Family file (Jerusalem) 28115-09-25 Anonymous v. Attorney General - part 2

No appeal was filed against the judgment and it is final.

21. The Applicants decided to expand the family, and this time, Applicant 1 was treated with donor sperm and became pregnant, giving birth to Minor B in 2025.
22. The Applicants raise Minor B jointly, together with Minor A, and manage one family unit, with both of them functioning as mothers with equal rights and obligations in their relationships, in relation to both minors.
23. On January 22, 2026, a decision was issued, according to which Applicant 2 was appointed as additional temporary guardian of Minor B in medical and educational matters, until July 21, 2026, on the assumption that by that date, a judgment would be rendered in this case (the decision was initiated by the court, given Applicant 1's planned trip abroad and leaving the minor in Israel with Applicant 2 for a while). However, it was given the consent of the parties without prejudice to the claims of any of them).  On February 3, 2026, its ruling was signed accordingly.
24. On February 26, 2026, a hearing was held before me. As in the previous proceeding between the parties, she stated that she did not wish to interrogate any of the applicants regarding the database included in their written arguments, and it was clarified that the dispute was limited to the legal question that relates only to the issue of residency, due to the possible impact of the issuance of the requested order on the status of the minor (see the clarification of the respondent's counsel at p.  1, at
    15-19).  The rest of the conditions for granting a judicial parenting order, even according to the guidelines according to which the respondent's position is formulated in proceedings dealing with the issuance of a judicial parenting order, are met.

The parties' arguments

The Applicants' Arguments

25. The Applicants are petitioning, as stated, for a judicial parenting order that will recognize Applicant 2, the non-biological mother, as an additional parent to Minor B, from the date of her birth.
26. The Applicants claim that the judgment given in the case of Minor A, the Applicants' eldest daughter, in which the State's claims regarding the residency requirement were rejected, constitutes an "act of court" and prevents the State from re-litigating those companies. The state did not appeal this ruling, and it became conclusive.
27. The Applicants claim that there is no explicit determination in the law regarding the need for residency as a requirement for the issuance of a judicial parenting order.  The Applicants refer to various rulings of the courts, which rejected or limited the residency requirement, including the judgment in Family Appeal 47781-12-19 State of Israel v.    M.  L., Nevo, given on January 4, 2021 (hereinafter: the case of K.  M.  L.).  They emphasize that the recommendations of the inter-ministerial team from 2018 (hereinafter: the guidelines of the inter-ministerial team), according to which a judicial parenting order should not be issued when the applicants are not citizens or holders of a permanent residence permit in Israel, which the respondent relies on in its objection to the application, are not binding on the court.
28. The Applicants claim that the decision to bring children into the world through sperm donation was shared, planned and financed by both Applicants, and that they function as parents with equal rights and obligations to Minor B from the day she was born, as in relation to Minor A.
29. The Applicants emphasize that the best interest of the minor is the overarching consideration that should guide the proceedings at hand, as it was also the main consideration in the basis of the judgment given in the previous proceeding. They claim that the failure to issue a judicial parenting order as requested and immediately harms the identity, stability and mental well-being of the minor, prevents Applicant 2 from making medical and educational decisions for her, and deprives the minor of rights under the law that will be granted to her, if the order is granted.
30. The Applicants further claim that a situation in which a parenting order is issued in relation to A (the eldest daughter) while a parenting order is not issued in relation to B, is absurd and harms the two minors, the unity of the family unit, and while preventing recognition of the sisterly ties between A and B. They emphasize that the minor's right to identity and family life is a basic right enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
31. According to them, there is no concern of abuse of the process in order to obtain status in Israel, since Applicant 1 is already in a gradual process to arrange her status.

The Respondent's Arguments

32. The Respondent objects to the issuance of the ruling parenting order at this stage, on the grounds that Applicant 1, the biological mother, does not meet the "residency requirement".
33. The Respondent notes that the residency requirement is based on the recommendations of the inter-ministerial team, and on the Respondent's updated policy from 2022. This requirement includes "substantive residency", which means being a citizen or holder of a permanent residence permit in Israel, and "practical residency", which means actual residence in Israel for a defined period of 3 out of 5 years preceding the submission of the application or during 12 of the 18 months preceding the submission of the application.  From the Respondent's arguments it appears that its position that the residency requirement is anchored in the judgment of the Honorable Justice v.  Sohlberg in Tax Appeal 802/21 State of Israel v.  Anonymous (Nevo, given on April 26, 2022) (hereinafter: in Tax Appeal 802/21).
34. The Respondent justifies the residency requirement on the following considerations, on which the recommendations of the inter-ministerial team are based: First, maintaining uniformity in legal arrangements, similar to the Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981 (hereinafter: the Adoption Law) and the Agreements for Carrying Embryos Law (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Newborn), 5756-1996 (hereinafter: the Surrogacy Law), which indicate that the relevant connection that grants the court authority is the residency of the applicants; second, the child's best interest in preventing the splitting of his status in Israel and that of the parent who is not a citizen, in the event that the parent is deported from Israel; Third, preventing the splitting of legal status between countries in the case of the minor, so that in Israel the minor will be recognized as the child of two parents and in his country of residence he will be recognized as a child of a single parent; Fourth, preventing a "shopping forum", i.e., situations in which the spouses will apply to a country where they can obtain a parenting order even though they could not receive it in their country of residence; Fifth, preventing the abuse of the judicial parenting order as a means of acquiring status in Israel; and sixth, the difficulty in providing professional opinions and collecting information when the applicants are not permanent residents.
35. The Respondent argues that a distinction should be made between the case at hand and the case that is the subject of the judgment given in the previous proceeding in the case of Minor A. In the case of Minor A, the minor was by law an Israeli citizen by birth (since Applicant 2 is an Israeli citizen).  In the case of B, the minor is not a citizen of Israel by birth, and her status is derived from the status of her biological mother (Applicant 1), who is a foreign citizen.  The granting of a parenting order to Applicant 2 in this case may have an impact on granting status to the minor, which makes the circumstances different from the previous case.  In any case, the claim of "act of the court" does not apply.
36. The Respondent emphasizes that in accordance with the updated policy that guides it today, in cases such as our case, where the biological parent does not have permanent status in Israel, and the applicant for the judicial parenting order is the Israeli spouse, the granting of the parenting order may grant status to the minor in Israel. For this reason, it is possible, according to the Respondent's position, to agree to the issuance of a judicial parenting order only in the last year of the gradual proceeding.  Applicant 1, the biological mother, received a temporary residence permit of type A/5 on July 23, 2024, and the gradual process takes an extended period of about 4 years in relation to such a license.  At this stage, Applicant 1 is not in the final year of the gradual proceeding - a proceeding that is expected to end in July 2028 - and therefore, at the earliest, the order can only be issued as of July 2027, subject to continued compliance with the conditions.
37. With regard to the issue of "split status" between two minors in the same family, to the extent that the requested order is not granted, the Respondent argues that considerations of the best interest of the child are also examined "in the broad and principled sense", as she puts it, and not only in the concrete case. Granting a judicial parenting order before the biological mother's status has been settled is tantamount to "harnessing the cart before the horses".  There is a possible scenario that the gradual process will cease and Applicant 1 will not be granted status in Israel and she will leave the country.  According to the respondent, given the aforesaid, there is no basis for preferring the prevention of the split of status between the minors in the family, at the cost of creating a substantial split of status between the biological mother, whose status in Israel depends on the continuation of a marital relationship and the center of life in Israel, and her minor daughter, when the issuance of an order may lead to the receipt of status for the minor in Israel.
38. The Respondent argues that it is possible at this stage, and as an interim solution, to suffice with granting temporary guardianship to Applicant 2 over the minor in medical and educational matters.
39. In addition to the aforesaid, the Respondent clarifies that its objection to the parenting order is limited to the non-fulfillment of the residency requirement, while the other conditions for granting the order are met, subject to the presentation of appropriate confirmation regarding the fertilization procedure, which was indeed presented.

Discussion and Decision

40. I will preface by noting that I have found that the application should be granted, although not because of the application of the doctrine of "act of court", which in my opinion does not apply in our case, but for other reasons, which are mainly related to the best interests of the minor; This is similar to the considerations that tipped the scales in the framework of the judgment given in the previous proceeding, and also tipped the scales in other rulings, including those that related to the residency requirement.

Summary of the reasons for the decision

41. As is well known, case law has recognized the model of "parenting by virtue of affinity", which allows for the recognition of a spouse as a parent by virtue of the marital relationship with the biological parent. The assumption is that where a couple maintains a marital relationship prior to the pregnancy and birth proceedings, and during their life together one of them had a genetic child in circumstances in which there was joint planning for his parenting, then it is a joint child of the couple, and accordingly, the non-biological/genetic parent will also be recognized as the additional parent of the child (see: Additional Civil Hearing 1297/20 Additional Hearing High Court of Justice 5591/20 Anonymous v.  Attorney General, Nevo, given on July 25, 2022, paragraph 22).  In addition, in the case of spouses whose relationship is proven and well-founded and the decision regarding the minor's parenthood, including the very parenthood of both spouses in respect of him, was made jointly, the parenting order will determine the parental relationship from the date of birth as the parent of two genetic spouses (Family Appeal 60269-01-17 Attorney General v.  Sol et al.  (Nevo, given on June 26, 2017).
42. In the present case, the dispute is limited only to the non-fulfillment of the residency requirement, which the Respondent seeks to set as a precondition for the granting of a judicial parenting order, and more precisely, the non-existence of substantive residency, since practical residency exists in this case, according to the recommendations of the professional team.
43. The problem is that the courts emphasized that the conditions of residency were not determined by law (see, for example: the case of K.L.M., paragraph 1 of the judgment of the Honorable Justice Shilo, and Family Appeal (Central Circuit) 25494-11-18 Appeal Family v. Anonymous (Nevo, given on September 13, 2020) at para.  22).
44. In any case, and also in accordance with the recommendations of the inter-ministerial team, flexibility should be taken due to the best interests of the minor, and they noted in the exceptions chapter that the welfare authorities should be given discretion to make exceptions in special cases and to examine recognition of parenthood despite the absence of residency (see: paragraph 1.6 of the summary report, and quoted from him in Family Appeal 25494-11-18 , supra, para. 27).
45. I am of the opinion that even according to the policy guiding the respondent - a policy that is not binding on the courts, as is well known - it is correct and proper to classify the case at hand as a case that falls within the scope of the exceptions, in which the granting of the requested order must be granted.
46. We are dealing with applicants who have been in a committed relationship in Israel for years, and who have a joint household and a full family life. They raise Minor A together as two mothers, after a parenting order was issued in the previous proceeding to Applicant 1 in relation to her, and since the birth of Minor B, they have been caring for and raising her together, like the eldest daughter.  The two minors were fertilized from sperm from the same donor.  There is no allegation that the procedure was abused for the purpose of obtaining status for a minor (even if the granting of the order may have an impact on the status of the minor), and the applicants' joint family history even teaches the exact opposite.
47. Failure to issue a judicial parenting order means preventing the existence of another recognized parent for the minor, and not granting Applicant 2 the full range of powers, rights and obligations that exist in law with respect to the relationship between a parent and his child, a result that is contrary to the best interests of the minor. In addition, this will prevent the recognition of the fraternal relationship between the minor and B- and Minor A, contrary to the minor's interest, a reason that also supports the issuance of the requested order.
48. Now, for the details of my reasoning. The applicants' preliminary argument that the judgment given in the previous proceeding constitutes an "act of court" for the purpose of the proceeding at hand will first be discussed.

The question of whether the judgment given in the previous proceeding is an act of court

49. In accordance with the doctrine of a court act by virtue of "estoppel of cause", where a final judgment is rendered, the same judgment grants immunity to the parties (or their substitutes) from another claim based on the same cause of action by the same parties. In this context, the concept of "cause of action" has been given a broad meaning in order to realize the purpose of the rule and to prevent the harassment of the parties in reclaims due to the same act (see, for example: Civil Appeal 303/79 Avni v. Gliksman, IsrSC 35(1) 92, 98 (1980); Civil Appeal 8/83 Gordon v.  Kfar Monash - Moshav Ovdim, IsrSC 38(4) 797, 801 (1985); Civil Appeal Authority 6498/05 Tzvoni v.  Bank Hapoalim in Tax Appeal - Afula Illit Branch (published in Nevo, 23 February 2006) Nina Salzman, Ma'aseh Beit Din in Civil Proceeding, 3-4, 29, 137-141 (1991) (hereinafter: Salzman)).
50. The aforementioned rule includes two branches: the first, estoppel of cause, which establishes, as stated, a procedural barrier to any claim that has already been exhausted in a previous judgment; The second is the estoppel of the company, which establishes a procedural barrier to each of the parties seeking to litigate once more in the case of a company that was necessary for a decision that had already been discussed and decided in a previous judgment, even if the additional litigation is based on a different cause of action (see, for example: Civil Appeal 9551/04 Aspen Construction and Development in Tax Appeal v. State of Israel (Nevo, October 12, 2009), para.  13); Salzman, p.  137].
51. In accordance with the rule of estoppel of cause, a plaintiff must include in his statement of claim all the remedies deriving from the cause of action, and he will be prevented from claiming remedies that he did not claim in his first claim, unless he has received permission from the court to split his remedies.
52. It is self-evident that the Applicants could not have appealed in the framework of the previous proceeding for a judicial parenting order even in relation to Minor B, when Applicant 1 had not yet become pregnant, but only in relation to Minor A, and therefore, it is clear that the rule of estoppel of cause does not apply in our case.
53. As to the rule of estoppel, the case law determined that four conditions must be met in order for it to apply: the first condition is that the company is factually and legally identical to the company discussed in the first proceeding; The second condition is that the parties held litigation in the first proceeding in the same company; The third condition is that the court decided in the first proceeding and made a positive finding about it; The fourth condition is that the decision in the company was essential for the purpose of the judgment in the first proceeding (ibid., at paragraph 43, and see the additional references cited therein: Civil Appeal 8558/01 Eilabon Local Council v. Mekorot Water Company Ltd., IsrSC 57(4) 769, 780 (2003); Civil Appeal 9211/09 Isotest in Tax Appeal v.    Orna Drizin [published in Nevo] para.  10 (July 4, 2012); Salzman, p.  141).
54. These conditions are not met, and certainly not in full, in our case.
55. In the previous proceeding, the Applicants petitioned for a judicial parenting order, according to which Applicant 1 in this proceeding is an additional parent to Minor A. The Respondent objected to the application, and argued that Applicant 1 here does not meet the residency conditions required for the issuance of a judicial parenting order, since she is a foreign citizen from...  No permanent status in Israel but residing in Israel with a work visa.  The state's position was based on the recommendations of the inter-ministerial team that a judicial parenting order should not be issued when one of the spouses is not a citizen or permanent resident of Israel, with certain exceptions.  One of the main reasons for her position was the fear of abuse of the process in order to obtain status in Israel.
56. In my judgment of April 2, 2024, the Applicants' request was granted and a judicial parenting order was granted to Applicant 1 in relation to Minor A, of whom Applicant 2 is her biological mother.
57. The main reason for the judgment was that the best interest of the minor was the main and prevailing consideration, and in that case A's best interest necessitated the issuance of the parenting order requested. The judgment was based, inter alia, on the guiding judgment of the Tel Aviv District Court in the K.M.  L.  case, while holding that the judgment properly balanced the various considerations, including the public interest, and the principle of the best interests of the child, and reflected proper law.  The judgment noted that the state no longer sweepingly adheres to the approach that denies the issuance of a judicial parenting order when one of the spouses is not a citizen or resident of Israel, and that the facts in that case support the granting of the order in favor of the minor.
58. In the judgment, all of the state's arguments, which were based on the recommendations of the inter-ministerial team, were rejected regarding its position as to why a judicial parenting order should not be issued in the absence of residency conditions, while the court relied mainly on the ruling of the Honorable Justice Shilo in the K.M.L.
59. As we have seen, the previous proceeding was indeed conducted between the parties in question and revolved around a dispute regarding the issuance of a judicial parenting order, when one of the spouses is not a civil and does not have a permanent license. However, and as the Respondent rightly argues, the parenting order issued in its framework referred to Applicant 1, who is not an Israeli citizen, and referred to Minor (A), who is an Israeli citizen whom Applicant 2 gave birth, an Israeli citizen, similar to the circumstances that are the subject of the K.M.  L.    In these circumstances, the ruling order issued had no effect on the minor's status in Israel (and it can be assumed that for this reason, the state retroactively accepted the judgment and did not file an appeal against it).  On the other hand, in this case, a judicial parenting order is requested for Applicant 2 for Minor (B) who is not an Israeli citizen, whom Applicant 1 gave birth, who is not an Israeli citizen, and the issuance of the order may have an impact on the status of the minor.
60. Hence, with regard to one reason for the recommendations of the inter-ministerial team, on which the Respondent relies in its position, and which concerns the prevention of abuse in order to acquire status in Israel, the situation in this case is prima facie, the situation in this case is different. In the circumstances of the judgment given in the previous proceeding, this argument was denied since Minor A is in any case an Israeli citizen by virtue of the Israeli biological mother, Applicant 2 here, and the judicial parenting order in itself was not sufficient to grant her status.  In these cases, the fear of abuse does not exist at all (or is less so), as determined in the judgment of K.L.M.  This is in contrast to the aforementioned case, in which the granting of a judicial parenting order to Applicant 2 may have an impact on the status of the minor.
61. Indeed, in the judgment in the previous proceeding, I adopted the flexible approach of the judgment in the K.M.L. case, while giving priority to the principle of the best interests of minor A in the specific circumstances of the case, in which the minor is an Israeli citizen and the two applicants live in Israel and raise her together, similar to the circumstances of the K.M.    case.  And as it was determined in paragraph 85 of the judgment in the previous proceeding: "In summary, in the circumstances of the present case, when Applicant 1 [Applicant 2 here] the genetic mother is an Israeli citizen, and the minor is in any case an Israeli, and while Applicant 2 [Applicant 1 here] is requesting the order, has been living and working in Israel for about 4 years, and the two have been leading a married life and a family and a joint household for about 3.5 years, and have been raising and caring for the minor together since her birth...I see that the request should be granted."
62. 00Admittedly, in the judgment in the previous proceeding, the court also referred in agreement to the words of the court in the case of M.L., according to which a sweeping rule should not be established due to a fear of a minority that will try to take advantage of it, and that cases of suspicion of abuse can be dealt with on a specific basis, but these matters deviated from the decision required in the concrete circumstances.

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63. If so, there is no full identity in the company in the two proceedings, the parties did not hold litigation in the same company in the first proceeding, and the decision on the question in dispute - what is the law when the issuance of the parenting order affects the status of the minor - was not essential for the purpose of the judgment in the previous proceeding. This also prevents the application of the rule of estoppel of her company.
64. The question of whether the aforementioned differences between the previous proceeding and the case that is the subject of the present proceeding, have any bearing on the outcome of the requested judicial parenting order in relation to minor B, is a separate question from the question of the existence of a court action, which I will discuss now.

The Minor's Best Interest as a Growing and Decisive Consideration

65. The principle of the best interest of the minor is, as is well known, the overarching principle that guides the court in any proceeding in which minors are involved, and I have no choice but to repeat, as detailed below, the entirety of what was stated in the judgment given in the previous proceeding, which in itself does not innovate anything, but rather refers to the principles set forth in the law and case law.
66. The term "the best interest of the child" appears several times in the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962 (hereinafter: the Kashrut Law); Thus, for example, section 25 of the Kashrut Law stipulates that in the absence of consent between the parents, the court will decide "as it sees fit in the best interests of the minor."
67. As stated in the judgment given in the previous proceeding and in a variety of court rulings, as such, the principle of the best interests of the child has priority weight in proceedings concerning the minor.  In the words of the Honorable Judge Alon, Other Municipality Applications 121/79 Anonymous v.  Anonymous, IsrSC 34(2) 253):

"As in any matter in this field, in which the well-being and future of a minor is concerned, the guiding and determining rule in any decision whatsoever is the best interest of the minor" (paragraph 7 of the judgment).

68. In the Supreme Court's ruling, it was held that the best interest of the child is his right to be preserved in his physical and mental health, that his mental, physical, including material needs will be properly provided (see: High Court of Justice case 5227/97 Michal David v. Rabbinical Court, Nevo, given on November 11, 1998, at paragraph 11 ).  It was further held, with regard to the principle of the best interests of the child, that this is a flexible, broad and undefined test, which is filled with content by the court according to the evidence and according to its judicial discretion (see: Civil Appeal 2266-93 Anonymous v.  Nevo, given on February 22, 1995, at paragraph 5).
69. It was also determined in the case law, and I noted this in the judgment given in the previous proceeding, that the court's decision must be based on the best interests of the specific child before it. And as it was held inTax Appeal 27/06 Anonymous vs.  Anonymous (published in Nevo, given on May 1, 2006), by the Honorable Judge Arbel:

"In deciding on the question of the best interests of the child, the court must give its decision first and foremost based on the facts of the case before it, and after all the necessary facts have been clarified and any possible damage to the benefit of the child whose fate is subject to the court's decision has been examined" (paragraph 13 of the judgment).

70. In the present case, I am of the opinion that it is in the best interest of the minor that a judicial parenting order be issued today, without any further waiting, due to the reasons enumerated in the previous judgment in the case of A, and which have even greater force now, in the case of minor B, as detailed below, and that this consideration prevails over any consideration relating to the implication of the order that will be given to the status of the minor.
71. The applicants are in a relationship of true and sincere love and relationship, and they have entered into a marriage covenant, and they have been living together for years, and they are conducting themselves together with the minor as a family for all intents and purposes. They take care of the eldest minor A, and raise her together, as mothers with equal rights and duties (after a parenting order was issued to Applicant 1 in relation to A in the previous proceeding) and they are the two parental figures, with whom Minor B has also had a relationship from the day she was born, and presumably also a relationship.  There is no dispute about this.
72. Acceptance of the Respondent's position that the judicial parenting order will be issued only after Applicant 1 reaches the last year in the process of arranging her permanent status, means that Applicant 2 will not have legal obligations towards the minor for the entire period until then. As stated in the judgment given in the previous proceeding, this situation, together with the temporary status of Applicant 1 in Israel, is liable, God forbid, to harm her attitude and sense of obligation towards the minor.  This, while arranging the parenting of Applicant 2 by means of a judicial parenting order will create an increased commitment to the entire family, while investing effort in the relationship with Applicant 1, including, God forbid, if difficulties arise in the relationship, due to the best interests of the minor and the parental commitment of the two Applicants towards her.  Failure to issue a judicial parenting order may incentivize the dissolution of the relationship with intolerable ease when difficulties arise, and may lead to the severance of contact with the minor, in a manner that will severely harm the best interests of the minor, who has been raised and bonded equally to the two applicants since her birth.
73. As stated in the judgment given in the previous case, the issuance of a judicial parenting order means that the minor has two parents, i.e., two mothers, who are her guardians in accordance with the Kashrut Law. In accordance with Section 14 of the Kashrut Law, the parents are the natural guardians of their minor children.  In accordance with section 15 of the law, guardianship includes the duty and right to take care of the minor's needs, including his education, studies, training for work and occupation, and the safeguarding, management and development of his assets, and the right to hold the minor, and to determine his place of residence.  The issuance of the requested order will anchor for both of them the full range of functions prescribed by law to take care of the minor's needs, including her education, studies, training for work and occupation, safeguarding, managing and developing her assets, and the authority to hold the minor and determine her place of residence, as well as the authority to represent her.
74. In addition, in the event that Applicant 1 passes away, before the minor becomes an adult, there will be no parental void, but rather the guardianship of the minor will be for Applicant 2 (section 28 of the Kashrut Law). In addition, to the extent that Applicant 1 is unable to fulfill her role as a guardian, with all the powers, duties and rights entailed under the Kashrut Law, whether permanent or temporary, the minor will still have an additional guardian to whom all the duties, rights and powers under the Kashrut Law will apply.
75. In addition, if a parenting order is issued now, the minor will have two mothers, and both of them will be liable for the maintenance of the minor by virtue of the law. This matter is of increased importance, to the extent that Applicant 1 will not be able to cover the needs of the minor from her sources in a full and satisfactory manner or if the minor's needs increase for one reason or another, in such a way that she will not be able to adequately provide them.  The imposition of the obligation to provide for the minor on Applicant 2 is even more valid, in the event that the Applicants separate, G-d forbid, before the date of July 2027, when the Respondent agrees to the granting of the order, and there will be no one else who will share with Applicant 1 the living expenses and upbringing of the minor, including her bonfire.
76. In addition, and again, as determined in the judgment in the previous proceeding, to the extent that a judicial parenting order is issued now, and God forbid the Applicants separate, it is clear that it is in the best interest of the minor to be in contact not only with Applicant 1, but also with Applicant 2, who serves as an additional parental figure, with all that this entails in terms of determining parental responsibility, custody and the division of time spent there. If a parenting order is not issued now, and the spouses separate, Applicant 2 will not have an obvious right to demand time spent with the minor.  It is easy to assume that the great harm to the minor's best interests will be severed, as long as the connection between her and who she has experienced as the second mother since she was born, and who is connected to her, as with the genetic mother.
77. In addition, a minor is an heir according to the law of both of his parents, and he is entitled to inherit them in the absence of a will. This right will also be denied to the minor, insofar as Applicant 1 passes away, before a judicial parenting order is issued.
78. All of these reasons enumerated in the previous judgment between the parties, which justified the immediate petitions for an application in the previous proceeding in the matter of Minor A, due to the best interests of the minor, apply, in my opinion, even more strongly in the case of Minor B. This, given that Applicant 1 has actually resided in Israel for more than 6 years, a period of about two years longer than the period she was in Israel at the time the previous judgment was rendered; It is at a more advanced stage in the process of grading it to a permanent license, and its status has been upgraded since the judgment in the previous proceeding; and the family life of the applicants has deepened and established even more, and they are raising their eldest daughter A, together as mothers with equal powers, rights and obligations under all laws.
79. Added to these reasons is the fact that the failure to issue a judicial parenting order to Applicant 2 in relation to Minor B or the suspension of its granting will prevent immediate recognition of the fraternal relationship between the minors due to the split in the parenting relationship in the family between the two minors.
80. In this context, I would like to refer to the judgment given in Family Case (Tel Aviv) 70429-03-23 Anonymous v. Attorney General, Ministry of Welfare and Social Services (Nevo, given on August 30, 2023) by the Honorable Justice Y.  Shaked, in a request for a judicial parenting order, in which the respondent's position that the application should not be granted due to the non-fulfillment of the residency requirement, since the two applicants are in a "relocation" in Spain, was rejected.  It is true that there were two Jewish-Israeli requests, but what was said there, in the context quoted below, is relevant to our case, in the context of the minor's best interest in recognizing a fraternal relationship with the eldest minor:

"9.  A careful examination of the case on its merits and of the best interests of the minors in the case before us should lead the Attorney General to determine that it is possible to exclude the applicants and to make the rule of practical residency flexible, all the more so when the couple has a child together who was born in the circumstances detailed above, so that not only the best interest of the child that is the subject of this proceeding is at stake, but also the interest of the additional child to be part of a family in which the identity of both parents (the mothers) is also known and recognized by the state authorities.  With all due respect, any other outcome is unreasonable, illogical, and I find it difficult to come up with a single reason rooted in the best interests of the child and/or a public interest that could have led the Attorney General to continue to hold this position.  Again, because of the importance of the matter, I will repeat what was said that the minor who is the subject of the application had a brother who was recognized as the son of the applicants, if only for this reason of recognizing the sisterly relationship, it was necessary to flex the requirement of practical residency, even if she had any basis in the law.  (v.  9).