......
Therefore, I order the deletion of the causes of action dealing with the circumstances of termination of employment and the remedies sought for them – compensation for loss of earnings and loss of pension payments; non-pecuniary compensation by virtue of the Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law and the claim for compensation for pain and suffering from the amended letter of claim, due to lack of substantive authority."
With regard to the claim against respondent 5, who is the appellant's direct commander, it was held as follows:
"Similarly, the statement of claim, including the draft amended statement of claim, does not disclose a cause of action against defendant 5, whose actions against the plaintiff were carried out by virtue of its position and within the framework of its powers. Subject to the existence of substantive jurisdiction to hear the causes of action, as will be detailed below, to the extent that it is proven that the defendants acted unlawfully against the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be able to be reimbursed by the state."
The appeal before us is directed against this decision.
(c) The parties' arguments
- The appellant argued in his appeal that there was no reason to dismiss his claim since he was not fired, but preferred to resign due to his health condition, and the cause of action was a violation of the Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law, which grants the Labor Court unique authority to hear such claims. He claimed that he was pressured to remove the restrictions set by the police doctor, and when he did not do so, he was removed from the service unit (Iron station) to another unit (Baqa Al-Gharbia station). The appellant reiterated that he was not appealing his dismissal, but rather the harm he experienced as an employee with a disability, and the discrimination he experienced as a result of his limitation. The appellant further argued that the tribunal is authorized to hear the claim in gerra by virtue of its authority under section 76 of the Courts Law, 5744-1984. With regard to respondent 5, the appellant argued that the tribunal erred in leaving the claim against the station commander in part, but dismissing the claim against her, since she was his direct commander.
- The state argued that the Regional Labor Court was correct in determining that most of the grounds in the statement of claim deal with issues that are not within the jurisdiction of the Labor Court in light of section 93A of the Police Ordinance. The State further argued – without admitting the appellant's arguments – that the appellant tried to divert the focus in the appeal to the issue of his placement or the failure to find an alternative position, but in any case these matters also fall within the scope of section 93A of the Ordinance. According to the state, "all of the appellant's claims regarding the alleged harassment, his placement and termination of employment are not within the substantive jurisdiction of the Labor Court by virtue of section 93A of the Police Ordinance..." (Section 28 of the summaries). As to the dismissal of the claim against respondent 5, the State argued that in the statement of claim the appellant does not mention a single statement of it that constitutes defamation. Therefore, it was argued that the basic condition with respect to wrongdoing before the Prohibition of Defamation Law is not met. It was further argued that the appellant does not explain why respondent 5 should be regarded as a joint tort and why section 13(9) of the Prohibition of Defamation Law does not apply to these matters , since respondent 5's actions towards the appellant were done by virtue of her position.
- In the summaries of the reply, the appellant claimed that the state had misled the court and provided contradictory answers while concealing material data. He reiterated his claim that his cause of action stemmed from the Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law in view of the harm to his employment conditions, and not his dismissal. He further argued that the court had acquired jurisdiction to hear the case when the question was required for the purpose of deciding questions directly related to his claim. As for respondent No. 5, he reiterated his argument that she should be left as a defendant by virtue of the doctrine of jointly wrongdoers in section 11 of the Torts Ordinance.
- On May 14, 2019, the first hearing of the appeal was held, and after hearing the arguments of the parties, it was decided that the parties would consider seeking mediation. It was further determined that "to the extent that there is no mediation agreement that the parties will notify the court, the state will submit a supplementary argument with regard to the question of substantive jurisdiction to hear a claim of the type that the appellant filed, including with reference to the question of the split between the courts in accordance with the questions that arose in the hearing." When the mediation attempt was unsuccessful, the parties' responses on the aforementioned issue were submitted, and on February 4, 2020, an additional hearing was held on the appeal.
- On February 12, 2020, the judgment was handed down by the Authority of Civil Appeal 7709/19 State of Israel - Israel Police v. Moti Yakubov [published in Nevo] (hereinafter: the Yakubov case)). The state filed a notice regarding the issuance of the judgment, which, according to it, deals with similar issues. The appellant argued in response that the said judgment deals only with the Police Ordinance, and does not relate at all to the special jurisdiction of the Labor Court by virtue of the Equality Law. The appellant does not argue against his dismissal, and this is not the core of his arguments. The judgment deals with remedies under the Police Ordinance, and does not affect the appellant's claims under the Equality Law.
(d) Discussion and Decision
- From the combination of the provision of section 93A of the Police Ordinance, section 24 of the Labor Court Law, and detail 37(1) of the Administrative Affairs Court Law, the wording of which was cited above, it emerges that the examination of the authority of the Labor Court to address a cause of action filed by a police officer must be conducted in a two-stage manner:
(a) First, it is necessary to examine whether the claim falls within the scope of the Labor Court's substantive jurisdiction under section 24 of the Labor Court Law, while in the context of the jurisdiction by virtue of section 24(a)(1), the three-stage test that we discussed above and detached from section 93A of the Ordinance must be applied.