"Information" means data, signs, concepts or instructions, other than software, expressed in a computer reading language, and stored on a computer or other storage [...]
"Software" - a set of instructions expressed in the language of computer reading, which is capable of causing a computer to function or perform an action by a computer [...] or that is inherent or unified with the computer in some way or is separate from [...]
Disruption or interference with a computer or computer material
- 2. Anyone who unlawfully commits one of the following shall be sentenced to three years' imprisonment: [...]
(2) Deletes computer material, causes changes thereto, disrupts it in any other way, or interferes with its use.
Unlawful intrusion into computer material
- Anyone who unlawfully penetrates computer material found on a computer is liable to imprisonment for three years; for this purpose, "penetration of computer material" means penetration by means of a connection or connection with a computer, or by operating it, but with the exception of penetration of computer material that is eavesdropping under the Wiretapping Law, 5739-1979.
Penetration of computer material in order to commit another offense
- A person who commits an act prohibited under section 4 in order to commit an offense under any law, except according to this law, shall be sentenced to five years' imprisonment.
- The appellant argues that the acts attributed to him do not constitute an offense under the Computers Law because the actions he took were done "in accordance with the internal logic of the smart contract", and did not include entry without authorization or the shutdown of the Nomad system. I am of the opinion that this argument is wrong. The explanation for this goes both on the legal level and on the technological-practical level.
- First, to the legal level. This court has not yet held a comprehensive hearing regarding the interpretation of the offense of disruption or interference with computer material, but in the matter of Criminal Appeal Authority 8464/14 State of Israel v. Ezra (December 15, 2015) (hereinafter: the Ezra case), the interpretation of the additional offense to which the State seeks to equate the acts attributed to the appellant - penetration of computer material in order to commit another offense was discussed at length. In the ruling, Deputy President Elyakim Rubinstein clarified that the two components that define the applicability of the offense - "penetration of computer material" that is done "unlawfully" - should be interpreted extensively in order to prevent cases in which technological changes will negate the applicability of the offense, even though the values protected by it are still violated:
It seems to me that the prevailing opinion among scholars should be accepted, according to which the term "penetration" should be interpreted in a broad sense. A faithful interpretation of the purpose of the law, and especially from a forward-looking perspective, requires a general definition of "intrusion", so that any information "entering" the computer - whether generated by another computer or generated as a result of the user's activity on the computer - establishes the behavioral requirement in the offense. It seems that this is also in line with common sense, which, in my opinion, seeks to reduce "escape routes." If we give the term "penetration" an interpretation related to a specific technology that is before our eyes today, we will be forced to participate against our will in a constant game of "cat and mouse", and as we know, the technology is tens of times faster than the law. As for the interpretation of the term "unlawfully", it seems that the proper interpretation of the term is the use of a computer in the absence of the consent of its owner.