Later in his interrogation, the defendant again answered as to the motives that led him to give a false version, stating: "... Coming back I see a human being, our eyes meet and I didn't want to tell them that I saw the person and go out to a lawsuit ..... That's why I made up the story" (p. 514, lines 5-7).
- Thus, the defendant tried to provide explanations for his lies as reflected in his statements to the police, stating that he did not want to "go out to prosecute" (see, for example, Mini Many, p. 509 of the transcript, line 20 and p. 514, line 6).
I have not lost sight of the defendant's version, As it was first brought before us, Regarding the identity of a third party who was present at the scene of the murder on the night of the incident. It is worth noting, Because His statement, in this context, is not credible. Add to that, it is a suppressed testimony. Hence, the weight of such testimony, as determined in a series of judgments, is small, due to the suspicion that naturally arises as to its veracity; This is as long as the witness does not have a convincing explanation that satisfies the reasons for suppressing the testimony.
For example, in a criminal appeal 1645/08 Anonymous v. State of Israel [Published in Nevo] (03.09.09), the court referred to the suppressed testimony:
"The rule that applies to the matter of suppressed testimony is that the value and evidentiary weight of the testimony is limited due to the suspicion that naturally arises as to its truthfulness. This is so long as the witness does not have a convincing and satisfactory explanation for the reasons for which he conquered his testimony (see: Criminal Appeal 5386/05 Al-Horti v. State of Israel ([published in Nevo], 18 May 2006); Criminal Appeal 4297/98 Hershtik v. State of Israel, IsrSC 45(4) 673, 687 - 688 (2000); Criminal Appeal 3625/91 Or v. State of Israel ([published in Nevo], June 9, 1993) paragraph 19 of the judgment of Justice Levin; Criminal Appeal 154/85 Abrushemi v. State of Israel, IsrSC 41(1) 387, 399 (1987)). The length of time after which testimony will be considered occupied is not determined according to a clear and rigid criterion, but it is determined in any case according to its circumstances... The center of gravity is not placed on the duration of the silence, but rather on the reason for which the witness chose the information in his possession, as well as on the change in circumstances that motivated the disclosure of the information."