Moreover, in contrast to the cases that were scanned by me above and examined by the Supreme Court in the framework of determining the case law - the uniqueness of the case at hand lies in the fact that in this case it is not a one-time signing event, but rather a plaintiff who added and signed appendices to the loan agreement, an additional mortgage deed, and yes, debt arrangements on no less than seven occasions. Thus, as detailed in paragraph 13 above of the judgment, the plaintiff signed appendices in which the amount of the loan was increased or its repayment date changed on 11/3/18, 11/11/18, 13/1/19 and 29/4/19. In addition, the plaintiff signed a mortgage deed with no limit of amount on May 15, 2019 (as detailed in paragraph 15 above of the judgment). Moreover, the plaintiff even signed debt arrangements on January 12, 2020 and June 25, 2020. I will note that in the framework of the last debt arrangement that the plaintiff signed, special provisions were also made relating to the realization of the apartment in which Goldberg was held, and it was also emphasized that this arrangement does not infringe on the defendant's right to repay from the plaintiff's residential apartment.
- The plaintiff's signature in general and in such a large number of separate events in particular establishes a presumption that the plaintiff read the documents she signed and that her signature is binding on her (see in this regard the Supreme Court's ruling in the Gilman case as detailed in paragraph 87 above of my judgment). This is unless the plaintiff denies the presumption of significant positive evidence.
I am of the opinion that in the present case, not only did the plaintiff not negate the validity of the said presumption, but on the contrary - the evidence shows - that the plaintiff did indeed understand the significance of the documents she signed and the risks she undertook.
This determination of mine is based first and foremost on the plaintiff's failure to present any factual version as to the events of her signature, apart from the presentation of a version as to what happened at the first signing event and the signing of the mortgage deed (and it is documented that she did not clarify in this matter in her affidavit to which of the two mortgage deeds to which her claims relate). Thus, as detailed above at length in the framework of the plaintiff's arguments (and see also paragraphs 10-16 of the affidavit in this regard), the plaintiff claimed that when she signed the loan agreement she met with Adv. Winder for a short period of time, and he did not give her any explanations as to the nature of the loan, the risks that she assumes and the protections she has in law and her waiver of these defenses. The problem is that the plaintiff filled her mouth with water and although, as detailed above, she signed documents related to the loan - appendices, debt arrangements and an additional mortgage deed - the plaintiff did not specify under what circumstances she signed these documents (apart from a general argument in paragraph 22 of the affidavit, according to which she signed the appendices at her husband's request, whom she "relied on with her eyes closed"). In this context, I will note that for the first time in the framework of her summaries, the plaintiff made a factual claim that was not supported by the affidavit and which was not mentioned before - according to which nothing was explained to her even at the time of the additional signing events. This argument is clear that it should not be accepted, since it was first argued in the plaintiff's summaries and and was not supported by either sexual or some of the evidence presented by the plaintiff in the proceeding.