The plaintiff will argue that the defendant's attempt to cause the plaintiff to refrain from reserve service creates an absolute presumption that the dismissal was of the most serious type – morally and legally – dismissal due to reserve service. (emphasis in original).
Clarification of this argument of the respondent is necessary in order to establish a causal connection between the administrative decision to dismiss him and the reserve service. This causal connection is a condition for the respondent to have the right to the damages claimed by him. All of this will require the Employment Committee to discuss and rule on the question of whether the administrative decision to dismiss the respondent is lawful or not. Therefore, we are of the opinion that we are dealing with an indirect attack on the administrative decision under the guise of a claim for financial relief."
- As for the second question, it was held as follows (paragraph 9 of the judgment):
"In other words, the legislature intended that all administrative decisions made by the IPS in matters specified in section 129(a) of the Prisons Ordinance would be heard only in the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, and then, with the enactment of the Administrative Courts Law, in the District Court sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs.
[...]
Therefore, since we have determined that in the respondent's lawsuit we are dealing with an indirect attack on the IPS's decision to dismiss him, even if this assault stems from a breach that originates in the Discharged Soldiers Law, the authority to hear this matter rests solely with the Court for Administrative Affairs."
- The third question was decided as follows (paragraph 10 of the judgment):
"There is no dispute that the Discharged Soldiers Law, which preceded the establishment of the Administrative Courts, did not authorize the Court for Administrative Affairs to hear claims under it. The Administrative Courts Law also does not explicitly authorize the Court for Administrative Affairs to hear claims under the Discharged Soldiers Law, but authorizes it to hear direct attacks on administrative decisions under section 129(a) of the Prisons Ordinance, by virtue of section 5 and section 37 of the Second Addendum to the Administrative Courts Law.