Labor Dispute (Tel Aviv) 44232-09-22 Woldemariam Mahari – Glossy Cleaning M.B. Clean Ltd. - part 38

Mordechai: He didn't say, he told you that in the kitchen there you don't need workers, but,

Batum: Dude,

Mordechai: We have another place for you to come to work. 

Batum: You don't have to, what else to work on, Mordechai? That's my job here, where it's located, you understand?

Mordechai: So what if it's your job?

The Bottom: Dude, don't be confused,

Mordechai: You, you work for our company, you don't work on its behalf. 

Batum: You don't have to, you don't need company.  Who are you anyway? I'll work for a company, a company."

321. In light of the above, and since the plaintiff confirmed in his testimony that he was offered a job at another site by Almog, we determine that the plaintiff's claim that he was fired is rejected.
322. It should be noted that the plaintiff's arguments in the summaries on his behalf that in the present case the provision of section 33 of the expansion order in the cleaning industry applies, and therefore the plaintiff was fired, are incorrect (p. 32 of the plaintiffs' summaries and Appendix 11 to the summaries to which they refer).  This section of the order deals with "change of employers" - that is, it relates to a different legal situation in which there was a change of service providers for the same service provider.  In such a case, the employee should be given the opportunity to announce whether or not he is interested in being employed by the incoming employer (the company that starts its activity for the customer of the services under the outgoing service company), and if he chooses not to continue, he will be considered dismissed.  Here, however, we are not dealing with a case in which the service providers changed in the yeshiva, but rather a situation in which the defendant offered the plaintiff another job offer due to defendant 2's decision to stop the plaintiff's employment with her.  Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is incorrect.
323. Once the plaintiff did not meet the burden imposed on him to prove that he was fired, and once it was proven that he abandoned the job when he refused the defendant's offer of another job, the plaintiff is not entitled to advance notice pay.
324. However, there is no room to accept the defendant's claim regarding offset for failure to give advance notice. From the moment the defendant herself admits that she initially intended to deduct the advance notice fee from the payment to the plaintiff, in the October 2021 slip (and she did so), but in the end she waived her right, and decided not to do so (and amended the slip).  In such a case, it has no right to demand retroactive deduction of the advance notice fee.

Overtime pay

325. The plaintiff claims that he worked six days a week, on Sundays and Fridays. Sunday-Thursday he worked from 7:00 a.m.  to 5:00 p.m., which is about 10 hours of shift.  On Fridays, he worked from 7:00 a.m.  until about 9:00 p.m., which is about 14  Antitrust - about 63 hours per week.
326. As stated above, the plaintiff claims that his salary was calculated in accordance with his actual working hours multiplied by his hourly wage only, and that he did not receive payment for his overtime hours or on Fridays as required by law. Therefore, he petitions for overtime pay in the total sum of ILS 6,740 - which he calculated according to the multiplication of the overtime hours claimed by him by the difference in overtime pay for which he was entitled to receive (25% or 50%) (according to the salary claimed by him, paragraphs 25-27 of the statement of claim).
327. According to the defendant, the plaintiff was indeed employed in cleaning work six days a week. Normally, the plaintiff worked from 7:00 a.m.  to 5:00 p.m.  Sometimes he worked other shifts and overtime.  According to the need and its constraints, the plaintiff sometimes worked less than this format, and all in accordance with the working hours specified in the pay slips.  According to her, the defendant paid him lawfully for the overtime hours as appears from the pay slips (paragraphs 10-13 and 25 of the statement of defense as well as paragraphs 9-10 Mordechai).
328. After reviewing the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion that the law of the claim for overtime work should be dismissed.
329. As stated above, the parties agree that the plaintiff worked six days a week and that the plaintiff generally worked from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., i.e., 10 hours a day.  This was also stated in the notice to the employee signed by the plaintiff.  The plaintiff stated that the recording of the working hours on the pay slip is correct.  In his testimony in court, he first contradicted himself and testified that the recording of the hours on the pay slip was incorrect, but later he testified that he was the one who reported the number of hours and that the hours recorded on the pay slips were correct (  3, paras.  9-16 and p.  6, paras.  6-8 of the pro of the hearing of May 31, 2023).
330. As stated above, Mordechai stated that initially the reporting of working hours was done by the employees on the basis of trust, using an Excel table and a signature at the end of the month (as well as the payment for wage differences). After false reports were discovered, the defendant tried to use the app and time clocks at the work sites, but even there the workers had difficulty and reported from other places or exits.
331. Indeed, the file contains both manual reports (via Excel) and reports made on defendant 2's attendance clock (for the months of 8/21 - 10/21) - this is contrary to the plaintiff's declaration that he did not sign an attendance clock (paragraph 7E of the plaintiff's affidavit). In reports using the attendance clock, it can be seen that the plaintiff did not always bother to sign attendance when he left work.  Therefore, the defendant, according to her, was forced to complete the recording of the hours in the excel report that she prepared in her office (paragraph 94 of the defendant's summaries).
332. As it emerges from these reports, the plaintiff usually worked six days a week (Sunday-Friday). The plaintiff did not work on Saturdays.  Most days the plaintiff worked from 7:00 a.m.  to 5:00 p.m.  Sometimes the plaintiff also worked until later hours (for example, until 19:00) and sometimes he finished work earlier (at 2:00 p.m.).  However, the plaintiff did not work 14 hours on Fridays, as he claimed.
333. The aforementioned work format emerges from both the manual reports and the reports prepared by stamping an attendance clock on the site (for the months of 8/2021 - 10/2021).
334. The defendant presented a recording of a conversation between Mordechai and the plaintiff attesting to an argument regarding the number of hours the plaintiff worked in the last month of his work for the defendant (10/2021). Mordechai claimed that the plaintiff left on the last day at 2:00 p.m., while the plaintiff denied this.  Mordechai told the plaintiff that he had sent him a report for 190 hours, and the plaintiff denied it, claiming that the report was only for 160 hours.  However, Mordechai claimed that since the plaintiff worked only 14 days, 10 hours each day, he was entitled to payment for 140 hours at most (as indicated by the actual pay slip, Mordechai paid him only for 135 hours).
335. In other words, this recording also supports the defendant's version that the plaintiff usually worked 10 hours a day and that there was an argument between the parties regarding the reporting of the hours (in view of problems with the signature). The conversations also indicate that the plaintiff tried to get paid for hours he did not work.
336. The total hours on the pay slips correspond to the total hours on the attendance reports. There are duplicate reports for the months of August 2021 and October 2021, which ostensibly indicate different hours than what was stated in the pay slips.  However, this stems from the fact that during those months the plaintiff did not always bother to sign at the attendance clock, and therefore it was not possible to know when the plaintiff would leave (as also testified by Mordechai, see Mordechai's testimony at p.  58 of the pro of the hearing of September 30, 2024).  The plaintiff was not harmed by this, since the pay slips paid him for a greater number of hours than the plaintiff reported through the attendance clock (this is also true with regard to the month of September 2021, for which there is only a report of hours reported by the attendance clock in a smaller quantity than stated in the slip).
337. Once the plaintiff admitted that the number of hours reported in the pay slips was correct and that attendance reports supporting the defendant's version were submitted to the file - the lawsuit for overtime work should be dismissed, if only for this reason.
338. It should be noted that an examination of the pay slips against the attendance reports shows that there were indeed errors in the classification of the plaintiff's working hours - regular and overtime, while the defendant sometimes counted some of the overtime hours as regular or incomplete hours according to the correct value of the hour (125%, 150%, 175% and 200%) - but at the end of the day the plaintiff received the full payment (and even more). As detailed in the table below, the correct classification of the plaintiff's working hours is as follows: