| The National Labor Court | |
| Labor Appeal 53036-03-20
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Given on 12 April 2021
| David Peled | The Appellant | |
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| מדינת ישראל | The Respondent | |
| Before: Vice President Ilan Itach, Judge Leah Gliksman, Judge Hani Ofek Gendler
Public Representative (Employees) Mr. Yossi Rahamim, Public Representative (Employers) Mr. Doron Kempler Counsel for the appellant – Adv. David Salton Counsel for the Respondent – Adv. Tal Zarko |
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| Judgment
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Judge Hani Ofek Gendler
- We have before us an appeal against the judgment of the Tel Aviv Regional Court (Senior Judge Idit Itzkowitz and representatives of the public, Mr. Gavriel Nevo and Mr. Moshe Kfir; LCA 31822-12-18), [published in Nevo] in its framework it was determined that the District Court, sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs, is the competent court to hear the appellant's claim, which was filed on the grounds that he was dismissed from the prison service (hereinafter: the Prison Service or the State) in contravention of the provisions of the Discharged Soldiers (Return to Work) Law, 5719-1949 (hereinafter: the Law or the Discharged Soldiers Law) and not the Employment Committee under the Discharged Soldiers Law.
- The appellant was employed by the Israel Prison Service from 6 June 2016 until 22 September 2017. Following his dismissal, he filed a financial claim in the amount of NIS 70,734 by virtue of section 21(a) of the Discharged Soldiers Law, and in Gedera he claimed that he had been dismissed from the Prison Service in violation of the provisions of the Discharged Soldiers Law. The appellant further claimed in his claim that the IPS Procedure 02-2018 for the service of prison guards in reserve contradicts the provisions of the Reserve Service Law, 5768-2008 and therefore has no legal validity. We will preface the latter and note already during the hearing before us, the appellant argued, "The issue of the legality of the procedure can be deleted from the letter of claim, and then we will suffice with an indirect attack. that the committee certainly has the authority to attack [indirectly] whether the procedure was followed or not, and whether this was a reason... " (p. 3, lines 1-3 of the transcript). Therefore, the focus below is only on the monetary claim.
- Hence the question of which court is competent to hear claims filed by a prison guard (or police officer) and whose grounds are based on the Discharged Soldiers Law.
The Normative Framework
- Section 24(a)(1) of the Labor Court Law, 5729-1969 (hereinafter: the Labor Court Law) establishes the principle that claims between an employee and an employer whose cause is an employment relationship (with the exception of torts that are not listed in section 24(a)(1b) of the Labor Court Law) are within the substantive jurisdiction of the Labor Court. Thus it is stated:
"(a)(1) In claims between an employee or his successor and the employer or his successor arising out of an employment relationship, including the question regarding the very existence of an employment relationship, and with the exception of an action that arose inthe Torts Ordinance [New Version]...".