Civil Case (Haifa) 66167-12-19 Anonymous v. State of Israel – Ministry of Public Security - part 2

-           As a result of the assault, the plaintiff suffered pain in his face and chest and suffered a rub in the calf of his left leg.  Due to his mental state and the pain that the plaintiff felt, his father drove him to the hospital, despite the fact that it was on Shabbat and despite the fact that they were both religious people, observant of the Sabbath;

-           In his actions described above, the policeman unlawfully attacked the plaintiff.

3. An agreement was signed between the police officer and the State Attorney's Office - the Department for the Investigation of Police (see: p. 6 of the defendants' exhibits file).  In the framework of clause 6 of the agreement, it was explicitly stated that in describing the events for which the police officer will be convicted, the parties will not deviate from the facts in the indictment, will not contradict them or add to them.
4. On July 13, 2014, and on the basis of his admission to the facts of the amended indictment, the policeman was convicted of assault causing actual injury (see: p. 10 of the defendants' exhibits file).
5. On May 5, 2015, the plaintiff and the policeman signed a "Injury Healing Agreement" (see: Appendix A to the affidavits of the third party's main testimony), in which it was agreed, inter alia, that the policeman would pay the plaintiff a sum of ILS 8,000 to repair the injuries caused to the plaintiff as a result of the assault. An appendix was attached to this agreement, according to which the plaintiff undertook not to sue the policeman in a civil lawsuit.  Moreover, the parties agreed that if a civil lawsuit was filed against the Israel Police in the future and the court obligated the policeman to pay compensation, then the plaintiff undertook not to collect the amount of compensation from the policeman.
6. In light of the aforementioned agreement, the plaintiff claimed that he was barred from suing the policeman (see: paragraph 10 of the statement of claim). Hence, the plaintiff refrained from suing the attacking policeman.  However, the latter was sued by the defendants, who sent the notice against him to a third party.  In this context, I will already clarify that the exemption granted by the plaintiff to the tortfeasor employee does not bind the plaintiff against the tortfeasor's employer, since it was not included in the agreement exempting the tortfeasor [see: Amos Herman, Torts Law, Second Edition, 2020, pp.  211-212) (hereinafter: Herman)].

The main arguments of the parties

7. The plaintiff claimed that the police and the Ministry of Public Security bear direct and vicarious responsibility for the damagescaused by and. It was claimed that they were the ones who sent the policeman on a mission during which the plaintiff was injured; they were the ones who should have instructed and briefed the policeman but failed to do so; and that they violated the "social contract" (the contract of trust between the citizen and the state).
8. It was also claimed that the Ministry of Public Security had not issued warning instructions; did not act as the Office of the Commissioner of Citizens' Security should do; did not enact appropriate regulations and laws; It did not give appropriate instructions to the police on an individual basis regarding the manner in which the police officers were absorbed, trained and trained in all matters relating to their behavior vis-à-vis the civilian population that came into contact with the police, and did not set appropriate standards for the police.
9. As for the police, it was claimed that it failed to select the policeman and recruit him to the police; did not brief him or supervise his work; did not sharpen its provisions before it embarked on activity in the field; placed the policeman in a position that was not suitable for him; employed an incompetent and unfit police officer for the task to which he was sent and did not act as a reasonable police would have done in the circumstances. It was further argued that in this case there was no justification for the use of violence.  All the more so since we are dealing with a group of minors.
10. Moreover, it was argued that the defendants are liable by virtue of their vicarious liability for the tort of assault committed by the attacking policeman, when the attacking policeman has no protection from those enumerated in section 24 of the Ordinance. It was further emphasized that the incident occurred after an employer's immunity for assault by his employee was revoked, an immunity that had previously been anchored in the provision of section 25 of the Ordinance
11. The plaintiff further claimed that the defendants violated the provisions of sections 7, 23, 24, 35 and 36 of the Torts Ordinance; Sections 3-7 of the Civil Damages Law (State Liability) as well as Sections 40 and 49 of the Police Ordinance.
12. The defendants, on the other hand, argued that the claim against them should be dismissed due to the delay in filing it. The lawsuit was filed about nine years after the incident.  This caused the defendants severe evidentiary damage and prevented them from conducting a full examination of the facts and circumstances alleged in the lawsuit.  I have already said that the law of the claim is to be rejected, and there is nothing but regret that it should be raised by the state.  The state conducted a comprehensive investigation into the circumstances of the incident in real time; attached investigative material and all the statements taken from all those involved in the affair and from all the witnesses who were present at the event; filed an indictment against the attacking policeman, who was convicted at the end of the day.  It is regrettable that the state saw fit to rely on the claim of delay, with all the investigations carried out in real time; all the required information; The determinations and findings in the judgment of the court that convicted the attacking policeman.  Moreover, the claim of delay was not proven at all and was even neglected in the affidavit of the only witness whose testimony was brought on behalf of the state.  To raise an argument in the affidavit of the main witness, according to which "several years have passed since the incident that is the subject of the lawsuit, and therefore I do not remember the incident and its details" is clearly not evidence that can establish the necessary foundations to prove the claim of delay.
13. With regard to the conviction of the policeman in the amended indictment, the defendants argued that in light of the provision of section 42A of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, the findings and conclusions of the judgment in the criminal case (criminal case 57197-03-14) are admissible as prima facie evidence in the proceedings at hand. Subject to the findings and conclusions of the judgment in the aforementioned criminal proceeding, the defendants denied everything alleged in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the statement of claim (where the plaintiff detailed the circumstances of the incident, according to him, and claimed the state's responsibility for the tort of assault as well).
14. The defendants further argued that the assault for which the policeman was convicted of criminal offenses was certainly not carried out in the course of the performance of his regular duties as a police officer on behalf of the Israel Police, and therefore, no liability arose on the defendants for the incident that is the subject of the lawsuit, which it could not have foreseen, and certainly did not approve or ratify, and on the contrary, it dismissed the attacking policeman after his conviction in the criminal proceeding (see: paragraph 9 of the statement of defense). The defendant reiterated her claim that the policeman, in the course of the incident, acted on her behalf and that his action was not done within the framework of his regular role as a police officer at the time, and that his action was unexpected (see: paragraph 11.A of the statement of defense).
15. The defendants denied their alleged liability, both direct and vicarious. They denied all the details of the negligence attributed to them in the lawsuit and the alleged violation of the statutory provisions.  It was further argued that the full liability lies with the plaintiff himself and the third party.
16. The defendants further denied all the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
17. In the notice to the third party, the state argued that the attacking policeman must indemnify it for any amount it is charged, to the extent that it is charged in the lawsuit. It was argued that the responsibility for the incident and the damages lies entirely with the third party who acted in contravention of the state's instructions and procedures; acted out of personal purpose or intentionally or maliciously; breached the duty of care imposed on him towards the plaintiff and towards the state; attacked the plaintiff and thereby violated the provisions of the Penal Law and the Torts Ordinance; did not act as a reasonable person or police officer would under the circumstances or act as a reasonable person and police officer would not have acted under the circumstances.
18. The third party petitioned to reject the notice against him. It was argued that once a mediation arrangement was reached in the framework of the criminal proceeding, when both the plaintiff and the sender of the notice trusted and approved it, there is no longer any cause of action against the third party.  It should already be noted that the third party abandoned its claim in this context.  However, he argued that if he was obligated to pay the plaintiff any sum, then the amount paid by him should be offset in the framework of such mediation arrangement.
19. The third party claimed that the state had acted with him in a conflict of interest and in bad faith. It was argued that in light of the recommendations of the report, it is very possible that the third party was not convicted in the criminal proceeding, "and only because of the representation of the state, which did not comply with the recommendations of the report, was he convicted, and therefore the sender of the notice that she did not give proper representation to the defendant in the criminal case cannot come today and request that the third party be charged again and pay the compensation..." (See: Section 3.e of the statement of defense in the notice against the third party).  This claim was also abandoned by the third party during the continued management of the case.
20. The third party also denied the plaintiff's alleged damages.

The parties' evidence

21. The following witnesses testified on behalf of the plaintiff: the plaintiff himself; his ex-wife, Mrs. A.F.; his former employer, Mr. Erez Avichai; the plaintiff's friend who witnessed the incident, Mr. Nachman Twito; Another acquaintance and former employer of the plaintiff, Mr. Moshe Israel Ben Haim.
22. On behalf of the defendants, Mr. Assaf Zioni testified, who was at the relevant time of the incident, the head of the Intelligence Bureau of Detectives in the Hebron Region, and is now the head of the Israel Police's Special Operations Unit.
23. On behalf of the third party, he testified only himself.

Discussion and Decision

24. It should be said already that the lawsuit should be accepted. The same applies to the notice to the third party.

I will explain my determination.

25. Before giving the reasons, I will only add another introduction and note that the parties have extensively articulated and argued. On behalf of the plaintiff, testimonies were also brought that could have been spared by hearing. Therefore, in the framework of the judgment, I will focus only on the main arguments and testimonies in the case.  Arguments and testimonies that will not be discussed in the judgment are arguments and testimonies in which I have not found any substance. 

Back to the reasoning.

26. In light of the principle of equal status, it is clear that there is no longer any dispute about the state's liability in torts. "... This principle, according to which the law of the state is the same as that of any incorporated body in the matter of liability in torts, has been adopted in Israeli law since 1952 and it grows out of the basic principle of equality before the law.  Therefore, where the State, by means of its conveyors or the executors of its powers, negligently causes damage to a certain person, it will be obliged to compensate him for such damage, with the exception of exceptional cases prescribed in the Civil Torts (State Liability) Law, 5712-1952 (see: ibid., paragraph 18; Civil Appeal 243/83 Jerusalem Municipality v.  Gordon, IsrSC 39(1) 113, 131 (1985); Civil Appeal 915/91 State of Israel v.  Levy, IsrSC 48(3) 45, 71 (1994)).[See: Civil Appeal 9656/08 State of Israel v.  Jamal Amir Kazem Halaf Saeedi, (Nevo, December 15, 2011) and Civil Appeal 7224/21 State of Israel v.  Anonymous, (Nevo August 6, 2023), para.  10].  Needless to say, our case is not one of the exceptional cases set forth in the Civil Torts (State Liability) Law, 5712-1952, and no state has claimed this.
27. Therefore, for the purposes of the hearing, it is necessary to examine the question of whether the defendants' liability for damages following the assault carried out by the police officer has been proven and whether their duty to compensate the plaintiff for his damages fromthe assault has arisen.

Police Responsibility:

28. Vicarious liability: I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving the vicarious liability of the police. To be precise, the court does not attribute the criminal act of assault itself to the police (i.e., the court does not impose liability on the police by virtue of the doctrine of organs, which identifies between the act of the perpetrator and the organ), but rather vicarious tort liability for the act of assault by virtue of the provision of section 13 of the Torts Ordinance.
29. The Torts Ordinance establishes four situations in which vicarious liability arises: Section 12 of the Ordinance sets out the conditions for imposing liability on the solicitor; Section 13 sets out the conditions for imposing liability on the employer; Section 14 sets out the conditions for imposing liability on the sender; and Section 15 sets out the conditions for imposing liability on a contractor vis-à-vis an independent contractor (see: Herman, at p. 208).
30. The situation relevant to our case is the second situation, so I will focus below on the provision of section 13 of the Torts Ordinance. According to this section, and in order to impose tort liability on the police for the act of assault committed by the policeman, it must be shown, first of all, that the employee, the policeman, committed a tort. In our case, there is no dispute that the policeman committed the tort of assault and had no protection from those enumerated in section 24 of the Ordinance.  The state's argument that the criminal conviction constitutes only prima facie evidence is correct.  However, the plaintiff succeeded in proving that the tort of assault was committed against him by the attacking policeman, and the state did not bring a single shred of evidence to refute the claim.  The second condition is that there was an employee-employer relationship between the police and the policeman, in the sense of the test of control, and not only the actual control, but also the right to control, transform, and supervise [for illustrative purposes only and without exhaustion, see: Civil Appeal 502/78 State of Israel v.  Nissim, (Nevo, November 12, 1981)].  This condition is also met, and the police did not even claim that there is no employee-employer relationship between it and the attacking police officer in the aforementioned sense.  The third and final condition - that the tort was committed in the course of the work, as stated in the provision of section 13(a) of the Ordinance [see: the provision of section 13(a)(2) is relevant in the circumstances at hand.  The provision of section 13(a)(1) of the Ordinance further establishes a situation in which the vicarious liability of the employer will be determined (if the employer authorized or ratified the act), but this situation is not relevant to our case].  This condition is also fulfilled in the circumstances at hand.  The policeman attacked the plaintiff during a policing operation.
31. The conditions that exclude the employer's obligation (see: section 13(2)(a) and (b) of the Ordinance) are also not fulfilled in this case.
32. The state argued that the assault should not be considered an act that was done while the policeman was working. I do not accept this argument. I will elaborate: In accordance with the provision of section 13(b) of the Ordinance, "an act shall be deemed to have been done in the course of the employee's work, if he did so as an employee and when he performs the duties of his work and which are involved in it, even though the employee's act was an improper performance of an act authorized by the employer, but an act performed by the employee for his own purposes and not for the employer's interest, shall not be regarded as such." [Section 13(c) states that "for the purposes of this section, an act - including omission"].  The state argues that it cannot be said that a criminal offense (in our case, the assault) is "improper performance of an act authorized by the employer." I do not agree with the claim.  First of all, if the legislature wished to exclude "criminal acts" from the framework of the definition of "improper performance of an act authorized by the employer", it is presumed that it would have done so explicitly.  Since this has not been done, it is clear that the argument that the criminality of the act nullifies, in part and with, the employer's liability for the damage caused by the assault committed by the employee during his work should not be accepted.  Moreover, the revocation of the provision of section 25 of the Torts Ordinance indicates the legislature's intention not to grant an exemption from liability to the employer following an assault committed by the employee.  [In a parenthetical article, I will note that the The aforementioned section 25 stipulates that the employer will not be liable for vicarious liability for damage caused as a result of assault, false and accessible imprisonment, which were carried out by the employee and were not permitted or ratified by the employer.  As stated, this section has already been repealed, in accordance with the Law to Amend the Torts Ordinance (No.  10), 5765-2005].
33. Moreover, the provision of section 13(b) of the Ordinance does not require any permit or approval on the part of the employer for the act of assault. Therefore, the state's repudiation of the act or the prosecution of the police officer for criminal or disciplinary proceedings is also of no importance, or the fact that immunity was not granted to the policeman. These situations do not diminish the police's tortious liability for the act of assault committed by the policeman in the course of his work.  In order to exempt the police from its vicarious responsibility, a complete deviation from the framework of the performance of the duty and outside the framework of the position is required, which does not exist in our case [see and compare: Civil Appeal 8199/01 Estate of the Late Ofer Miro v.  Miro et al., (Nevo, March 10, 2003) and Civil Appeal Authority 1389/98 Mazawi v.  State of Israel, (Nevo, June 3, 1999); Civil Appeal 8027/14 Shorosh v.  Shalian, (Nevo 29.11.2015) and Herman at p.  213]
34. All parties agree that in fact the attack was not an explanation and there was no justification. Neither the state nor the attacking police officer raised any claim in this regard.
35. In the circumstances detailed above, it is clear that all the elements of the tort of negligence were also met. For even if it is a deliberate act or out of some mistaken thought on the part of the policeman, the tort of negligence also applies to intentional acts [see: Yitzhak Englard, Aharon Barak, Mishael Cheshin, Gad Tedeschi The Law of Torts - General Torts (2nd ed., 1977, G. Tedeschi ed.) 88-104].
36. The truth can be said that there was no justification on the part of the police to shirk its vicarious responsibility for the attack in question. A review of our case law shows that in many similar cases, the police were liable for damages to victims when it was found that the assaults were "improper performance of an act authorized by the employer" [see, for example, Civil Case (Shalom Afula) 2666/90 Yosef Mahagna v. Zamir Joamis, Meir Ashash and the State of Israel, (Nevo, November 3, 1992); Civil Case (Shalom Jerusalem) 9202/06 Riki Kabesa v.  Avi Buchnik, (Nevo, March 4, 2009); Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv) 13100-05-13 Harel Elazar v.  State of Israel - Israel Police, (Nevo, August 29, 2017; Civil Case (Shalom J.M.) 8380/09 Morar v.  Barzilai and the Israel Police, (Nevo, September 27, 2015); Civil Case (Shalom J.M.) 28240-12-11 Yitzhak v.  State of Israel - Israel Police, (Nevo, January 22, 2017); Civil Case (Shalom Jerusalem) 8545/09 Bilal Hassan v.  Israel Police et al., (Nevo, April 29, 2014); Civil Appeal (Shalom Chai) 53422-05-13 S.  v.  State of Israel, (Nevo September 11, 2017); Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 3252-11-15 Zhao Bimru v.  Department for the Investigation of Police (Nevo 20 February 2019)].
37. It is true that contradictory rulings were also given, but these were isolated cases [see: Civil Case (Shalom Jerusalem) 4515/06 Abu Amal v. Gaiman and the State of Israel, (Nevo, April 23, 2009); Civil Case (Shalom J.M.) 5451/05 Kordia v. Yifrach and the State of Israel, (Nevo, July 15, 2007)] However, in light of all the reasons I mentioned above, my opinion is different.
38. Even for policy considerations, it is appropriate that vicarious responsibility be imposed on the police in the case at hand. Determining the responsibility of the police in a case such as this serves the principle of dispersing the damage. Moreover, the police have full authority and control over its employees and their work, which also justifies imposing liability on the employer for the actions of its employees that advance its interests and serve its interests.  Not to mention the deterrent factor.  An employer that is held responsible for the actions of its employees will behave in a manner that will ensure the proper behavior and conduct of its employees.  He will pay special attention to the way his employees are recruited, pay attention to and adhere to safety rules, and guide his employees appropriately and at an appropriate frequency.  It is also justified for reasons of social convenience to impose responsibility on the police for the act of the attacking policeman in such a case (see Herman, pp.  209-213).
39. Direct responsibility of the police: The only witness on behalf of the defendant (and despite the fact that at the time of the incident in question he served as the head of the Hebron District Detective Intelligence Bureau and despite the fact that he is currently a Special Operations Officer in the Israel Police) did not know how to provide any information regarding the work procedures given to the police officers and the third party, the manner and frequency with which the instructions and procedures were communicated; the measures taken by the police to verify and ensure compliance with the instructions and instructions regarding the conduct and conduct of the police officers when they come into contact with the civilian population; and in order to implement the provisions regarding the use of unreasonable force. Failure to provide evidence in this matter is the duty of the police. The state made do with submitting a short, laconic and highly abstract affidavit, without providing data or documents or records of the measures it took to reduce the incidence of violence in general and to prevent the attack in question.  The lack of evidence, which by its nature is exclusively in the hands of the police, works to its detriment [for the purposes of illustration and without exhaustion, see: Civil Appeal 548/78 Anonymous v.  Anonymous, [published in Nevo] (May 15, 1980)].  However, since the third party claims that it received training from the police, underwent training and has no claim against the police, there is no need to continue the discussion of the question of the direct responsibility of the police.  To be precise, in the summaries on behalf of the third party, it was claimed that "the police and the state acted properly, as a reasonable state should have behaved, when a police officer committed an action that should not be done...  This is a policeman who made a mistake on a personal level, lost his temper in a moment of weakness."

Responsibility of the Ministry of Interior:

40. In light of the conclusion I reached above, it is unnecessary to discuss the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. I will only briefly note that the examination of the question of liability on this level (i.e., the imposition of tort liability for governmental activity, or more precisely, for the alleged failures in the exercise of the powers of the Ministry of the Interior) is more complex, and as a rule, the court will not rush to impose tort liability on the public authority for these omissions (on the policy considerations for imposing tortious liability on the public authority, see: Herman, pp. 264-278).  From a review of the plaintiff's claims, the evidence that was brought and the summaries of his arguments, it can be seen that the plaintiff did not prove his claims on this level and even abandoned them.  Thus, it is unnecessary to continue discussing the question of the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior.

Third Party Responsibility:

41. As for the third party's obligation to indemnify the police, and although there are rare cases in which an employer returns with an indemnification claim against the employee who committed a tort, it is clear that the case at hand applies to those rare cases. For there is no dispute that his act was intentional and that the third party was convicted of the offense of assault (see: Herman, at p. 208).
42. Moreover, the agreement with the plaintiff, which dismissed the third party and prevented the filing of a lawsuit against him, was concluded after the damage occurred. Therefore, this agreement does not prevent the additional wrongdoer, the Israel Police, from filing a claim for participation against the other wrongdoer, the third party (see: Herman, pp. 203-204).
43. The direct tort liability of the third party to the plaintiff cannot be disputed. The third party itself did not deny this, either. Therefore, the third party is obligated to indemnify the police.

Liability of the wrongdoers towards the plaintiff:

44. It is inconceivable for anyone to dispute that the damage caused to the plaintiff by the two wrongdoers is one damage and cannot be separated. The police were found to be vicarious responsible for the act of the third party. Thus, it is clear that the damage caused by the attack is one damage and cannot be separated.  In light of the aforesaid, it is clear that the police will bear the full damage against the plaintiff, since its charge and the charge of the additional tortfeasor in such a case are liabilities together and separately.

Division of responsibility among wrongdoers:

45. The degree of participation of each tortfeasor is determined mainly by the guilt test and less by the causation test. In other words, the question is the degree of guilt that lies at the door of each wrongdoer, and not to what extent each one caused the event of damage (see: Herman, p. 205).  "The degree of participation is determined according to the test of moral guilt (Gad Tedeschi (ed.) The Law of Torts - General Torts 508 (Second Edition, 1976)).  According to section 84(b) of the Torts Ordinance, the court is authorized to "order that a person's participation shall be for the purpose of full indemnification." [See: Civil Appeal 2579/11 Bank Hapoalim in Tax Appeal v.  Solkor Marketing and Shopping Company Ltd., (Nevo 29.06.2014) (hereinafter: Bank Hapoalim Case)].
46. In this case, the police were found responsible for the damage in light of its purely vicarious responsibility for the act of assault caused by the third party. Even if I assume that there is some negligence directly on the part of the police, it is clear that in our case there can be no dispute that the deliberate actions of the policeman far exceed the negligence attributed to the police. Moreover, the attacking policeman did not raise any defense claim against the police on this level.  On the contrary.  The third party assumed full responsibility for the damage, as detailed above.
47. Therefore, it seems that the notice against the third party should be accepted in full.

The Question of Damage:

48. The plaintiff claimed that as a result of the assault he was left with a mental disability of 50%, in accordance with the opinion of Dr. Isabella Greenberg on his behalf. On behalf of the defendant, the opinion of Dr.  Yael Dembinsky was submitted, which estimated that the plaintiff's mental disability was 20%, of which she attributed 13% to the accident and 7% to the plaintiff's past.
49. In light of the discrepancies between the opinions, the court appointed Dr. Ayala Sheinkman (hereinafter: the expert), who found that the plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder after the assault incident. The expert was not impressed by any mental health problems prior to the incident.  It also found that the mental disorders and behaviors described during the plaintiff's life are the result of an undiagnosed and untreated post-traumatic stress disorder.  With regard to the rate of disability, the expert recommended permanent disability at a rate of 20%, in accordance with section 34(b)(3) of the addendum to the National Insurance Regulations (Determination of the Degree of Disability for Work Accident Victims), 5716-1956 (hereinafter: the Addendum to the Regulations).
50. The experts on behalf of the parties were not questioned about their opinions. The expert, Dr. Sheinkman, was also not questioned about her opinion.  The parties also failed to convince me that there was justification for deviating from the expert opinion on behalf of the court.
51. On behalf of the plaintiff, his ex-wife, Mrs. F. As it appears from her testimony, she knew the plaintiff about seven years after the incident that is the subject of the lawsuit. Thus, it is clear that the purpose of her testimony is to support the plaintiff's claims on the level of damage only.  The couple divorced in July 2022.  In her affidavit of her main testimony (Exhibit A/1), the witness recounted a number of incidents that took place in front of her eyes, following which she saw severe reactions on the part of the plaintiff, for example: entering an acute anxiety attack; inability to have a matter-of-fact and calm conversation; anxious reactions to any situation; being frightened by slight noises outside the house; getting under extreme pressures easily; if entering a restaurant, he would demand to sit next to the wall so that he could look out over the entire space from there.  when the wall serves as a kind of security and neutralizes unexpected phenomena at least from the direction of the wall; Even on the few bus trips, the plaintiff would drag her to the back seat for security reasons.  The witness also spoke about the plaintiff's refusal to be near a crowd or in crowded places.  When she asked the reason for such abstinence, the plaintiff would tell her that his presence in crowds or crowded places put him in anxieties and pressures.  Moreover, the witness stated that the plaintiff would get stressed and anxious just by seeing the flashing light of a police car or security forces, which would raise his pulse and breathing rate, and he would not calm down until he sat down to rest and relax on the side, and sometimes he would even smoke a few cigarettes until he calmed down after the patrol car or the security vehicle moved away.  There were cases in which the witness was even forced to call an ambulance to treat the plaintiff.  The witness went on to describe the plaintiff's screams in his dreams and statements "Enough, enough, enough" and how the plaintiff would not calm down hours after waking up from his horrific dreams; about his suspicious attitude toward strangers; feelings of humiliation and frustration; the difficulties of communicating with her and her children; about the anti-anxiety medication he took; About his work at Sela Infrastructures A.H.  Ltd., the termination of his employment there, and more.
52. I must note that Ms. A.P.'s testimony left a very reliable and reliable impression on me. Moreover, her testimony was not contradicted at all. Moreover, most of the phenomena described by the witness appear in the opinion of Dr.  Sheinkman and even in the opinion of Dr.  Dembinsky, the expert on behalf of the defendants.
53. The witness Erez Shalom Avichai (see: Exhibit A/2) stated that he is the founder, owner and CEO of Sela Infrastructures A.H. In a tax appeal (hereinafter: the company) engaged in electrical work and the installation of solar systems, and that he accepted the plaintiff to work for the company in 2019 (in May 2019).  Initially, the plaintiff carried out the installation of solar systems and his average monthly salary was ILS 7,450 gross.  When the witness saw that the plaintiff was a "good and responsible guy", he promoted him to the position of head of a team of solar system installers, and his salary increased, and in 2020 the salary even reached ILS 13,000.  However, in February 2021, the plaintiff informed him that he could not cope with the pressures and workload, due to a personal reason that he did not wish to elaborate.  Therefore, the plaintiff resigned in March 2021.
54. A review of the pay slips that were attached to the witness's affidavit as well as to the plaintiff's affidavit shows that in just one month, the plaintiff's salary amounted to approximately ILS 13,000. The rest of the coupons ranged from ILS 6,400 to ILS 12,650.  As for the period that has elapsed since the incident or from the age of 18 until April 2019, there is no information about the plaintiff's occupations.  From a single paycheck that showed a salary slightly higher than the average wage in the economy, it is not possible to establish a factual finding that justifies a deviation from the presumption of wages for minors.  Therefore, I determine that in the plaintiff's case, the salary that will serve as the basis for calculating his future wage losses is the average wage in the economy.
55. The defendant and the third party questioned the two additional witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff. They also interrogated the plaintiff in a lengthy cross-examination.  I should note that neither the defendant nor the third party succeeded in contradicting the prosecution's testimonies with regard to the circumstances of the assault, the plaintiff's injury and the permanent disability recommended by the court's expert.
56. On the basis of the opinion of the expert on behalf of the court and on the basis of the prosecution's testimonies, the following findings can be summarized and determined:

• The plaintiff's permanent mental disability is at the rate of 20%; in this context, it goes without saying that in accordance with rule 5, the Court of Appeals, as a rule, will tend not to intervene in determinations in the field of professional knowledge and experience of the experts appointed on its behalf, except in exceptional cases [see: Civil Appeal Authority 7863/17 Anonymous v. HaPaul Insurance Company Ltd., (Nevo, December 17, 2017)].  Our case is not one of the exceptional cases.
• The functional disability and the impairment of the claimant's earning capacity are equal to the extent of his medical disability. If we examine the regulation by virtue of which the medical disability was determined, it can be seen that this disability, by its nature and essence, is fully functional.

Thus states Regulation 34(b)(3) of the addendum: "In disorders of periodic anxiety (phobia); Other anxiety disorders; obsessive-compulsive disorder (obsessive-compulsive disorder); reaction to unusual stress; Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); adjustment disorders of all kinds; dissociative disorders; somatoform disorders; eating disorders; anorexia nervosa; marbosa and unclassified eating disorders, the percentage of disability will be determined as follows: