Civil Appeal 48399-09-24 Anonymous. Anonymous - part 4

Hence, unlike a prenuptial agreement between married couples, an agreement that regulates the property relationship between common-law couples does not require approval in order to be validated.  At the same time, the family courts are indeed authorized to approve it and in this way strengthen its binding status.

8. The result that emerges from what has been described so far is that in practice, the approval of "prenuptial agreements" for married couples (even before marriage) is done as a matter of day to day by virtue of the Property Relations Law, whereas the approval of property agreements between common-law spouses is also common, but this is by virtue of Family Court Law.  The case before us relates to the "confluence" point between the laws - and raises the question of whether the transition to marriage requires a new agreement to be drawn up and approved once again.  As emphasized, the question relates only to those cases in which the common-law couple Explicitly state in the agreement they made between them that they wish to apply it in the case of a future marriage as well.

The facts of the case

9. The proceeding before us originated in an agreement entered into on August 14, 2023 between the appellant and the respondent (hereinafter together: The couple or The Parties), that they are common-law partners, and bear the title "Prenuptial Agreement and Joint Life" (hereinafter: Prenuptial Agreement or The Agreement). The agreement mainly detailed the property belonging to each of the spouses at the time of its signing, as well as the manner in which the property would be divided between the two during the marital relationship and in the event of separation.  The preamble to the agreement also states that "the couple is interested in regulating the financial relations between them within the framework of this agreement, which will remain in effect even if they move together and/or marry each other," and that the couple "wishes to stipulate in this agreement any law and law that applies to them."
10. On August 17, 2023, the couple filed a joint application with the Family Court in Petah Tikva to give effect to a judgment on the prenuptial agreement, by virtue of the Section 3(III) Law Family Court.  On September 14, 2023, after the parties appeared before it, the Family Court gave approval and validity of a judgment to the agreement (Agreement File 42228-08-23, The Judge N.  Gadish).  It should be noted that in this context, the Family Court explicitly stated that the agreement will be valid by virtue of the Property Relations Law and the law Family Court.
11. Without elaborating, later that day, September 14, 2023, a joint request to amend the minutes was filed by the parties. This, given that it was stated in the minutes that they agreed that if they decide to marry in the future, they will have to reapprove the agreement, this time as a married couple.  The motion argues that this trial contradicts the parties' agreement and the judgment.
12. On October 29, 2023, another decision was issued by the Family Court, in which the request to amend the minutes was rejected.  The decision states that if the couple decides to marry in the future, they will have to re-approve the agreement by virtue of the Property Relations Law, applies only to married couples.  It also stated, in contrast to what was stated in the original agreed judgment, that the agreement is valid only by virtue of the Family Court Law.
13. On December 18, 2023, the appellant, with the respondent's consent, filed an appeal to the District Court. The appeal argues that the Family Court's decision will lead to "real chaos" on this issue and will lead to a "flood" of the family courts - due to the need to obtain recertification of agreements made or litigation between parties seeking to repudiate agreements they made in the past.  In this context, the appeal noted that in its first decision on the matter, the Family Court itself noted in its judgment that the agreement could also be validated by virtue of the Property Relations Law.
14. On July 3, 2024, the District Court held a hearing in the presence of the parties (Family Appeal 36827-12-23, [Nevo] Vice President V. Plaut, the judge Z.  Weizmann and the judge C.  Gradstein Pepkin).  The next day, on July 4, 2024, he issued a judgment rejecting the appeal.  The District Court ruled that a common-law couple who entered into an agreement that was brought for approval without the intention of marrying shortly after it was drafted, will be required to re-approve it by virtue of the Property Relations Law If they marry.  In the meantime, it was emphasized that in accordance with the Cohen, Property Relations Law It does not apply to unmarried couples.  The District Court explained, referring to other judgments handed down in district courts, that contracts that are made without a clear separation between the stage at which the couple is a common-law spouse and the stage in which they are married should be avoided, since this can "disrupt the areas, increase disputes and create an opening for unnecessary problems" (at paragraph 9).  The District Court was also of the opinion that drafting the agreement in this way undermines the requirement to approve a prenuptial agreement.  The District Court further clarified that the parties cannot rely even on the Family Court's determination that the agreement can also be validated by virtue of the Family Court Law And also by virtue of Property Relations Law, noting that it was written "apparently out of the routine of the tongue and the keyboard race" (in paragraph 10).  Finally, the District Court commented that this was said beyond what was necessary since the couple does not intend to marry in the near future, so the demand for further approval of the agreement is a theoretical question at this time.

The Proceedings in This Court

15. As stated above, the proceeding in question, which originated in the application for leave to appeal that was filed, is unique in the sense that the parties are not rivals to each other, but rather - together - seek to challenge the legal determination of the previous courts.
16. The appeal before us is directed at the judgment of the District Court, in which it was argued, in essence, that the couple's case raises questions of principle regarding the need to re-approve a prenuptial agreement in accordance with the provisions of the Property Relations Law As long as the two decide to get married. This is while the agreement was approved long ago before the Family Court when the couple were common-law partners and when the agreement explicitly stipulated that its provisions would continue to apply to the extent that the two married each other.  It was further argued that this issue raises an additional question regarding the definition of the "period of time" within which the parties can sign a prenuptial agreement by virtue of the marriage Property Relations Law.  It was argued that since the legislature did not stipulate in the framework of the Property Relations Law A defined period of time, insofar as the parties have declared the possibility of marrying, the agreement can be considered as one signed on the eve of the marriage.  Subsequently, it was argued that a decision on the question that arises in this case is necessary in view of the inconsistency in the rulings of the various courts that were required to address the issue, as well as the fact that there are other common-law couples who entered into agreements relating to the possibility of marriage and have already relied on the approval given to them.  Considerations were also noted that support the fact that no additional approval would be required, including the striving for certainty, the need to respect the parties' apriorial consent to such a provision, preventing the burden that could prevent prenuptial agreements from being drafted, and the fact that the agreement had already been approved by the court.
17. Taking into account the principled nature of the proceeding, as well as the fact that there was no real "other side" in it, on December 29, 2024, it was decided that the case would be transferred to the panel for hearing, and the Attorney General's position on the issues that arise from it was requested.  Ultimately, on September 1, 2025, the Attorney General announced that she was appearing for the present proceeding by virtue of her authority under the Section 1 to the Procedure Ordinance (Appearance of the Attorney General) [New Version], and at the same time, a position was submitted on its behalf.
18. The Attorney General noted in her statement that the request does indeed raise a question of principle that requires a decision, since this is an issue that recurs in the courts, and has even received conflicting responses.  In the meantime, it was noted that despite the difficulty in locating judicial decisions of the type in question (due to the fact that these proceedings are conducted behind closed doors), a review of the published judgments shows that the rulings of the trial courts expressed different positions on the matter.
19. On the substance of the matter, the Attorney General is of the opinion that a textual examination of the Property Relations Law I tolerate the two interpretive alternatives that must be chosen between - both the interpretation according to which a prenuptial agreement on the occasion of marriage must be reaffirmed by virtue of the Prenuptial Relations Law, and the interpretation according to which if a common-law couple has drawn up a prenuptial agreement and expressly expressed their desire to apply it even in the case of marriage, no additional validity is required for the agreement.  According to the Attorney General's position, choosing the second interpretive alternative means that as long as the couple is a common-law partner, the agreement between them, which has received the approval of the Family Court, will be valid by virtue of Family Court Law, whereas at the stage of marriage, its validity will be based on Property Relations Law.  It was also argued that although the Property Relations Law does not apply to unmarried couples, it seems that its language allows (In Sections 2(c) and(C1) 36) the drafting of the prenuptial agreement at the premarital stage, without reference to the explicit point in time at which things should be done.  It was also argued that the demand from common-law couples to reaffirm the agreement between them regarding the marriage by virtue of the Property Relations Law, undermines the logic of this law, which is intended to allow couples to arrange their marital relationship in advance.
20. The Attorney General was not required to decide between the two interpretive alternatives that she defined as possible. At the same time, she argued that in any event, if the first alternative is accepted, according to which a prenuptial agreement on the occasion of the marriage must be reapproved, it would be appropriate to establish in the judgment a transitional provision accordingly.  According to her, the transitional provision should recognize the validity of agreements made by a couple while they were common-law partners, and it was specified in them that they would also apply at the time of marriage, to the extent that they had already been approved by the Family Court (so that no additional approval would be required in relation to them after the marriage).  This is in view of the variation in judgments given on the issue and the parties' reliance on agreements that have been signed and approved in the past.
21. On September 17, 2025, the parties submitted a supplementary response on their behalf to the position of the Attorney General, in which it was argued, in essence, that the second alternative proposed by the parties should be adopted, according to which no additional approval was required for the agreement they signed. The parties argue that despite the fact that common-law couples are not obligated to approve an agreement that they make between them, in this case they chose to regulate the property relations between them and give them validity, while anticipating the future possibility of their marriage and referring to it explicitly.  Among other things, it was argued that the demand for re-approval of the agreement imposes on the parties an unnecessary procedural burden that undermines the principles of legal certainty and respect for the will of the parties, a disadvantage that is even more intensified in the context of a marital relationship.  In this situation, it was argued, conflicts may arise between the spouses out of fear of "blackmail" by either of them, in a way that may even undermine the possibility of institutionalizing the relationship between them.  It was also argued that it is not appropriate to delimit precisely the period of time that allows the approval of the agreement, which is defined in the law as "before marriage".  This is because, in the reality of life, a couple may plan their marriage months or even years in advance, and later on, against their will, postpone the date of the marriage for an indefinite period.
22. The hearing was held before us on November 17, 2025, in which the parties reiterated their position, while clarifying that the request was directed only at cases in which the agreement explicitly stated that the parties' desire was to apply it even if they decided to marry.  In addition, the Attorney General's counsel reiterated the importance of deciding the issue in order to provide a guiding interpretive answer to the question that arose and to enable the direction of behavior.
23. After hearing the arguments and considering them, the time has therefore come to render our ruling.

Discussion and Decision

24. As mentioned, The appeal before us raises the question of whether the Family Court is authorized to approve an agreement to regulate the property relations between common-law spouses, who wish to explicitly state that its provisions will continue to apply to them even if they marry (so that even after the marriage it will be considered a binding prenuptial agreement without an additional process of approval). My answer to this is in the affirmative.
25. In principle, theAn issue that has been placed before us is found in the "seam line" between two laws that grant complementary powers to the Family Court.  Section 3(c) to the law, as it has long been interpreted in the matter of Singer, allows the approval of agreements to regulate the property relationship between common-law spouses.  There is no dispute about this.  At the same time, Section 2 Law Prenuptial Relations, in accordance with his interpretation of the matter Cohen, allows for the approval of a prenuptial agreement between married spouses, and even requires that it be done in order to give binding effect to the agreement.
26. I will preface by saying that I cannot accept the District Court's determination that the question before us is theoretical.  There is no doubt that for the parties before us, the question of the validity of the agreement may be important for planning their steps.  Moreover, the decision on this question is important in view of its implications for many other couples who sought to approve an agreement that they entered into as common-law couples and included provisions relating to the period of the marriage, if any.  It is not superfluous to note that The request for leave to appeal mentioned other cases in which the Family Court gave effect to an agreement signed by common-law couples.  Approval of agreements in those cases was given at the joint request of the parties, without a dispute arising between them, while they included explicit provisions regarding the applicability in the case of marriage.  The question, then, is certainly not theoretical from the perspective of these many couples.
27. If so, after examining the arguments of the parties as a whole, I have reached an opinion that there is room to accept the appeal and adopt The interpretation according to which a property agreement between a common-law spouse that was approved by the Family Court and includes an explicit provision that what is stated in it will continue to bind the couple even if they choose to marry in the future will not require an additional approval process to the extent that the couple has realized their will and married later.

The Language of the Property Relations Law

28. The beginning of any interpretive process of legislation is in its language. Exam Sections 2(a)-(c1) The Property Relations Law teaches that these include various provisions addressed to the Family Court or the religious courts, as well as to the Marriage Registrar and the notary.  While the Family Court and the Religious Court are authorized Confirm Prenuptial agreement, marriage registrar and notary can Verify Prenuptial agreement.  According to the section, verification can come in place of the approval of the court or tribunal.  It is also important to note that In Sections 2(III)-(C1) With regard to the marriage registrar and the notary, it was explicitly stated that they could also be approached to verify an agreement made "before the marriage", Without defining the said time period precisely.  On the other hand, In the section 2(A) - The person at the center of the present proceeding - there is no reference to the time dimension, and there is no formal restriction on the date on which the relevant court may approve a prenuptial agreement.  It should be clarified that The recent ruling of this court clearly shows that the authority of the family court to approve a prenuptial agreement also extends to the period before the marriage (See, for example: Matter Cohen, at p.  679; P"m 9692/02 Anonymous vs.  AnonymousIsrSC 62(3) 29, 35-36 (2007); High Court of Justice 473/24, paragraph 34), and this is the practice practiced in the trial courts as a matter of day-to-day affairs.  This conclusion is also required by way of "kal ve-chor": If the Marriage Registrar and a notary are authorized to authenticate a prenuptial agreement, it is clear that the Family Court's broader jurisdiction also allows for this.  In fact, support for this conclusion can also be found in an examination of legislative history.  Without exhaustion, it should be noted that the original wording of the section, as it appeared in the Property Relations Law Between spouses, 5729-1969, there was an explicit distinction between the authority of the registrar of marriage to authenticate an agreement "before the marriage or at the time of the conduct of the marriage", and the court or religious court whose authority to approve an agreement was defined as applying to an agreement "made during the period of the marriage".  This box was ultimately omitted from the language of the section in order to authorize the judicial courts to approve an agreement even before the marriage, without any distinction in this regard between them and the marriage registrars (see: Transcript No.  133 of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of July 7, 1971).
29. It may be added that in the matter of Cohen Explained When approving a prenuptial agreement, the family court is not required to validate the marriage itself. In that case, it was also determined, in a specific manner, in relation to a prenuptial agreement that was entered into and submitted for approval Before marriage, because "according to all opinions, the court is not able to clarify at that time, what will be the validity of the marriage that will come (if it comes)" (Name, at p.  679).  If so, The starting point is that the court is authorized to approve prenuptial agreements even before the marriage.
30. In their arguments, the parties addressed at length the question of the duration of the period that can be considered "before the marriage", and in particular to what extent it requires proximity to the date of the marriage. However, in fact, a sharp decision on this exegetical question is not directly required here.  Indeed, It is reasonable to assume that in a typical case, the drafting and approval of a prenuptial agreement is done close to the planned marriage.  However, from a linguistic point of view, the law does not impose any additional restrictions.  In this state of affairs, I believe that When a couple explicitly declares the possibility of getting married, and is preparing for it, it can suffice to approve the agreement at this stage.
31. In my opinion, There is nothing in the language of the legislation to prevent the Family Court - which is the competent court for both approving a property agreement for common-law spouses and approving a prenuptial agreement for married couples (alongside the parallel authority of the religious court) - to do so in relation to a single comprehensive agreement in which both situations are explicitly addressed. Thus, the Family Court is entitled to exercise these powers simultaneously and act in a "two-hat" manner, both according to Family Court Law and according to Property Relations Law.

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32. It should be clarified that this does not stretch the scope of the Property Relations Law Even for couples who are not married at all. At the stage when the couple is a common-law partner, the agreements approved under the Family Court Law.  Only if and when they choose to exercise the possibility of marriage will the provision in the agreement that explicitly relate to the period of the marriage be included in the agreement.  With regard to this state of affairs, the Family Court acts by virtue of its authority according to Property Relations Law Approve this type of agreement "before marriage".  Therefore, there is no contradiction between the arrangements.  In this context, the words that were said on the matter are beautiful Singer:

"Indeed, to the extent that the Property Relations Law does not apply to common-law spouses, the Family Court Law fills in the gaps...  The provision in the Family Court Law does not contradict the provisions in the Property Relations Law, but rather the provisions complement each other.  Together, the two laws allow the spouses living together to agree among themselves on a monetary regime that regulates the property issues related to living together..." (ibid., at p.  499).