This is the case in our case. Section 6 The law expressly states that the appointment of the commissioner will not be subject to a tender obligation; This means that the legislature is of the opinion that the position of Commissioner justifies an appointment not by way of a tender, and this, as explained above, in order to give the government a tool to realize its policy.
- Thus, from all of the above, it emerges that the purpose of the exemption provision from a tender that is fixed In the section 6 to the law, she Providing a tool for the government to implement its policy. It is clear, therefore, that the relevant considerations for the exercise of the authority to appoint the Commissioner by the permanent government In the section 6 The law derives from the aforesaid purpose of the tender exemption provision.
- What are the considerations, then, that derive from the purpose of the exemption provision from a tender in relation to the appointment of the commissioner? As my colleagues also mentioned, the Vice President Solberg (in the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing) and the judge Mintz, considerations of "conceptual worldview" relate to the candidate's ideological outlook regarding professional issues involved in the position of commissioner, to which government policy is relevant. Consideration of these considerations in the framework of the appointment of the Commissioner is based on the assumption that similarity in such a view will assist in the realization of the government's policy (see also paragraph 40 of the President's judgment in the judgment that is the subject of further discussion).
Therefore, I am of the opinion that in view of the purpose of the Tender Exemption Provision In the section 6 To the law - Providing the government with a tool to implement its policy - The aforementioned considerations are certainly not foreign to the appointment of the Commissioner by the Government, in accordance with its authority under the Section 6 to the law.