In the current state of affairs, the Model Compensation Law is part of the statute book of the State of Israel, and the rulings of the trial court are in law.
Indirect Injuries and Drug Compensation
- After discussing the appellants' arguments in principle, I will now address their specific arguments with respect to the recognition of the respondents as indirect victims, and in relation to the remedy compensation awarded to the deceased's estate and to the respondents.
- As to the recognition of respondents 3-5 as indirect victims. I did not find any substance in the appellants' argument with respect to the affidavits of respondents 3-5, who in any case testified and were cross-examined in the trial court. The appellants' arguments with respect to the expert opinions submitted on behalf of respondents 3-5 should also be rejected. The trial court addressed the appellants' arguments in relation to the opinion – that they were based on a conversation with respondents 3-5 and not on medical or therapeutic documentation; and the great similarity between the opinions, but he did not find that they could reject the experts' conclusions, inter alia, in the absence of a counter-medical opinion. I have not found it necessary to intervene in these determinations, especially given the rule that the appellate court will not be inclined to intervene in the decision of the trial court to adopt an expert opinion (see, among many, Civil Appeal 55027-01-25 The Phoenix Insurance Company in the Appeal Taxes v. Anonymous, paragraph 8 and the references there (August 3, 2025)). Finally, with regard to the argument regarding the necessity of taking medication in order to enter within the scope of Regulation 34(b)(4) of the National Insurance Regulations (Determining the Degree of Disability for Work Accident Victims), 5716-1956, I have noted elsewhere that the language of the Regulation deals with the "need" for medication, "and it cannot be inferred from the fact that the respondent is not taking medication because he does not require such treatment or that it is not possible to determine his disability under this Regulation" (Matter Anonymous 3619/23, in paragraph 16). Therefore, I did not find it necessary to interfere with the trial court's determination that respondents 3-5 meet the conditions of the rule Alsoja They should be recognized as indirect damages.
- And now for the medication compensation. As a rule, the appellate court will not intervene in awarding compensation to the various heads of damages as determined by the trial court, except in cases where there was an unusual and extreme error in the assessment of the damage (Civil Appeal 7895/08 Kalina Eliezer & Sons Engineering Planning and Execution v. Yassin, paragraph 36 and the references therein (August 31, 2011); Civil Appeal 741/10 Cohen v. ZIM Israel Sailing Company Ltd., paragraph 8 (12.10.2010)) In the circumstances of the case, I did not find that there was an unusual error in the assessment of the damage that justifies the intervention of the appellate court. The rulings of the trial court are anchored in the evidence submitted before it, and where it is required – they were given by way of estimate, in a reasonable and customary manner. At the same time, I found it necessary to relate in more detail to two of the appellants' arguments:
(-) I do not believe that the appellants' argument that weight should be given to the exemplary amount of compensation awarded by virtue of the law when awarding medical compensation for non-pecuniary damage should be accepted. The language of the law in this regard is clear – the injured party is entitled to exemplary compensation "In addition to any other compensation awarded, if it was ruled in his favor in a tort claim filed for that act" (section 2(b) of the Law). Moreover, I noted above that the purpose of the law was "to dress up in accordance with the existing law, insofar as it applies to the situation, and add to it" (Transcript 157 of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, at p. 34). Therefore, medication compensation for non-pecuniary damage on the one hand and exemplary compensation by virtue of the law on the other.