131), which were given unanimously by an expanded panel of seven justices, and which I also discussed in the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing:
"The alleged justification for appointing Mr. Einstein to the position of Director of the Administration is his ideological identification with the government's policy with regard to the policy of construction and settlement in Judea and Samaria. In the present case, the government is of the opinion that the opinions of the civil servant are a condition without which there is no regard for a sensitive position, in the area under the responsibility of the Director of the Administration. This argument cannot stand either in principle or in terms of law. [...]