(-) The considerations and criteria for the operation of the chosen mechanism have not been defined and are not reflected to the public. At the same time, the prime minister is not required to detail the considerations that led him to choose a specific candidate, or to specify which other candidates he disqualified and why (and I will remind us that past experience teaches us that the prime minister's selection of a single candidate for the position of civil service commissioner does not necessarily lead to the identification of the most suitable candidate from a professional point of view (see paragraph 73 of my judgment in the petitions)).
(-) The considerations for the selection of the three members of the Special Appointments Committee are also not open to the public. In this last context, it is not possible not to mention the Prime Minister's conduct after the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing - when shortly after the judgment was rendered and before the request for an additional hearing was submitted, the Prime Minister sought to terminate the term of most of the representatives included in the list, which, if the judgment in the petitions is annulled, would appoint two of the three members of the Special Appointments Committee (see paragraph 48 of the main arguments on behalf of the Attorney General). In the next hearing). Therefore, I find it difficult to accept as an absolute point of departure the statement of my colleague that the Appointments Committee is composed of "members who lack a political overtone" (paragraph 137 of his opinion). To be precise: a person or an appointment can be found to be devoid of "political affiliation," but nevertheless, it bears a political hue, and sometimes even a strong political hue.
(-) Lack of reference in the government's position to the consideration regarding the preservation of the independence and independence of the Civil Service Commissioner. In this context, it is not superfluous to mention that it was the Prime Minister himself who declared in the past that "His full support for the independent statutory status of the Civil Service Commissioner, the constitutional status of the institution of the Civil Service Commissioner, and the importance of maintaining this institution as an independent entity that is not affected by political changes, inter alia, an institution that is not dependent on a change of government" (High Court of Justice 4446/96 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 50(3) 705, 708 (1996) (hereinafter: the Galnoor)). This important consideration - which, as noted, can also be supported in the legislative proceedings of the Appointments Law - was not given real expression in the government's decision and in the discourse that preceded it, nor in the government's arguments in the petitions that are the subject of the additional hearing. I will add that according to the case law, one of the circumstances that may justify shifting the burden of proof to the Authority to show that its decision was based solely on substantive considerations is the existence of a "'silent' decision that testifies to itself that it was based on irrelevant reasons" (AAA 343/09 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality, IsrSC 66(2) 1, 40 (2010); See also the references detailed in paragraph 48 of the judgment in the petitions).