Further to the judgment in the Mirz case, in the same case, see the Joseph (Criminal Appeal 6932/17) [Published in Nevo]; There, in accordance with this judgment, the respondents were acquitted, due to doubt, of bribery and obstruction of justice for which they were accused. One of the questions discussed in the judgment was whether the court was correct in determining that the confession of an employee of the Tax Department (Mirez) before the informants could not be relied upon as evidence of the defendants' conviction of the offenses attributed to them. The same Miraz was convicted of taking bribes and obstruction of justice based on the same factual set detailed in the indictment. The main evidence that led to Miraz's conviction was the confession he made to informants while he was in custody. This was after the minor claim he raised was rejected by the Supreme Court. The fact that this confession led to the conviction of Mirz does not necessarily mean that it should be accepted as evidence and relied upon for the purpose of convicting the respondents. Indeed, in this case, after reviewing the confession to informants and the tests for invalidating the confession, it reached the conclusion that it was appropriate to invalidate that confession, since it was not given freely and voluntarily, but only under the pressure of threats of physical harm that he had experienced, and after realizing that he had to convince his cellmates that he had committed offenses in order for them to believe him that he was not an undercover policeman. It should be added that in this case, too, the documentation of the interrogations did not include visual documentation that could have provided a complete and exhaustive picture of what happened in the detention cell.
- More, on the subject Elzam, the Supreme Court acquitted the late Yonatan Elzam, who was convicted of the murder of Hananya Ohana against the background of a struggle between criminal organizations, and then found his death in prison under unknown circumstances. It was determined that the actions of the informants who were brought into his cell exceeded the scope of legitimate subterfuges in the investigation and violated his basic rights: the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, in a way that incriminating findings cannot be based on. The Supreme Court, by a majority opinion, ruled that the informants' actions exceeded the scope of legitimate subterfuge in the investigation and deteriorated into improper actions that undermine Elzam's most basic rights as a suspect in a criminal proceeding, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. The informants coaxed Elzam to relinquish his right to remain silent, after causing him to question the defense counsel. To this end, the informants did not hesitate to cast aspersions on the professional integrity of defense attorneys in general and of the particular defense attorney in particular, and even persuaded Elzam to fire him, and in the meantime they offered Elzam "legal" advice, misrepresenting the matter, and developing Elzam's dependence on them. In doing so, the informants violated not only the right to silence that was about to be silenced, but also another right that was recognized by law as a first-class right for a criminal suspect, namely the right to be represented by a lawyer and to consult with him. Contrary to our case, even after Elzam confessed to the informants, he later confessed to the interrogators as well and even reconstructed the murder, and his confessions included many details that corresponded to the findings of the investigation and even prepared details.
In addition to this, unlike the Elzam case, in our case – we are dealing with a minor, whose confession came to the informants only 18 minutes later, after massive pressure was exerted on him, as detailed above. Even after his confession to the informants, the defendant here continued to maintain his right to remain silent (while denying the commission of any offense) for the duration of all his many and intensive interrogations (which were not documented visually) that lasted for many hours. Again, it should be noted that the defendant's confession to the informants is inappropriate, in its bulk, with findings and facts that are not in dispute, all as detailed above.
- In the matter MustHav (Criminal Appeal 2868/13 the above); The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant of the offenses of conspiracy to commit a crime, murder, and robbery, by virtue of the doctrine of judicial invalidation, in view of the violation of the appellant's rights, first and foremost the severe violation of the right to consult with a lawyer.
The court rejected the argument that a relationship of dependence and authority was created between the appellant and the informant, as well as the claim of a violation of the appellant's right to counsel, insofar as they relate to the question of the admissibility of the confession according to Article 12 to the command. The relationship between the appellant and the informant was not characterized by the exercise of authority on the part of the informant, and no relationship of dependence was created between them, which denied the appellant's freedom of choice. In addition, the appellant was aware of his rights and insisted on their realization, and it cannot be said that his free will was substantially impaired, due to the conduct of the interrogators and the informant during the interrogation, to the extent that the confession should be invalidated according to Article 12. In addition, the gratitude to the informant there passed the internal and external test. In light of the aforesaid, the appellant's arguments regarding the admissibility of his confession to the informant, as well as the claims regarding its internal and external weight, were rejected.