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- In response to the completion of the argument on behalf of the state, which was filed on February 13, 2026 according to the permission granted, the appellant argues that the state is based on offenses under Israeli law, which include a component of penetrating a prohibited area on a computer or bypassing an authorization mechanism - but the American indictment does not attribute such an act to the appellant. The state's position, it is claimed, assumes that sending the Ordinance to the smart contracts ("process()") constitutes a circumvention of the authorization mechanism set by Nomad, but in practice it is a proper use of the smart contracts, which is in accordance with the definitions of the system's programmers. As to the other offenses, the appellant argues that the State does not dispute that there is no parallel offense, normatively, in Israeli law to the offense of transferring stolen goods, and that it is not possible to bridge the gap by attributing other offenses to the appellant.
Discussion and Decision
- After reviewing the arguments of the parties and hearing their arguments, I have come to the conclusion that the appellant's arguments should be rejected. I found that the requirement of "double criminality" exists both in relation to the offense of computer fraud and in relation to the offense of transferring stolen goods, and that there is a basis for the charge of money laundering.
- As is well known, one of the basic principles in extradition proceedings is the principle of "dual criminality", according to which a wanted person may be extradited only for an act that is punishable, both according to the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State (in our case - the State of Israel). The formal enshrinment of this principle is found in section 2(a) ofthe Extradition Law, which states that an "extradition offense" is "any offense that if committed in Israel is punishable by one year's imprisonment or a more severe punishment" (section 2(a) of the Extradition Law (emphasis added)). At the international level, this principle plays a role in ensuring reciprocity in the extradition relations between the requesting State and the requested State (see: Criminal Appeal 6717/09 Ozifa v. Attorney General, para. 25 (December 6, 2010) (hereinafter: the Ozifa case); Criminal Appeal 7742/15 Anonymous v. Attorney General, para. 8 (August 28, 2016) (Request for an additional hearing was denied inAdditional Criminal Hearing 7108/16)). No less important, the principle of dual criminality is important in protecting the constitutional right of the wanted person to liberty, and in preserving the principles and values of the state in question. This principle ensures that a wanted person will not be extradited for an act that in the eyes of the requested state does not deem appropriate for significant punishment (S.Z. Feller, Extradition Law 176 (1980); A. 8013/21 Attorney General v. Cohen, para. 26 (April 27, 2022) (Request for an additional hearing was denied inAdditional Criminal Hearing 3009/22). For more on the balance between these two purposes in extradition laws, see: Criminal Appeal 2612/23 Gaber v. State of Israel, paragraphs 19-21 (November 11, 2024)).
On the other hand, The dual criminality requirement does not require full overlap between all the components of the parallel offenses in the two countries. There is nothing wrong with the fact that legal systems define similar criminal offenses differently, and the fact that there are certain differences between the definition of the offense in the requested country and its definition in the requesting country does not impair the purposes of the dual criminality principle described above. Therefore, it was held that The requirement of dual criminality should not be interpreted in a narrow and precise manner, and that the comparison between the various offenses must be made"Flexibly and liberally" (Criminal Appeal 459/12 Amara v. State of Israel, paragraph 32 (March 13, 2013). See also: Criminal Appeal 205/73 Ross v. State of IsraelIsrSC 27(2) 365, 373 (1973); 50"S 6974/20 Leifer v. Attorney General, paragraph 13 (December 15, 2020)).
- Offense of computer fraud: Most of the appellant's arguments were directed at the existence of an Israeli counterpart to this offense. For the sake of convenience, I will present the offenses on which the State relies in theComputers Law, accompanied by the relevant definitions:
Definitions
- In this law -
"Computer Material" - Software or Information;