Alongside the view presented above, i.e., that there is not necessarily a need for the existence of a contractual relationship as a condition for an employee-employer relationship, President Barak made another distinction with regard to the contractual relationship. This additional distinction is in fact at the basis of the judgments in the Official in both instances. The distinction is that officers by virtue of the law are "dual-essential" employees. The existence of a relationship by virtue of public law does not prevent the simultaneous existence of another relationship of a contractual nature in the field of private law. The status of workers by virtue of the law (and, in our case, elected officials) is characterized by a "normative duality" that allows the application of all or part of the "protective laws" to them as well. The recognition of normative duality is, in retrospect, the axis around it, as stated in the judgment in the Official This will be clarified later. On the basis of the aforementioned observations, and after reaching the conclusion that the content that should be poured into the concepts of employee and employer can change and must adapt itself to the concrete framework being examined, President Barak moved on to examine the question of whether the matter of unemployment insurance is relevant to the fact that it is a position by virtue of the law (as opposed to a contractual arrangement between the parties). This examination led to the conclusion that "The purpose underlying unemployment insurance is inconsistent with the approach, that someone who was employed by virtue of the law is not insured by unemployment insurance. The reasons underlying unemployment insurance apply equally to both those who are employed by virtue of the law and those who are employed outside the law.". Similarly, the Labor Court reached the conclusion in our case that when it comes to the protection of wages, an elected official should also be regarded as an employee.These rulings apply not only to the relationship with the National Insurance Institute, but also to the application of other laws to the employment relationship(p. 8 of the judgment of Justice A. Barak-Ososkin of the National Court). President Adler put it unequivocally: "In accordance with the purpose of the Wage Protection Law As I discussed, inter alia, in the case of charity, certain provisions of this law must apply to an elected official, namely the provisions relating to the obligation to pay wages and the obligation to pay it on time".
- The state argues in its petition that the path taken by the court is wrong and that it led it to the wrong conclusion. The court examined the relief requested, i.e., the protection of his wages that are appropriate (or unworthy) Official andNachmani and came to the conclusion that this remedy should also be given to elected officials, hence his authority to hear claims. However, according to the state, the court acquires its authority by virtue of the existence of an employee-employer relationship as stated in theSection 24(a)(1) to the law. Only after the existence of these is clarified will the question of relief be examined. "In order for an elected official to enter the gates of the Labor Court, he must first prove the existence of an employee-employer relationship and the existence of a cause of action stemming from that relationship as part of the argument of jurisdiction. The absence of these blocks his claim due to the hurdle of authority..." (paragraph 113 of the petition's arguments). The state relies on this matter Halamish, There, Justice M. Cheshin said that:
"Indeed, there are times when the court's jurisdiction is determined according to the relief requested. Thus, for example, is the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court in the matter of claims for payment of money, and so is its jurisdiction regarding possession or use of land (sections 51(a)(2) and (3) of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version, 5744-1984]. See, for example: Civil Appeal 27/77 Toby v. Rafaeli, IsrSC 31 (3) 561, and Civil Appeal 510/82 Hassan v. Feldman, IsrSC 37(3) 1 (cited in Justice Barak's opinion).