12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D. 51 (2)
- A careful examination of all of the above shows that in real time, the municipality did not claim that the assessment had become conclusive as early as 2018, as it now claims. All that was claimed was that the plaintiffs knew about the existence of the assessment and were supposed to collect the payment voucher - However, it was not claimed that this was done. Unloaded - A stick that has not been proven - that the assessment with its details was lawfully provided to the defendants in 2018, and therefore the date for filing an appeal has passed. Therefore, I reject the argument that the assessment is final.
- However, the defendants' argument that the claim should be dismissed out of hand due to delay is also not and cannot be accepted. Attorney General's Directive No. 7.1002 relating toActivation of administrative collection proceedings according to The Tax Ordinance (Collection), as its name implies, refers to the operation of collection procedures Administrative Only. Section 1.2(a) of the Directive states that "as long as the limitation period has not passed, the Authority may submit Civil Action to the court against the debtor" (emphasis added). Therefore, the claim of delay is rejected.
The late request to amend the statement of defense and to dismiss the claim should not be granted
- As already noted, this action was filed with the court after the parties had already corresponded between them. Thus, their arguments regarding the betterment levy were clarified and the front of the dispute was determined: the question of whether the defendants transferred to each other the rights in the land "without consideration". Both the Municipality and the defendants addressed this front at the very beginning of the proceeding - in their pleadings and in the first hearing that took place before me. The same front was also before the parties in the statements submitted after the first hearing, in which they agreed to a decision without hearing witnesses (clarification on behalf of the plaintiff and supplementary statement on behalf of the defendants, dated May 12, 2025). This, and this alone, was the front to which the parties referred in their summaries in the second hearing that took place before me.
Copied from Nevo8. I will not be able to accept the defendants' request. The application states an entirely new ground: it no longer relates to the date of payment of the betterment levy, but rather to its rate as determined by the municipality. There is no mention of this cause in the statement of defense and it has, until now, had no mention of it in the management of the defense affair. The addition of a new cause of action and a substantive amendment of the defendants' defense in its wake will require the beginning of the hearing from the beginning. I will not be able to allow. The assessment was never attached to the writings of any of the parties to this proceeding prior to the defendants' last request. It was not clarified before the court. The parties did not claim anything about it. Raising a claim in respect of it only after the court suggested to the defendants that the claim be accepted, while the municipality waived the collection differences, is a major deviation from the rules of procedure and the fundamental principle of conducting a proceeding efficiently and in good faith (Fifth Regulation of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018). Therefore, I did not find room to allow the statement of defense to be amended at this advanced stage of the proceeding (Issachar Rosen Zvi: The Civil Procedure Reform 336 (July 2025)).