In the Avni case, the defendant claimed that it was forced to cancel the flight as a result of the discovery of a technical failure, which amounts to an unusual and unexpected malfunction, and that the combination of the malfunction with the Yom Kippur landing curfew (when the flight was scheduled to land on the eve of Yom Kippur) created "special circumstances" due to which it had no possibility of preventing the cancellation of the flight. The court ruled that the test of whether to apply the exemption from providing statutory compensation due to the cancellation of a flight resulting from the prevention of the desecration of the Sabbath and the holiday is intrinsically connected to the question of whether the airline did everything in its power to prevent the malfunction that caused the delay that led to the cancellation of the flight due to the prevention of the desecration of the Sabbath and holiday, and this should be examined using the same tools of section 6(e)(1) in such a way that special circumstances and technical failures that could have been foreseen do not meet it. Similarly, if in any case the repair would have taken more than eight hours, or it has not been proven that it would have taken less than eight hours when the burden is on the defendant, this is the reason for canceling the flight and not because of the prevention of desecration of Shabbat and holidays. Let us bring the words in their own words:
"The defendant's counsel reiterated the argument that if it were not for the expected curfew at Ben Gurion Airport, the defendant could have left the flight on time, whether after the plane was repaired or by means of an alternative plane or alternative flights of foreign companies, and she would not have had to cancel the flight. The problem, as clarified above, with regard to the repair of the plane, is incorrect, since according to Mr. Dimri's testimony, the necessary replacement reached him only in the evening. With regard to the other part of the argument - according to which in a different situation, alternatives of an alternative aircraft or alternative flights would have been examined - difficulties arise; First, this does not arise from the defendant's evidence; The defendant's witnesses did not testify to the examination of these alternatives and the fact that they were denied only because of the curfew (except for Ms. Lerman-Levy's general statement that "many attempts were made to find a solution"). Second, but it is reasonable to assume that the introduction of a replacement aircraft is also a time-consuming process - you need to find an aircraft that is suitable for replacing the faulty plane, sometimes flying it from the place in the world where it is located and training it for flight. In relation to all of these, the defendant did not provide any data, and it is not impossible that the time required for her to perform the alternatives would have exceeded 8 hours in any case. In addition, the defendant did not produce data regarding the flights of other airlines that took off at the same time from Ljubljana to Israel, nor did it provide evidence that this alternative was indeed considered and examined in real time. Since no data was brought, on the one hand, it cannot be determined that the defendant proved that had it not been for the short timetable dictated by the landing stop at Ben Gurion Airport, it would have been able to launch the flight in less than 8 hours. On the other hand, it is possible that if the defendant had begun to examine other alternatives, other than repairing the malfunction, as soon as it was discovered while the plane was still in the air, and not only after it was inspected on the ground, a solution would have been found with which the passengers could have been brought to Israel, before the curfew was lifted. The burden of bringing the evidence before the court is on the defendant. Since it did not meet the burden of proving that it had examined other alternatives, other than the repair of the plane, it is not possible to establish factual findings in this matter, and hence the evidentiary conclusion that the defendant did not prove that it was able to prevent the cancellation of the flight and that the cancellation of the flight stemmed from the need not to lead to the desecration of the holiday."