Hence; The question arises, what led the defendant to decide to kill the deceased?
Since there was not sufficient evidence to show that Y. used to turn around and ride an electric bicycle, the question arises – who had an interest in attacking and/or stabbing the deceased who was riding an electric bicycle? After all, where the only explanation that the accuser had as to the reason for the defendant's action and the place in which it was not proven, a motive for the defendant to attack the cyclist whose face was covered was omitted, the answer to this question remains unclear, even if the claim that there was indeed a dispute between the defendant and Y. is correct.
In other words, the defendant claimed, at first, to the informants, that he mistakenly believed that the deceased who was riding his bicycle at that time was none other than Y., who also owned an electric bicycle. After the defendant's statements to the informants were disqualified (yes, after he retracted these statements) and no evidence was produced regarding the aforementioned issue, there is no longer any basis for the claim that the defendant mistakenly thought that the deceased was Y. Yes, later in the interrogation process, when the police confronted the defendant with his confession to the informants (in the framework of the tenth interrogation of March 15, 2016 (see P/101)), the defendant claimed as follows: "And as I said, I no longer know this Evyatar Kaitz, I have nothing to do with him, and you can also bring Y. here and ask me if I am in conflict with him. And the fact that he attacked me, no problem. The police came to me that day and I won't file a complaint." (ibid., p. 53).
Relevant Rulings Regarding Whistleblowers and Disqualification of Confessions
- It is not possible to conclude this judgment without referring to some of the judgments that were rendered only recently (some of which were quoted above) in relation to the same issue that was on our table in the framework of the proceeding here; It is the invalidation of confessions obtained before informants because they are inadmissible. For the sake of clarity, I will note that the parties referred in their arguments to some of those judgments.
- In the framework of her arguments, the accuser referred to the decision as given in the case Serious Crimes Case (Center) 932-01-16 State of Israel v. Ben Uliel [Published in Nevo] (Dated June 19, 2018) (Hereinafter: "The Duma affair"). As part of that decision, the District Court invalidated some of the confessions (while accepting another part). Referring to the interrogation exercise, which included the use of informants, the court there ruled (in section 378) that this was a sophisticated, complex and meticulously planned exercise, which included many people involved and lasted for a considerable number of days. However, this is not a flawed ploy that may lead to the invalidation of the defendant's confessions given during the exercise. At most, this is a "tolerable" ploy. Later, in section 379 of the same decision, he held as follows:
Even if there was a considerable atmosphere of pressure in the various parts of the exercise, the active and wooden voice of a number of informants was used, and even taking into account the defendant's minority and his stay with adults, this is not a flawed ploy and flaws that could lead to the invalidation of his confessions to the informants. No explicit or implicit threats were made against the defendant, and there were no measures taken to effectively negate his free will to confess. Even if the means created a difficult atmosphere of pressure, sometimes hostile, and great discomfort for the defendant, they do not have the force required to determine that accepting the confession will lead to a significant violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial. "