Additional Hearing High Court of Justice 70105-05-25 Government of Israel v. Louis Brandeis Institute for Society, Economics and Democracy, The College of Management Academic Track, founded by the Tel Aviv Bureaucracy - part 59

Subsequently, the Appointments Law grants the Civil Service Commissioner various powers in this matter.  For example, Section 15A(b)(1) The Appointments Law instructs the Civil Service Commissioner to take the necessary measures that enable and encourage appropriate representation.  Also, Section 15A(d) This law requires the Civil Service Commissioner to submit to the government every year recommendations regarding the goals it must set for promoting adequate representation among civil service employees.  Section 15a(g) The same law stipulates that the Civil Service Commissioner shall submit to the government and the Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, once a year, a report regarding the actions taken in the matter and data for appropriate representation in the civil service.  It should also be noted that Section 15A(h1) The Appointments Law states that the Civil Service Commissioner may take various enforcement measures in order to ensure compliance with the goals of adequate representation.

17. These are broad powers that have a direct and significant impact on equality and ensuring the representation of diverse populations in the civil service. The direct appointment of the civil service commissioner by the government, in a proceeding that lacks any competitive dimension, undermines these principles and is flawed in two ways.  First, a civil service commissioner who has a political affiliation is liable to give extra weight to pressures of one kind or another to "order" close associates, while pushing considerations relating to equality and the obligation of proper representation to the corner.  As a rule, competitive, equitable and fair appointment procedures go hand in hand with the duty of adequate representation (although they do not necessarily fully fulfill it per se).  SecondThis is also true with regard to the filling of the position of the Civil Service Commissioner himself.  It is clear that a competitive process in relation to it will help candidates from diverse backgrounds to run for the position and be appointed to the senior position.
18. It should be clarified: these words are not "absorbed from the air." Not so long ago, the judgment of this Court was given on the matter of the duty to ensure adequate representation of women in senior positions exempt from a tender (see: High Court of Justice 1363/23 The Women's Caucus in Israel v. The Government [Nevo] (24.2.2025)).  The dismal data presented on the matter clearly show that among the jobs exempt from the tender, the share of women is very low (see: Name, in paragraphs 6 and 46 of the judge's judgment v.  Solberg).  It is not superfluous to mention that the Civil Service Commissioner heads the "Service Committee" which has the authority to exempt jobs from the tender obligation, and that this authority is increasingly being exercised (as stated in paragraph 23 of the original judgment, with reference to the research of Nissim Cohen, Ron Doll and Tal Abutbul Exemptions from a Tender in the Civil Service: The Deviation from the "King's Way" and the Connection to Political Appointments (2024)).  In my opinion, the processes are intertwined: the multiplicity of exemptions from a tender on the one hand, and the erosion of the principles of proper representation on the other.
19. The additional point that I emphasized was that another anchor for the conclusion regarding the obligation to conduct a competitive proceeding is at this time found in the laws of conflict of interest.  As I explained in my original opinion, in circumstances in which the Prime Minister is facing a criminal trial, a process that gives him a primary role in the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner cannot be validated.  This is because the Civil Service Commissioner is involved as a central axis in the process of appointing - and accordingly also in the dismissal - of senior officers in the law enforcement system.  Thus, by virtue of his position, the Civil Service Commissioner serves as a member of the search committees for the appointment of the State Attorney, the Deputy Attorney General (including for criminal matters), and the Commissioner for the Audit of the Prosecution System and the state's representatives in the courts.  In addition, the Civil Service Commissioner sits as a member of the advisory committee that discusses the appointment of the head of the Shin Bet and the police commissioner - and, as noted, also their dismissal.  All of these - and in particular the State Attorney and the Deputy Attorney General - are in positions at this time, and the prime minister who is accused of criminal offenses has a clear personal interest in them.  From my point of view, this is not mere concerns, but rather a real concern of a conflict of interest.
20. My Fellow Judge Willner She commented on this matter that even if my approach on the issue of conflict of interest had been accepted, it would not have led to the relief sought.  This is because even if a competitive process had been conducted in the first stage, the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner would have ultimately reached the government's decision.  I disagree with my colleague on this issue as well.  To the extent that a competitive proceeding had been conducted in relation to the position of civil service commissioner, it would have diluted and distanced the prime minister's involvement in the appointment, even if it had not disappeared entirely.  As is well known, in the laws of conflict of interest, the degree of distance and the guarantees of removal are the main thing, as opposed to a "binary" solution.
21. I will add that since the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing was rendered, there has been another development which, in my opinion, strengthens the concern that I have pointed out - the government's decision regarding the removal of the Attorney General from her position. Indeed, the decision has been annulled in the meantime in the rulings of this court (High Court of Justice 18225-06-25 Gilon v.  Government of Israel [Nevo] (14.12.2025)).  However, it can be inferred from this that the possibility of dismissal of officials in the field of law enforcement is not a distant concern, and in this context there is an important place for the Civil Service Commissioner, who is a member of relevant committees relating to some of the senior officials, as detailed above.  In my view, this is a background data that reflects on the intensity of the fear of a conflict of interest.  Even if the appointment and dismissal procedures of officials such as the State Attorney are complex, and the Civil Service Commissioner cannot carry them out alone, the question must be presented as simple: Is it conceivable that a prime minister who is also accused of criminal offenses would be the leading factor in the appointment of someone who has the power to dismiss senior law enforcement officials? To this I answer in the negative.
22. It's time to finish.  I am therefore sorry that my position was not accepted.  From my point of view, this has followed the accepted path in the fields of public law in Israel, in which Judicial development is an integral, thorough and natural part of the process of formulating the law.