However, this is not always the case. Thus, the authority of the Labor Court depends on itself - as stipulated in section 24(a)(1) ofthe Labor Court Law - not on the remedy but on the substance:
in the existence of an employee-employer relationship; and once an employee-employer relationship has existed, a plaintiff in a labor court may claim any relief that the court is authorized and may grant. The jurisdiction of the Labor Court is therefore not similar to that of the Magistrate's Court: the authority of the latter is determined by the relief, the authority of the former is determined by the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. See also: High Court of Justice 675/84 The General Histadrut of Workers in Eretz Yisrael v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa Regional Labor Court, IsrSC 39(3) 13." (pp. 666-667).
Employee-employer relations do not exist in our case. In its petition, the state enumerates a long list of differences between an elected official and an employee according to the accepted and proper tests in its opinion, with the obvious conclusion, according to it, being that a public servant should not be considered an employee. The same conclusion can also be reached according to a purposive interpretation of the law (all according to the state's approach). The purpose of The Labor Court Law is to establish a tribunal specializing in labor law with its special rules and rules. When administrative law is to be applied (as is argued with regard to the facts of the two cases before us), the Labor Court has no advantage, and in any case it has no jurisdiction (section 114 of the petition).
- The state's position, as stated above, involves a number of issues, with one issue holding on to the other's heels, sometimes without the ability to separate them. The questions are sometimes circular questions, with the catalogue of status, the question of relief, and the purpose of the legislation intertwined and not necessarily standing one after the other in a certain order as the Petitioner requests.
As for myself, it is doubtful whether it is possible to create the clear and sharp dichotomy that is the basis for the state's argument, between the acquisition of the authority under the law, and the relief sought. This is especially the case if we depart from the basic assumption as expressed in Parashat Official (and in the references included therein), that is, that labor relations are a dynamic and evolving matter, the work frameworks change, new times give rise to new frameworks, and therefore it is possible that even someone who was not previously recognized as an employee will receive a change of status and recognition as an employee, along with the possibility of recognizing that he is an employee for a certain matter, and not recognizing it for an anonymous matter. The key word is flexibility and a substantive examination - and these, as stated, are inconsistent with the dichotomy between the question of status and the other components of the claim (any claim). A perusal of the petition before us will indicate that the state is also not adhering to, perhaps because it is not possible, with the same sterile separation between the question of status and the additional issues that arise in one case or another. Thus, for example, in relation to the subject Purpose The enactment of the law (in support of the argument that the Labor Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the salaries of elected officials) indicates that there is no room to recognize the authority where it is required to apply the rules of administrative law (since the Labor Court's expertise is in labor law). And what is this argument, if not a glimpse forward, to the requested remedy, and the questions that will need to be discussed in order to reach a conclusion as to whether it is appropriate to grant it.