According to her, a distinction must be made between section 3 of the Arbitration Law, which relates to arbitration set out in the agreement ("contractual arbitration"), and section 10 of the Sports Law, which is a specific clause that establishes a mechanism for statutory arbitration. Therefore, according to its position, the prohibition on adjudicating cogent rights cannot be derived from section 3 of the Arbitration Law.
As part of the examination of the proper interpretation of the provision of Section 10 of the Sports Law, which relates to "wages and payments to athletes..." The Attorney General is of the opinion that from a linguistic point of view, the clause can be interpreted in two ways - on the one hand, as a provision that allows the internal institutions to discuss cogent rights, and on the other hand, as a provision relating to payment for service (as opposed to wages). According to her, the second option is correct. Objectively, according to the Attorney General's position, since at the time of the enactment of the Sports Law, the soccer players were not yet recognized as employees, it is incorrect to attribute to the legislature an intention to give the internal institutions the authority to discuss cogent rights.
It was also stated that a distinction must be made between the broad interpretation given to the authority of the internal judicial institutions in the Supreme Court's rulings in all matters relating to contractual disputes; and the concrete issue of protective rights - which according to the law are not arbitrable. According to its position, the balance that it made in the case law is that "when it comes to cogent rights, the expertise of the institution of ignorance withdraws from the expertise of the court, even when it comes to statutory arbitration by virtue of the Sports Law" is a proper balance. With regard to the issue of "splitting" the claims, the Attorney General is of the opinion that in cases where there are "mixed" issues - some that derive from cogent rights and those that are not - the rule of "the matter follows the main thing" can be applied, and thus prevent the splitting of the hearing.
- The parties submitted their responses to the Attorney General's position to the Tribunal and reiterated the arguments they raised in the course of the hearing held on September 29, 2022 - as follows:
Mr. Babiev and Mr. Ben-Shushan adopted the position of the Attorney General, including her position with respect to the Machnes judgment [High Court of Justice 176/90 Gad Machnes v. Minister of Labor and Welfare, IsrSC 47(5) 711 (hereinafter: the "Machnes Judgment")], according to which the Sports Law did not seek to exclude players or athletes from the protections of the protective laws. Their counsel reiterated the arguments raised in the hearing on June 23, 2021 regarding the issue of the statute of limitations and the failure to subject the arbitrators to substantive law. According to him, in the absence of supervision of the bylaws, the association and the administration have a great deal of power and a common interest that does not include the best interests of the players.